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In the last decades, in the wake of increasing attention to technology transfer, 
Europe followed the American lead paying more and more attention to university-
industry links. Debates on technology transfer are on-going in academic journals 
and conferences. National and European policies are also increasingly attentive 
towards the necessity of transferring technology. Research centers as well as 
university are developing their own policies on technology transfer. However, for 
technology to be successfully transferred, the single researchers must be an active 
part of the process. 
 It is in this light that this work wants to explore whether researchers show an 
entrepreneurial behaviour either at the personal and/or at the organization level 
and what are the factors related to such behaviour. A researcher is here defined as 
having an “entrepreneurial behaviour” not exclusively by creating his own firm, 
but also by being active towards technology transfer and partnership with industry 
in many different ways. The focal point is what might move the researcher to 
become involved in technology transfer at large, and not what practical actions he 
undertakes nor what the results of his actions are.  
 
Time and resources constraints were essential in bounding the empirical part of 
the research to only one research centre, where ideally the whole set of European 
research centers might have been subject to the study. From here the choice of 
CERN, the biggest international research center in Europe, but the technology 
transfer (TT) capabilities of which are not unique to it. Hence, the theoretical 
framework developed in this study may be used for successive studies in 
analogous research institutions, allowing for a generalization of the methodology 
developed and for comparison of results.  
Thus, the contribution this work wishes to give is a better understanding of the 
understudied individual level within a public research centre. In fact, if the 
organization’s TT policy is matched by an increasing interest of the researchers 
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towards entrepreneurial activities, it is possible to highlight some of the factors 
that induced this interest to grow. Whereas, if the organization’s policy is not 
matched by any significant change, it is possible to indicate which factors and 
incentives do not seem to bear responses at the level of the individual researcher 
and to react accordingly.  
 
The research questions this study wants to answer to are: 
- Do the researchers show an interest towards an entrepreneurial behaviour 
either at the individual level or at the organization level?  
- Do they see scientific research and entrepreneurialism as essentially 
complementary or substitutive activities? 
- Are there incentives that (can) play a role in encouraging CERN 
researchers to become (more) entrepreneurial and thus engage in 
technology transfer activities? 
 
Chapter 1 presents an analysis of the literature that forms the natural background 
for this study. Most of the times, in technology transfer analyses, research centers 
are treated together with, and with no distinction from, universities; and the 
individual researcher’s role is often neglected to concentrate on the institutional 
level.  However, some authors notice that scientists may participate to TT, 
because of the prospect of financial gains, for both themselves and their research 
group (e.g. Trune and Goslin 1998; Mejia 1998). On the other side, the idea that 
TT  and scientists’ entrepreneurialism, as ways to create additional funds, are 
motivated by shrinking budgets alone has found some opposition, justified by the 
fact that income from TT to industry is very modest compared to governmental 
funds (Mowery and Rosenberg 1989). 
An interesting proposition is that researchers’ support of entrepreneurial activities 
can partly be explained by a restructuring of the evaluative norms for scientific 
performance (Etzkowitz 1998, 2001; Lee 1996). This shift in evaluative norms 
allows individual scientists to aim at two goals simultaneously: scientific 
excellence and profit making.  
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Other background literature comes from the sociology of science: from the 
analysis of the reward system based upon reputation effects (Merton 1968)  to 
recent studies where knowledge is identified as commodity upon which to 
capitalize, (Etzkowitz 1998); and from De Solla Price’s (1963) pioneering work 
on the concept of ‘network’ to recent works on the ‘networks dynamics’ (e.g. 
Callon 1994; Gibbons et al. 1994; Ziman 1994; David et al. 1997). From the 
economics of science comes the classical concept of scientific knowledge as a 
public good (Nelson 1959; Arrow 1962);  from the new economics of science, 
comes the focus on research networks and on the choice between disclosure and 
secrecy (Dasgupta and David 1994, 1987). From the science policy literature 
comes the post-World War II rationale, as expressed by Bush (1945), that 
governments should “pour” money into research because of the infallibility of the 
linear model; as well as more complex models of the interactions between basic 
research, applied research, society and the market, emphasizing feedbacks among 
the different actors and activities (Geuna et al. 2003).  
 
Chapter 2 is dedicated to the presentation of CERN and its technology transfer 
policy and infrastructure. Literature about the organization is briefly considered, 
mainly from the historical perspective (Pestre and Krige 1988), but also from the 
economical point of some authors, who have interpreted TT from CERN mainly 
in terms of its frontier-technology needs, which require industry to develop new 
technologies to satisfy CERN’s requirements (Hameri and Vuola 1996; Hameri 
1996).  
Documents however are mainly to be found at CERN, especially the reports 
focusing on its technology transfer policy. This policy concentrates on patents, 
licenses, copyrights, etc., but it also highlights the importance to support staff to 
be pro-active about commercial exploitation of research results. Within the 
organization, technology transfer is recognized to happen though different means: 
people, purchasing, collaboration agreements with industry (Barbalat 1997), R&D 
special projects (CERN 2000), IPRs, consultancy and services,  start-ups and spin-
offs (CERN 1999, 2002b, 2003, 2006g). 
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Chapter 3 is composed of two parts, the theoretical framework and the research 
procedures. 
The first part is itself divided into two sections, the first of which proposes some 
organizational concepts that should be considered when analyzing a basic research 
center. A European research center organization is constrained by a series of 
factors: its constituting mission as set in its founding constitution; fixed funds 
coming from member countries; the accountability to European research policy; 
the public accountability; and the researchers’ goals and objectives. It will be 
proposed that a European research center such as CERN should remain a 
knowledge seeker organization, where, mediated by public and EU accountability, 
technology transfer is a complementary activity, which has to be mediated by the 
eventual entrepreneurialism of the researchers. It will also be proposed that the 
technology transfer policy actually in place at public research centers in Europe 
allow for a reading of the TT process as a peculiar form of the classical 
sharecropping process in agriculture. In fact, the sharecropping arrangement 
allows for both the landlord and the worker to gain from the outcome (although 
the worker usually also receives a fix wage) by sharing risks and allowing for 
incentives for the worker (Stiglitz 1974). Both the organizational model of a 
knowledge-seeker institution and that of sharecropping give relevance to the 
figure of the researcher. In both of them, the researcher is an active part in what 
happens both in the institution and in the TT process. 
A theoretical framework will then be proposed to explain what factors can be 
expected to influence entrepreneurial behaviour (EB) of the researchers. Whereas 
the two factors identified as ‘Recognition by peers’ and ‘Networks’ represent a 
connection between the individual researcher and the community in which s/he is 
embedded, the factors identified as ‘Prior knowledge’, ‘Field of research’ and 
‘Personal character’ represent the more characteristic aspects of each person as an 
individual. Finally, the ‘Incentives’ factor wants to identify a connection between 
the researcher and the specific organization into which s/he works and to which 
s/he is under contract. 
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The second part of chapter 3 is a presentation of the methods and procedures 
adopted for this study and a description of the main characteristics of the receivers 
of the questionnaire take the final section of the chapter. 
 
Chapter 4 presents the results of the statistical analysis conducted on the responses 
to the questionnaire. The theoretical framework supposed a linear correlation 
between the identified factors influencing entrepreneurial behaviour and the 
expression of interest and attitudes towards EB by the single researcher both at the 
level of CERN and at the level of the researcher him/herself.  
Hypotheses were confirmed, both at the individual level and at the organization 
level, that the desired entrepreneurial behaviour is correlated to general networks, 
general incentives, to prior experience in consulting and to applied research as 
main field of activity. Such correlations could not be confirmed in the case of 
recognition by peers, of CERN networks and of CERN incentives.  
While aware of a technology transfer policy and infrastructure, researchers claim 
there were no significant changes in their relationships with industry, although the 
existence of financial incentives would push them to engage in TT-related 
activities. High shares of respondents also agree that the Lab should 
commercialize its research and/or technologies, set up incubators and mostly 
encourage its staff to provide consulting services to the industrial sector. Finally, 
academic career was recognized as the most attractive, followed by corporate, 
public sector and entrepreneurial career. 
 
From the results obtained it is possible to draw some interpretations that are 
presented in Chapter 5. The starting point is that researchers do show to be 
interested in entrepreneurial behaviour both at the individual and at the 
organizational level. Although different factors influence in different ways such 
interest towards collaboration with industry, the fact that CERN specific factors, 
such as CERN incentives and CERN networks, do not show significant 
correlations, allows to inductively form interpretations abstracted from the 
Laboratory itself.  
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A proposition is made that it could be the case to start thinking of research 
organizations as “entrepreneurial organizations”, much in the same way as 
Etzkowitz suggestion of “entrepreneurial university” (Etzkowitz 2001). At the 
same time, a partial revival of the linear model might be considered for the 
specific case of basic research centers. At the intermediate level, some relations 
connecting outputs from research and TT activities with costs in terms of 
personnel costs are proposed, for the case of fixed-terms contracts. And as a 
consequence of the new contract scheme at the Lab in case of TT outcomes, an 
information asymmetry problem arises, which should be considered within the 
sharecropping arrangement. At the individual level, interpretations regarding the 
CERN specific population of researchers are made. 
 
To synthetize, the unit of analysis is the individual researcher; the time period 
concerned is that subsequent to the formal introduction of a technology transfer 
service; survey-based methodology is adopted; the institutional context is CERN; 
the broader context is that of technology transfer at non-university basic research 
institutes; the background literature is mainly, but not only, that of technology 
transfer; and the factors identified as correlated to entrepreneurial behaviour can 
be of use for further studies of similar institutions. 
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This chapter wants to give a panoramic view over the aspects of the literature that 
are at the base of the model that will be presented in the following chapters. For 
this reason, the following discussion is not, and does not want to be, an exhaustive 
and all-inclusive analysis of the literature. On the contrary, here the focus is on the 
main topics that should be mastered as a base for the research done in this thesis.  
The chapter is organized according to the following structure: 
- “The macro-level: knowledge governance” treats of the literature that 
deals with the entire system of knowledge governance, it looks in general 
at how knowledge is produced and used, without making distinctions 
about specific institutions and knowledge producers/users; 
- “The intermediate-level: institutions producing knowledge” treats 
specifically of how  research institutions producing knowledge deal with 
this knowledge, focusing on technology transfer; 
- “The micro-level: knowledge producers and users” presents the relevant 
literature concerning the people that produce knowledge (the scientists) 
and the people that use it for business goals (the entrepreneurs). 
Throughout the following analysis and the oncoming chapters it should be kept in 
mind that the knowledge discussed in the thesis is basic research. This is the 
research done to gain an understanding of the basic laws that govern the physical 
world around us in any field of knowledge (from astrophysics to computers, to 
medicine, to geology, etc.). This kind of research can be motivated by curiosity, 
by a need to better understand the basic laws in order to increase efficiency, or by 
any other reason. 
The core of this thesis focuses on basic knowledge produced by a public 
international institution. As a consequence, basic research produced by industry 
per se is kept into account and recognized as an important share of the overall 
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knowledge produced, but it is foreign to the focus of the thesis and insomuch it is 
only marginally discussed. 
 
 
1. The macro-level: knowledge system 
1.1 Knowledge as a public good 
In the “classical” economics of science, scientific knowledge – here interpreted 
mainly as basic research – is seen as a public good, because of its characteristics 
of non-excludability and non-rivalry, and therefore the problem of non-
appropriability (Nelson 1959; Arrow 1962). Non-excludability means that once 
the knowledge is available, others can not be stopped from using it, and non-
rivalry means that the use of knowledge by others does not detract from the 
knowledge of the producers. It follows that knowledge is subject to the problem of 
non-appropriability because the producer of the knowledge cannot appropriate (or 
better maximize) the profits deriving from the production of that knowledge. 
Moreover, scientific knowledge is a durable good, as it is not consumed by use, 
and its production is uncertain, as it is not generally possible to exactly predict 
results and their usefulness. From here, the “market failure” approach: the private 
sector is not interested in producing knowledge that it cannot appropriate enough. 
Scientific knowledge is then a public good, which the government must fund in 
order to overcome “the reluctance of firms to fund their own research to a socially 
optimal extent because of their inability to appropriate all the benefits” (Salter and 
Martin 2001, p.511). 
 
Connected to the relative positions of science and technology is a debate that has 
been going on for years in the economics of science: the debate of science and 
technology push vs. demand pull.  
The demand pull party affirms that in a great number of cases research was 
motivated by “the recognition of a costly problem to be solved or a potentially 
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profitable opportunity to be sized” (Schmookler 1966 cited in Bridgstock and 
Burch 1998). 
The science and technology push party says that science is produced irrespective 
of economic interests: scientists research what is intrinsically interesting (e.g. 
Price 1963). Once in a while a discovery is made that is useful to industry, which 
then uses applied research to turn it into a remunerative product or process.  
The science push position is basically that of the linear model of innovation, 
which derives by the seminal report “Science: the endless frontier” by Vannevar 
Bush. The post World War II rationale expressed by Bush (1945) maintained that 
governments should “pour” money into research because of the infallibility of the 
linear model.  
The linear model describes a process that leads from basic science to profits in 
three stages, as Abetti puts it (Abetti 2002): 
1) scientific research stage: give to the best scientists well-equipped laboratories 
and money and let them decide their own research, and then wait for their 
inevitable discoveries; 
2) technology and invention stage: finance creative inventors who will translate 
the scientific discoveries into technology, developing new products and processes; 
3) management stage: business managers insert the new products and processes in 
markets, creating profits that will be used to finance new research. 
More in detail, the linear model can be thought as a process that starts with basic 
research, continues in applied research, then applied research results are 
developed in innovations or in inventions, which are then adopted by firms and 
diffused on the market (Figure 1.1).  
 
Figure 1.1 – The linear model  
 
Source: Geuna (2001) 
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In the years, authors proposed different reasons for rejecting the linear model, as 
shown by the few examples that follow.1 
 There have been cases where technological breakthroughs were made first and 
the scientific base was understood afterwards (Bernal 1971 cited in Pavitt 2000). 
According to Abetti (Abetti 2002), the linear model failed because it did not take 
into account innovation (in contrast to invention) and entrepreneurs (in contrast to 
business managers). Other critics to the linear model are: a) the description of the 
evolution of scientific and technological knowledge is oversimplified; b) the 
depiction of basic and applied  science as two separated activities, with the former 
bearing no connections with the economy; c) new technological opportunities for 
producers are often the result of small incremental advances and not necessarily of 
research breakthroughs; d) current and future economic conditions influence the 
allocation of resources to the various research activities (David 1992).  
One of the consequences of the dismissal of the linear model is that it reduced the 
privilege attached to internalist agendas – why should what scientists think, be 
more highly valued than what users of scientific knowledge think is important. 
Bush answered this with his ‘Gresham’s law’ statement that the isolation of 
science prevented short-term orientation and opportunism from crowding out 
‘pure science’ (Steinmueller 1994). In a world where science is not an ivory tower 
anymore, this claim cannot be sustained. However – as shown by the case of 
CERN analyzed in this thesis –  high-energy (particle) physics is a discipline in 
which it can be hypothesized that problem domains have no current overlap with 
practical purposes, but the means for exploring these domains are very likely to 
have overlaps. Hence, there is no reverse causation from practical pursuits to the 
pursuit of string theory for example, but if there are specific tests of string theory 
hypotheses to be made, then the problems domains relevant for making tools for 
performing these tests are likely to overlap with practical problems domains2.  
                                                 
1 For a detailed critics to the linear model see (Kline and Rosenberg 1986). 
2 In fact, CERN develops for its research unique and most advanced technological facilities and 
equipments. These are a kind of applied research not restricted by cost or market requirements. 
Their adoption and diffusion on the market is possible and has happened through a) incremental 
changes in developing new products on their base; or b) innovation due to combination of different 
disciplines inputs; or c) creating revolutionary means for society at large (e.g. the Web). 
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A partial revival of the linear model, integrated by a reshaped reward system 
allowing scientists to get credit also for entrepreneurial activities, may then form a 
theoretical basis on which to conduct the research. 
 
 
1.2 Knowledge as a quasi-private good 
 
Time and research have proven that the linear model is not entirely apt to explain 
reality. As stated by Antonelli “The first major shift in the economics of 
knowledge takes place when the notion of knowledge as a public good is 
challenged and knowledge is regarded as a quasi-private good with higher levels 
of natural appropriability and exclusivity” (Antonelli 2005). 
 
A more complex model of the interactions between basic research, applied 
research, society and the market was developed; emphasizing feedbacks among 
the different actors and activities (Figure 1.2). As synthesized by Dasgupta and 
David: 
"It would seem that as we look to the future there is more and more reason to 
treat research, both scientific and technological, as one continuous process of 
iteration between phases of generalization and application" (Dasgupta and 
David 1987, p. 525). 
 
In parallel to the new understanding of the science and innovation interaction, 
many governments have taken a different approach on basic research, based on 
concentration and selectivity of research funds and a higher level of accountability 
and cost reduction. This change was due to some global factors: increasing 
competition, constraints on public expenditure, and the growing importance of 
scientific competencies (Martin 2001).3 
 
 
                                                 
3 “An alternative way of interpreting these changes is (the shift from Mode I to) the Mode II 
thesis” (Martin 2001, p. 6). 
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Figure 1.2 - The circular model 
 
Source: Geuna (2001) 
 
In contrast to the view of scientific knowledge as “on the shelf, costly available to 
all comers” (Rosenberg 1990, p.165), the evolutionary approach suggests that it is 
necessary to consider how much knowledge is embodied in the researcher. 
Therefore scientific knowledge is not completely a public good because only 
those who have the necessary background can understand it; and to acquire the 
necessary background, investments must be made (Callon 1994). 
As noted by Salter and Martin (Salter and Martin 2001), the evolutionary 
approach generated two lines of enquiry in the economics of science. One 
assumes that publicly funded research is still important in producing knowledge, 
here defined as information, given the different approach of private and public 
production of knowledge towards its dissemination: respectively secrecy vs. 
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disclosure approach (e.g. Dasgupta and David 1994). The other line of enquiry 
says that the information view does not fully describe knowledge, as part of the 
knowledge is embodied in people. Knowledge in part is tacit, as it cannot be 
transferred from one person to another by words (Pavitt 1991; Rosenberg 1990). 
In this second approach networks of researchers play an important role.4  
 
 
1.3 Knowledge as a collective process  
As explained by Antonelli: “The new approach is based upon the re-discovery 
through the 1990s of external knowledge as an essential intermediary input in the 
production process of new knowledge” (Antonelli 2005, p. 60). Basically, the 
production of new knowledge results from the interdependence (i.e. transaction 
and interaction) of many different agents, who are engaged in complementary 
research activities in the same geographic region and who are connected in 
network relations.5 
 
The “new growth economics” takes into account R&D spill-overs as a factor of 
economic growth (Griliches 1992; Romer 1994). This relationship between 
science and economic growth is mainly studied in three lines of enquiry: 1) 
relationship between published knowledge and growth; 2) innovations are 
analyzed to study the scientific antecedents of the innovation and the time lags 
involved; 3) relationship between innovative activity of firms and research 
activities of universities (and other firms) (Stephan 1996).  
All the three lines of enquiry find that spill-overs do exist, but while the former 
two focus on the time lag aspect, the third one is interested in the geographical 
aspect of spill-over effects. The rationale behind the third line of enquiry is that of 
tacit knowledge: the availability to the firm of close contacts with university 
                                                 
4 For a compendium on the Economics of Science with informative views on sociology and policy 
of science see (Stephan and Audretsch 2000). 
5 For a detailed and summarized explanation on the topic of knowledge as a collective process see 
(Antonelli 2005). Here we focus only on the two aspects relevant to this thesis: spill-overs and 
networks. 
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researchers and of a pool of trained personnel as some of the explaining factors 
for economic growth through localized R&D spill-overs (Zucker et al. 1998; 
Mansfield 1995). As shown by Cohen and Levinthal 1989, in-house R&D efforts 
are important because they allow the firm to create new knowledge, but also 
because it enhances their ‘absorptive capacity’, i.e. their capability to assimilate, 
understand and exploit external knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal 1989). 
Spill-overs are but a form of technology transfer in its broad definition and are 
valued by firms, universities and governments: 
“Firms also look to universities as a source of technology as well as trained 
personnel. Local and regional government also view local universities in a 
new light as a potential source of contribution to the economy through the 
formation of start-up firms” (Etzkowitz 1994, p. 11) 
 
1.3.1 Networks 
Connected to the concept of knowledge as a collective process, is the idea of 
networks. In the sociology of science, De Solla Price’s  pioneering work 
established the concept of ‘networks’, which he defined as “invisible colleges”, 
informal groupings of around 100 scientists (Price 1963). More recent works on 
the ‘networks dynamics’ (e.g. Callon 1994; Ziman 1994; Gibbons et al. 1994; 
David, Foray, and Steinmueller 1997) offer interesting insights on the process by 
which networks form, work and interact within the scientific community and the 
industrial one.  
While in the past knowledge was generated within a disciplinary, primarily 
cognitive, context (Mode I), nowadays there is a new method (Mode II) of 
producing knowledge, where knowledge is generated in “broader, trans-
disciplinary social and economic contexts” (Gibbons et al. 1994, p. 1). The 
importance of networks can be implicitly recognized in some of the attributes of 
knowledge production in Mode II: 1) knowledge produced in the context of 
application; 2) trans-disciplinarity; 3) heterogeneity and organizational diversity; 
4) social accountability and reflexivity; 5) quality control.6  
                                                 
6 For a brief critic to (Gibbons et al. 1994) see (Bridgstock 1998). 
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Many different forms of networks have been identified in the economic and 
sociological literature. Networks might be a collection of inter-institutional 
collaborative alliances or they might be a much wider range of linkages of varying 
levels of formality, between a large variety of different actors (Coombs et al. 
1996). Examples of networks can be: 1) collaborative agreements between 
institutions; 2) inter-organizational linkages of all kinds (not only by firms); 3) 
informal networks between individuals (where the exchange of tacit knowledge is 
an important component); 4) formal agreements involving legal contracts between 
organizations.7 
 
In the new economics of science, the importance of research networks for 
economic growth has been long emphasized (David, Foray, and Steinmueller 
1997). And, as Antonelli clearly summarizes: 
Within knowledge networks, localized technological knowledge can be 
understood as a collective activity characterized by the complementarity 
between heterogeneous and yet complementary items. Such 
complementarity takes place especially between external and internal 
knowledge and the stock of existing knowledge and the flows of new 
knowledge. (Antonelli 2005) 
In the same way, formal and informal networks are being recognized as an 
important feature of TT activities, both in academic literature and in policy 
(Nelson 1993; Chataway 1999).  As shown by a study presented in 1992, informal 
links are a very important channel for passing scientific and technological ideas 
and information to industry, and formal links such as licenses or collaboration 
agreements might be only the tip of the iceberg of all interactions taking place 
(Senker 1992). This study also shows an interesting aspect of the importance of 
networks in scientific research, here recognized by industrialists but easily 
applicable to researchers working in public or academic institutions:  
“informal contacts are also a channel for linking into other networks of 
academics, existing contacts unable to help with specific problems often 
provide the name of an appropriate person to approach” (Senker 1992, p. 2).  
Informal contacts between researchers and private companies potentially develop 
into formal contracts. For example, a study by Harmon et al. found that, in the 
                                                 
7 For an indication of selected literature on networks see (Coombs et al. 1996). 
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majority of cases analyzed, technology was not transferred through formal 
searches, but thanks to pre-existing informal relationships among individuals 
(Harmon et al. 1997). Similarly small companies and entrepreneurial companies 
that use faculty members as consultants already have personal informal links at 
least with the university, if not with the researcher (Shane 2002b). 
 
Networks have been shown able to introduce new theories and behaviors in 
research organizations, “altering the style and quality of research, the environment 
in which research was done, and even fundamental policies about the kinds of 
research to be supported” (Hoddeson 1980). In the same way, networks may also 
play a role in introducing and teaching entrepreneurial behaviour into research 
institutions, as hinted in the model proposed by this thesis. 
Finally, a recent Italian study showed that the concept of network can be invoked 
also to partly fill the gap of geographical and cognitive distance between 
academic and industrial research. The results presented are the first steps of a 
broader program “whose ultimate goal is – in the words of the authors – assessing 
the role of geographical and knowledge proximity in technology transfer not just 
on the basis of a few assumptions on the nature of knowledge exchanges, but as a 




2. The intermediate-level: institutions 
producing knowledge 
 
Institutions producing knowledge are here identified as Universities, research 
centers, companies, formal and established collaborations between public and 
private bodies, etc. It is clear that these institutions are more than the sum of their 
researchers, as they have internal policies and functioning methods that influence 
how research is conducted and eventually transferred. 
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Connected to the dismissal of the linear model in science policy, from the point of 
view of institutions, are the changing reward system in sociology of science and 
the importance of networks. This is the Triple Helix concept developed by 
Leydesdorff and Etzkowitz in 1996. They suggest that the modern knowledge-
based system of innovation can be seen as depending from three main spheres of 
influence: government, industry and university: 
We focus on the network overlay of communications and expectations that 
reshape the institutional arrangements among universities, industries, and 
governmental agencies (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 2000, p. 109). 
Academic research is now seen as one of the main actors in creating innovation in 
industry, as shown by the growing importance of joint public/private patents, 
incubators for start-ups, university spin-offs (Martin 2001), collaboration research 
contracts, consulting activities by faculty member allowed by the university, etc. 
 
2.1 Institutions producing knowledge 
As already said, knowledge production arises in different organizational 
structures: universities, public and private research centers, individual or 
corporate firms, etc. Given the focus of the thesis, organizations such as firms and 
private research centers will not be dealt with, as they have different rationales 
and different operating methods. On the contrary, universities and public research 
centers are directly comparable with European research centers, as they receive a 
consistent share of their funds from the government and as they traditionally 
where not directly concerned with a profit-making use in terms of money of the 
knowledge they produced. 
 
Lately a good part of the research community agrees that universities and research 
centers are facing increasing demands from the public and private sector in terms 
of provision of services, public accountability, etc (increasing demand of outputs). 
At the same time, they are receiving ever diminishing funds, which in turn make it 
hard to keep human resources (decreasing amount of inputs). These are the 
general reasons why some level of re-organization is required to knowledge 
providers. 
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As synthesized by Jacob and Hellstrom (2003) organizational drives can be 
divided in two categories: “relevance” and “structure”. By relevance they mean 
that “eligibility for funding (is becoming) dependent upon the ability of research 
group to demonstrate co-operation with, or the expression of interest by, specified 
user or stakeholder groups”, but also the “responsibility to see that knowledge 
reaches the public”. Whereas by structure they mean “the general category of 
problems that arise as universities try to accommodate the new demands within 
their organizational form”. 
These same authors (Jacob and Hellström 2003) apply some corporate 
organizational models to universities: the cellular organization, the “patching” 
organization and the boundaryless organization. The cellular university is 
organized in a federal structure where a cell might be a department or a research 
group; each cell is capable of semi-autonomously changing function and direction 
on its own and interacting with other cells.  
The boundaryless university should not try to eliminate all kinds of boundaries 
(i.e. vertical, horizontal and external boundaries, such as size, role clarity, 
specialization, control, etc.) but only remove the ones that don’t allow the 
university to deal with new demands, where the most important aspect is accede 
to who has the relevant information, instead of who is in charge.  
Finally, the patching university is one where resources are stitched and re-stitched 
when and where new opportunities arise. Critical aspects for the patching process 
are size of the research groups, modularity among them, speed and routine of the 
patching process. 
As they put it: 
“One may combine existing activities to create critical mass and cash flow 
(e.g. when departments temporarily join forces in larger project bids) or one 
may strategically exit existing businesses and re-stitch those resources into 
new areas” (Jacob and Hellström 2003, p. 58). 
 
Another approach to organizational structure of knowledge production centers is 
taken by Wilts (Wilts 2000). Actor-Centered Institutionalism (ACI) “concentrates 
its analysis on the intentional action of both individual and collective actors and 
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relates the outcomes of interaction to the institutional settings in which these 
actors pursue their particular goals and interests”. 
In the framework of ACI, Wilts proposes a categorization of research centers in: 
knowledge seekers, research contractors and service providers.  
 
Knowledge seeker organizations are characterized by a constitution and have 
fixed amounts of funds based on agreements, these aspects allow them to 
independently set their own research agenda, without being too much concerned 
by applicable knowledge; in this way, the researchers are allowed to pursue 
individual goals such as acquiring scientific reputation through publications. 
However, it could be argued that even if such organizations do not have “strong 
incentives to accommodate their internal decision-making procedures to direct 
external demands and expectations”(Wilts 2000, p.772), they might have 
incentives to accommodate indirect external expectations, such as research 
creating at least some form of byproduct that cam be transferred to the industry, 
therefore allowing technology transfer and public accountability.  
Research contractors are autonomous organizations, but their access to funds 
depends on successfully ‘selling’ their research results. Therefore, internal 
decision-making is informed by what is externally considered valuable research 
outcome, and individual researchers will have to orient their intellectual efforts 
towards organizational goals and priorities. 
Service provider organizations are so much influenced by gaining funds for the 
necessary action resources that “it may be difficult to recognize them as 
independent research facilities” (Wilts 2000, p. 772). Such is the case of in-house 
R&D divisions of public bodies, large enterprises, banks, etc. Here the individual 
researcher is almost discouraged to set his personal goals in a divergent direction 
from the organizational objectives. 
This theory, then, allows for an integration of the intermediate (=organizational) 
level and the micro (=individual) level. 
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2.2 Technology Transfer 
In order for research institutions to contribute to the economy, they must have in 
place some kind of technology transfer (TT) mechanism. In general, in TT 
analyses, research centers are treated together with, and with no distinction from, 
universities, as they both contribute to the creation of knowledge ‘freely’ available 
to the public. Moreover good part of the existing literature focuses mostly on 
universities and on the institutional level altogether, often neglecting the 
individual researcher’s role in TT.   
 
2.2.1 Technology Transfer definition 
Technology transfer is a widely used term, but it is seldom given a definition. A 
good exception is the linguistic definition given by Autio and Laamanen (Autio 
and Laamanen 1995).  
The word technology is composed of two Greek words: τεχνή (read: techné) and 
λόγος (read: logos). Autio and Laamanen define τεχνή as skill of hand or 
technique, and λόγος as knowledge or science. Τεχνή means art, and therefore 
ability or skill – thus the meaning is near enough to Autio and Laamanen 
interpretation – but λόγος means word or speech, and not knowledge or science. 
Already in ancient Greek existed the word τεχνολογία (read: technologhia), which 
meant systematic speech (or treatise) about an art or skill (Rocci 1987). Therefore 
the word technology does not exactly mean knowledge of skills, but a speech 
about skills, which can be extended to mean an explanation of skills, thus 
approaching the definition given by Autio and Laamanen.  
The word transfer is also composed of two words: the preposition trans means 
across a border and the verb fero (from the Greek verb φέρω, read phero) means 
to carry (Castiglioni and Mariotti 1987). Already in Latin existed the verb 
transfero meaning to carry something from one place to another (Castiglioni and 





Therefore, the term technology transfer means to carry the explanation of a skill 
from one place to another: 
Accordingly, technology transfer can be viewed as an active process, during 
which technology is carried across the border of two entities. These entities 
can be countries, companies or even individuals. (Autio and Laamanen 
1995) 
 
Under the heading of TT many different activities can be recollected: publication, 
education programs, technical consultancies, physical transfer of a tangible 
product of research with or without a view toward commercialization, as well as 
the transfer of property rights as the result of ownership of the intellectual 
property generated during the conduct of research (Bremer 1998).  
Some of these activities have been in place for centuries, in fact it has long been 
argued that technology transfer – at least in its broader definitions – is not a 
novelty in the university sector (Etzkowitz 1998; Lee 1996; Martin 2001).  
 
2.2.2 Approaches to Technology Transfer 
There are various academic approaches to technology transfer. The main 
distinction must be made between studies concentrating on technology transfer 
between countries (e.g. Robinson 1988; Mowery 1994) and studies concentrating 
on technology transfer between actors in the economy (e.g. Lundvall 1992). The 
first category – where technology is transferred from the more developed to the 
less developed country – was labeled as developing country oriented technology 
transfer research. The second category – where the focus is more on technological 
innovation and its effects when transferred – was labeled innovation-oriented 
technology transfer research (Autio and Laamanen 1995). 
Within the second category, there are three main approaches to technology 
transfer in the existing literature (Harmon et al. 1997). Their differences lie in the 
relation between inventors and industrial users, which can be either: non-existent 
(inventors and users function independently), existent and emphasized 
(importance of networks) or hybrid (the focus is on TT process with some 
outlooks on the relationships between inventors and users). 
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2.2.3 Technology Transfer tradition in the USA 
A good part of the TT literature focuses on the USA and sees the Bayh-Doyle Act 
in 1980 as a cornerstone in the evolution of technology transfer from universities 
(Mowery et al. 2001), with analyses comparing the situation before and after the 
Bayh-Doyle Act. 
Until 1963, the American government did not have a patent policy for its research 
centers; therefore each of them developed its ad hoc patent policy. In the same 
way, until then universities and researchers did not generally considered valuable 
holding a patent. In 1963, a Policy Statement concerning patents was issued, 
giving guidelines to federal agencies for the allocation of rights to inventions. In 
particular, the Government was trying to convince federal agencies to enter into 
Institutional Patent Agreements (IPAs) with the universities. This encouraged the 
private sector to enter in licensing agreements with universities that had IPAs 
(Bremer 1998). 
In 1980, the IPAs were replaced by the Patent and Trademark Law Amendments 
Act, more known as the Bayh-Dole Act. This Act gave American universities 
property rights to federally funded inventions (Shane 2002a). More in detail, it 
created a uniform patent policy among the many federal agencies that fund 
research, as it enables small businesses and non-profit organizations, including 
universities, to retain title materials and products they invent under federal 
funding (COGR 1996).  
An example of the importance attached by American universities to TT activities 
is the yearly publication by the Association of University Technology Managers 
(AUTM). The yearly publication is a Licensing Survey report on the number of 
products currently on the market due to AUTM member licensing activities. In the 
financial year 2000, over 5000 licenses generated Running Royalties, and around 
half of those products would not presently be available if not for AUTM member 
licensing activities (AUTM 2001). 
As a consequence of the Bayh-Doyle Act, the Stevenson-Wydler Act in 1986 
authorized Federal laboratories to transfer technology to industry (Lee 1996). In 
particular, the Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986 (FTTA), also known as 
Stevenson-Wydler Act made technology transfer a subsidiary mission of the 
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government-owned laboratories, thus  expanding the licensing opportunities for 
those laboratories (Etzkowitz 1994; Bremer 1998).  
In 1993, the Defense Authorization Act emphasized technology transfer from 
Defence laboratories (Frank 1993). In fact, previous legislation treated the 
services as separate agencies for technology transfer purposes, but this act 
implements some new responsibilities regarding defence conversion, of which 
technology transfer is seen as a part. 
 
2.2.4 Technology Transfer tradition in Europe 
In the wake of US attention to technology transfer, Europe followed the American 
lead in the last three decades, giving more and more attention to public research-
industry links.  
Europe’s history of countries collaborating in RTD programs is an old one, 
starting from the creation of CERN in 1952, passing through ESPRIT (European 
Strategic Program for Research and Information Technology) in 1983 and RACE 
(Research and development in Advanced Communications technologies in 
Europe) in 1985, to arrive to the Framework Programs (Sessano 2001).  
The real turning point for EU policy towards active collaboration and 
enhancement of links between public and private research was the ESPRIT 
program. It was established to keep pace with the USA and Japan in 
microelectronics and it was the model upon which the Framework Programs (FP) 
were shaped (Sharp 2001). The first FP (1984-1987) was conceived to strengthen 
strategic industrial areas by funding academic and industrial research actors in the 
strategic areas and stimulating the formation of research networks (Sessano 2001).  
Since the late 1980s the European Commission started to actively stress the 
importance of TT through its Strategic Programme for Innovation and Technology 
Transfer (SPRINT) in 1989 (Charles and Howells 1992), under which a series of 
16 trans-European investment fora was initiated. However, it was only since the 
fourth FP that technology transfer was explicitly stated as one of the objectives of 
the program (European Commission 1997), as it is one of the aims of the 
European Research Area, which the 6th FP tries to create. Finally, from the earliest 
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proposals of the 7th FP, it is clear that TT in the broadest sense will be actively 
supported: 
In order to strengthen the diffusion and use of the output of EU research, the 
dissemination of knowledge and transfer of results, including to policy 
makers, will be supported in all thematic areas (CORDIS 2005). 
 
At the single country level, UK, Germany and France have a long-standing 
tradition of involving potential users of research (i.e. industry) in public research 
advisory committees, whereas TT policy is a more recent phenomenon in 
countries such as Italy, Portugal and Spain (Senker et al. 1999).8 In any case, a 
discussion on the different TT policies of European countries would be out of 
topic here, as CERN is recognized the state of international organization, and 
therefore it is not subject to any single state policy, but to general EU policies9.  
 
2.2.5 Institutional incentives to entrepreneurial researchers at 
CERN and in other research centers 
 
In the TT literature reviewed until now, whenever the focus is entirely on public 
research centers, these are mainly analyzed as partners in research joint ventures 
(Leyden and Link 1999) or as sources of spin-off companies (Carayannis et al. 
1998; Steffensen et al. 2000). In the latter kind of analyses it is often pointed out 
the importance of the entrepreneurialism of researchers, and the importance of 
incentives from the mother-institution to enhance such entrepreneurialism 
(European Commission 2000). 
 
Within TT literature, few studies were dedicated to European basic research 
centers, although with no explicit focus on the individual researcher’s role in TT. 
One of these studies, commissioned by the European Commission and entitled 
                                                 
8 For a detailed analysis of differences in public sector research in the following European 
countries – Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, and the UK –  see (Senker et al. 1999). 
9 At any rate, regarding TT, CERN has a policy of equal opportunities towards Member States, and 
this creates an important peculiarity when compared to conventional TT process analyses.  
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“Getting More Innovation from Public Research”, concludes that more has to be 
done to improve and understand TT capabilities of large public research 
institutions, possibly through benchmarking methodologies and activities 
(European Commission 2000).  
 
An introductive survey was conducted by the author in 2003 while at CERN, in 
collaboration with Dr. Snoeys of CERN. We wanted to gather data on how were 
the incomes from licensing distributed among the institution and the inventor at 
other major research centers and/or universities. To this goal we decided to 
directly contact the TT (or corresponding competent) offices. Please note that for 
simplicity, researchers transferring technology through the office in place were 
called inventors, even when they might have acted as consultants or developers. 
 
Table 1.1 – Technology Transfer Income Redistribution at other European 
Institutes 
40% to the organization
25% to the inventor's group
30% to the inventor
5% to EMBL
33% to the organization (general fund)
33% to the inventor's group (department)
33% to the inventor
85-90% to the organization
10-15% to the inventor
bonus for invention 1250 E
if inventor's share < reference salary
50% to the organization
50% to the inventor
for part of inventor's share > reference salary
75% to the organization
25% to the inventor





60% to the organization
40% to the inventor
Weizmann Institute
Israel
inventor's share was a maximum of 5000 Euros over the
duration of the patent, it was under review.
Up to 50% for inventor (no more details given)








Commissariat à l'Energie Atomique
France
 
NB.: Instead of correct cost accounting some institutes subtract a significant percentage from the 
gross revenue to cover cost and to obtain the net licensing income. For those cases the percentages 
were calculated on gross income to avoid significant distortion. 
Source: Original work by D. Sessano and W. Snoeys 2003. 
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The main rationale for conducting the survey as a CERN survey was to obtain 
data that might be used by the TT office, in order to better understand what its 
situation was in comparison to institutions that were faced by similar issues.  
 
The results obtained are shown in the two tables Table 1.1 and Table 1.2 divided 
in European (and an Israelian) Research Centers and American Research Centers. 
 
Table 1.2 – Technology Transfer Income Redistribution at some American 
Institutes 
33% to inventor's faculty or school 
33% to the inventor's group (department)
33% to the inventor
28% to the organization (general fund)
28% to the inventor's group
28% to the inventor
15% toTT
Up to 100k US$: 20% to the inventor's department
20% to the inventor's research
40% to the inventor
20% toTT+overhead
Beyond 100k US$: 20% to the inventor's research
20% to the inventor
20% toTT+overhead
Rest some to department, but not
specified…
52% to the organization
15% to the inventor's site











NB.: Instead of correct cost accounting some institutes subtract a significant percentage from the 
gross revenue to cover cost and to obtain the net licensing income. For those cases the percentages 
were calculated on gross income to avoid significant distortion. 
Source: Original work by D. Sessano and W. Snoeys 2003. 
 
When the survey was done, CERN resulted to be coherent with the vast majority 
of fellow research centers and university. In fact, from the formalization of its TT 
policy, CERN used to divide TT net income from a project in the following way 
(CERN 1999): 
? 30% to the inventor 
? 25% to the inventor’s group  
? 45% to TT office to be reinvested. 
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In this way, incentives for TT activities were strong both at the individual 
researcher’s level and at the group level. At the same time, a significant 
percentage would remain at the TT group so that other projects might be 
undergone. 
 
However, in March 2005, the Finance Committee opted for a different method of 
redistributing TT incomes. TT revenue was defined as the sum of all 
remunerations coming from TT activities (lump sums, royalties, funds received 
for specific collaboration or partnership projects). Net TT revenue is given by the 
detraction to Gross TT revenue of: TT overheads, technical department costs 
(included the reward to the inventor) and material and manpower costs. TT net 
revenue would now be completely re-injected in the TT group, whereas to the 
researcher(s) responsible of the transferable technology will be remunerated, 
always at the discretion of the Director-General by:  
- an added step (or steps) in their career path,  
- and/or by an added remuneration called the “Responsibility Allowance” 
for the TT effort made (this is an extra-salary that is paid for the period of 
time for which the effort was made)  
- and/or by a special remuneration called “Premium for Exceptional 
Services” (this is a once-only bonus given to the individual researcher). 
 
This policy change is somewhat striking if compared to the results of the survey 
obtained in 2003. In fact, of all the organizations contacted only ESRF had a fixed 
sum of 5000 Euros as the only reward for the inventor, but it was told us that such 
policy was under review. No institution at all had a policy where it was entirely to 
the discretion of the Director-General to decide how the inventor should be 
remunerated of his TT activities and in what amount, on a case to case base. This 
awkwardness of CERN raises interesting points regarding the modelization of 




2.2.6 Concerns over Technology Transfer emphasis 
Before concluding the analysis of TT literature, it is important to notice that there 
also are authors concerned about a too strong emphasis on technology transfer 
from universities and public research centers. 
Although technology transfer policies have been a priority in the USA, authors are 
beginning to question their validity. Betz tried to identify the reasons for TT 
policies failure (Betz 1994):  
1) lack of focus - research must be fundamental but technologically focused 
and usable, so any basic research project needs to designed from the 
beginning with the industrial partner;  
2) incompleteness - research output must be applicable from the practical 
point of view - materials used, processes, etc.;  
3) lack of recipient and/or proper incentives - recipients and/or incentives to 
the user must be taken into account in the project planning and focus. 
 
Another of the main concerns is that too much attention on TT may “distract” 
academics from their original missions: education and research (Byckling et al. 
2000; Martin 2001). 
Focus on TT activities may create potentially dangerous consequences:  
1) a shift in academic research towards more promptly “sellable” research;  
2) an involvement of academic researchers in post-discovery activities (e.g. 
commercialization), instead than in new researches; and  
3) changes in the ways and channels by which academic research passes to 
the market (Feller 1990).  
This focus on short-tem research may allow capturing immediate economic 
returns, but may cause the unavailability of enough long-term funds to fund 
extensive basic research. Moreover, it can cause a shift in the norms governing 
academic research, giving to it a definition of knowledge as something that must 
produce gains, instead than something that should be pursued just to enhance 
human comprehension of our world. In the “new economics of science”, the 
relationship between science and technology must be one of equals:  
“Although the contributions of scientists and technologists in the search for 
knowledge may be perceived to be interdependent and even symbiotic, we 
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shall suggest that science as a social entity today is in danger of being 
undermined by the technological community's conception of knowledge as a 
form of productive capital” (Dasgupta and David 1987, p. 521). 
 
2.3 Sharecropping and Technology Transfer 
“In general terms, share contracting involves two or more individuals combining 
their privately owned resources for some mutually agreed productive purpose; the 
outputs being shared in mutually agreed proportions. While this is a universal 
feature of industrial enterprise in capitalist economies, it is also one of the most 
common contractual relationships in fishing enterprises and in non-capitalist 
farming economies” (Robertson 1980, p. 411). 
Sharecropping is a classical and ancient arrangement still used in agriculture 
where the owner of the land capital, the landlord, is not directly involved in 
manually productive activities on his own land, instead it is the worker (labour 
supplier) who manually works the land in order to produce an output; the output is 
then shared between the landlord and the worker.  
Debates on sharecropping have been ongoing from Adam Smith to nowadays. 
However, if classical economists – e.g. Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, Alfred 
Marshall, Karl Marx – agreed on condemning sharecropping focusing on the 
undersupply in the allocation of resources, modern economists started to study 
this arrangement from the point of view of its insurance properties (Braido 
2003)10. 
 
In his seminal paper, Sitglitz (Stiglitz 1974) showed that understanding 
sharecropping can enlighten the “complex phenomena of shareholding in modern 
corporations” (Stiglitz 1974, p.219), by focusing on risk sharing and incentives. 
Later on in the thesis, it is shown that the same concept can be used to explore the 
TT policy of CERN and that of a number of other research centers which have a 
similar policy. 
                                                 
10 For a good review of modern economics studies on sharecropping see (Braido 2003) and 
(Robertson 1980). 
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At this point, it might be useful to remember that the incentives theory states that 
economical subjects must be provided incentives to behave efficiently, even in 
presence of asymmetry of information, by setting contract terms rewarding them 
in case of good performance and penalizes them in case of unfair behaviour or 
adverse selection (Nicita 2005). 
In a series of elaborations of the model, introducing each time more variables, 
Stiglitz (1974) showed that – contrary to the then common view – sharecropping 
is an arrangement which is efficient in an economy where there is an asymmetry 
of information. In fact, under sharecropping the landlord is not able to perfectly 
measure the effort of the worker as the output is not only a function of a 
measurable input (e.g. hours of work), but also a function of effort (i.e. pace of 
work, thoroughness, efficiency, decision making and inventiveness) and of other 
variables which can not be forecast, as weather, disease, etc. (Stiglitz 1974). If 
information were perfect, the worker would receive a wage. But as information is 
not perfect, than the worker is given a share to provide him incentives to produce 
and the risks are shared between the landlord and the worker (Stiglitz 2000); 
whereas, in case of wage, the worker would have less incentives and bear no risks, 
giving rise to moral hazard problems11 and the landlord would have to monitor 
him. The contrary would be true in case of a rental contract, where the worker 
would have all the incentives but bear all the risks of fluctuations in output. 
As Stiglitz himself explains, the alternatives to sharecropping are the following: 
“Sharecropping represented a compromise between balancing concerns 
about risk sharing and incentives. The underlying information problem was 
that the input of the worker could not be observed, but only his output, 
which was not perfectly correlated with his input. The sharecropping 
contract could be thought of as a combination of a rental contract plus an 
insurance contract., in which the landlord “rebates” part of the rent if crops 
turn out badly. There is not full insurance (which would be equivalent to a 
wage contract) because such insurance would attenuate all incentives.” 
(Stiglitz 2002, p. 465) 
                                                 
11 We have a moral hazard problem when – after the contract – the actions of the agent (i.e. the 
worker, the one that has more information) are not entirely observable by the principal (i.e. the 
landlord, the one who has less information), by these same actions affect the utility of both the 
agent and the principal. The impossibility by the principal to observe the behaviour of the agent, 
allows the agent to act for his own goals to the detriment of the principal (Nicita 2005). Moreover, 
as in the case of sharecropping, the principal can only observe the output, which is only partly 
influenced by the actions of the agent. 
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In the theoretical chapter, it will be shown that is possible to use Stiglitz’s concept 
of sharecropping to explain the TT policy of CERN. In the parallel, CERN is the 
landlord, as it is CERN who owns the laboratory and the capital (=the field) to 
undertake the research; the researcher is the worker, who uses the assets owned by 
CERN to do his/her research; incentives are present for both CERN and the 
researcher to transfer the results of the research or the technologies used for the 




3. The micro-level: knowledge producers 
and users 
Single knowledge producers (= researchers) and knowledge users 
(=entrepreneurs) are also very important in analyzing the interactions between 
science and the economy. As a sum, in fact, they influence the overall picture (and 
particularly the institution in which they are inserted) with their own behaviors 
and beliefs. In the same way, the incentives they have will affect what they do and 
how. And the same is true for both researchers and entrepreneurs.  
 
3.1 Knowledge producers: the researchers 
3.1.1 The reward system 
In the sociology of science, Merton (Merton 1957) seminal work explains that the 
normative system is constructed around the concept of advancing knowledge. In 
fact, the scientist’s role is to advance the existing knowledge and his fulfillment is 
to do it in the best possible way. As, knowledge advances through originality, the 
scientist that made original contributions to the stock of knowledge is the scientist 
that will gain the recognition and esteem of his colleagues. In this way, the self-
interest of the scientist (gain esteem and establish his position) and the moral 
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obligation (advance the existing knowledge) come together to form science 
normative system. It comes by itself, that the claim of priority is fundamental in 
establishing the originality of the scientist’s contribution.  
In Mertonian terms, the reward system in science is based on the importance of 
the scientist’s contribution to knowledge (Merton 1957). Rewards can be 
honorific – eponymy, awards and membership in honorary academies – and 
material – advancement in university hierarchy, and increase in remuneration. 
One limit of such a reward system is the Matthew effect, which states that higher 
level of recognition is given to those with past successes: 
“The Matthew effect consists in the accruing of greater increments of 
recognition for particular scientific contributions to scientists of considerable 
repute and the withholding of such recognition from scientists who have not 
yet made their mark”. (Merton 1968, p. 58) 
 
Much earlier Lotka had already noted that publication counts were skewed as a 
small number of people made the majority of contributions, whereas over 60% of 
the authors made only one contribution (Lotka 1926). More recent studies show 
that Lotka’s law and Matthew effect still apply in the awarding of prizes, even if 
the quantity and richness of the rewards has increased (Zuckerman 1992). 
 
Whereas Merton’s idea of reward systems was based upon reputation effects, 
recent studies go further by identifying a process of “capitalization of knowledge” 
(Etzkowitz 1998), where researchers actually treat knowledge as a commodity 
upon which to capitalize. The focus is not anymore on the material rewards 
deriving from scholarly activity (i.e.: how much a new publication or citation 
increases scientist’s remuneration), but on whether the scientist is interested in 
“commercializing” his/her knowledge to obtain financial gains. Such a behaviour 
is consistent with that of most economic agents and shows that scientists are 
interested in rewards coming from industry, such as ownership of stock holdings, 
consulting fees, licensing agreements, etc (Stephan and Everhart 1998).12 
                                                 
12 As will be seen in Chapt. 3, sect. 3.1 and sect. 4, CERN researchers can not directly interact with 
industry and any income deriving from their collaboration with industry as part of their activity at 
CERN does not automatically create a remuneration, although a reward (monetary or otherwise) 
can be awarded by the Director General on a case-to-case base.. 
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3.1.2 Complements and substitutes 
The enlargement of scientists’ interests to economically rewarding activities raises 
the question whether performing scientific research and trying to profit from this 
research are complements or substitutes activities.  
Being one of the most classic in economics, the concept of complementary or 
substitutive goods was raised at the institutional level concerning scientific and 
entrepreneurial activity (Geuna 2001; Stephan and Everhart 1998). To our best 
knowledge there is a gap in the literature as this concept was not raised at the 
individual level, analyzing whether there is a shift towards more applied research 
to the detriment of basic research or towards entrepreneurial activities to the 
detriment of classic scientific activities (research and teaching).   
Research could be seen as an activity which has a dual use: one “academic” for 
reward in Mertonian terms, and one industry-oriented, for reward in monetary 
terms. In this sense, analogies with “dual use” technologies might be 
hypothesized.  
The concept of dual-use technology states that technologies and R&D developed 
for military use can be transferred into the civilian economy to stimulate civilian 
technologies (Etzkowitz 1994). 
Paraphrasing, it might be said that research and technologies developed for 
academic use can be transferred into the civilian economy to stimulate civilian 
technologies. 
 
A further reason for considering the problem of complementarity or substitution 
effects is the different attitudes towards the dissemination of scientific knowledge 
in the scientific and industrial communities. In the scientific community 
knowledge is usually made readily available because of the priority race, whereas 
in the industrial world knowledge is usually kept as secret as possible to keep an 





3.2 Knowledge users: entrepreneurs 
Entrepreneurship research is not yet considered a self-standing domain of social 
sciences by most of its own scholars. This is due to the fact that research focuses 
on a too wide array of problems and from multiple perspectives and disciplines: 
economics, psychology, finance, marketing and management (Low 2001).  
Between entrepreneurship research scholars there are still open debates on 
fundamental questions such as the definition of entrepreneurship (Low 2001), the 
purpose of entrepreneurship research (Davidsson et al. 2001), and the need for a 
theory of entrepreneurship (Davidsson, Low, and Wright 2001; Low 2001) and 
research gaps that need to be addressed are identified (Ucbasaran et al. 2001). 
An overview of entrepreneurship research literature is presented below to give a 
general framework for subsequent concepts useful for this study. Such 
presentation is kept short in order not to be drawn in considerations external to 
this thesis13. 
 
3.2.1 Entrepreneurship research: an overview 
Entrepreneurship research received increasing attention after the publication of a 
seminal paper by Low and MacMillan (Low and MacMillan 1988), where the 
authors identified six design specifications that should be present in every 
entrepreneurship research work: purpose of the research, theoretical perspective, 
focus of the phenomena investigated, level(s) of analysis, time frame and 
methodologies. Already at that time, Low and MacMillan noticed that too many 
definitions of entrepreneurship were present in research papers and concluded that 
“each (of these definitions) are captures an aspect of entrepreneurship, none 
captures the whole picture” (Low and MacMillan 1988). Discussing the purpose 
of entrepreneurship research, the authors proposed that it should try to explain and 
facilitate the role of new enterprises in economic growth (Low and MacMillan 
1988). 
 
                                                 
13 For a brief summary of the main schools of thought in entrepreneurship research see (Shane 
2000). 
 40
Over ten years later, Low seems to have softened his position into a purpose that 
varies according to the envisaged role of entrepreneurship research. If it is seen as 
teaching support then the purpose should be just that of facilitating the role of new 
enterprises; if entrepreneurship research is considered a “potpourri” of other 
academic domains, then there is no space for a specific purpose; if 
entrepreneurship research is seen as a set of issues that can and should be 
investigated from multiple disciplines, then there is no need for a purpose and a 
theory of entrepreneurship, whereas there is a need for a theory in economics (or 
psychology,  finance, etc.) to address the different aspects of entrepreneurship; 
finally, if entrepreneurship is to be constructed as an academic field per se then it 
needs to narrow its focus according to the definition of entrepreneurship that will 
be adopted (Low 2001). 
A good number of approaches within entrepreneurship research saw the light 
since Low and MacMillan seminal contribution: opportunity recognition theory, 
resource acquisition theory, behavioral aspects of entrepreneurs, categorization 
into different types of entrepreneurs, entrepreneurial teams, external environments 
(see Ucbasaran, Westhead, and Wright 2001 for a brief critical description of 
these approaches).  
 
3.2.2 Entrepreneurship shaped by context, process and 
outcomes 
What most scholars of entrepreneurship research seem to agree upon is that 
research should focus on process, context and outcomes. This methodology of 
research, first proposed by Low and MacMillan (Low and MacMillan 1988), has 
been widely accepted by researchers, although the interpretation of what 
“process” means has given way to variations. Some, for example, see it as an 
indication that beyond entrepreneurs’ characteristics and efforts, also 
organizational, environmental and creation processes influence the entrepreneurial 
adventure and outcomes (Gartner 2001). Others interpret the process as the 
recognition and exploitation of opportunities process (Shane and Venkataraman 
2000). Others understand this focus on process, context and outcomes as an 
 41
indication that an evolutionary approach should be used in entrepreneurship 
research (Aldrich and Martinez 2001). The importance of networks is recognized 
by various authors, such as Lin (1999) and Burt (1992) (cited in Aldrich and 
Martinez 2001). The importance of social context is highlighted also by those 
trying to find a compromise between psychological and social determinants of 
entrepreneurship (e.g. Katz 1992). 
 
A number of approaches have been used in entrepreneurship research and bear 
connections with this research project: psychological determinants of 
entrepreneurship, personality characteristics of the entrepreneur, entrepreneurial 
orientation and entrepreneurial intent, theory of planned behaviour,  behavioral 
and cognitive aspects of the entrepreneur, the role of networks in 
entrepreneurship, opportunity recognition and exploitation by entrepreneurs, and 
environmental factors affecting entrepreneurship.  
Although these approaches differ from a theoretical perspective – some of them 
identifying the determinants of entrepreneurship within the entrepreneur, while 
others emphasize the role of external factors in entrepreneurship (Gartner 2001) –
they can offer useful insights in trying to explain what factors might influence an 
entrepreneurial behaviour in researchers. 
 
3.2.3 Entrepreneurial intent – theory of planned behaviour 
Entrepreneurial intent has been the goal of explanation of some theories within 
entrepreneurship research. One of them is the theory of planned behaviour. 
Originally developed in the 1980s mainly by Ajzen, it recognises three 
antecedents to entrepreneurial intent. As explained by Autio et al. (Autio et al. 
2001), the first – attitude towards behaviour – reflects the evaluation of the 
behaviour by the individual; the second – subjective norm – reflects the social 
pressure to undertake the behaviour; the third – behavioral control – reflects the 
control perceived by the individual in actually undertaking the behaviour. This 
last aspect is considered to be the most important one in influencing the intention 
of performing the behaviour. As rightly stated: 
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“If the person does not perceive to have control over the behaviour and its 
outcome, intentions are not likely to lead to behaviour, even though 
subjective norms and attitudes towards the behaviour would be 
favourable”(Autio et al. 2001)  
 
It might be possible to relate this theory to Etzkowitz’s stress on the influence of 
social norms in entrepreneurial studies (Etzkowitz 1998, 2001). In this way, a 
theoretical confirmation of the importance of social norms in entrepreneurial 
behaviour can be obtained.  
 
3.2.4 Entrepreneurial orientation 
The concept of entrepreneurial orientation (EO) is analyzed in some depth by 
Lumpkin and Dess (Stephan 1996). According to them, “entrepreneurial 
orientation refers to the processes, practices and decision-making activities that 
lead to new entry. (…) Thus, it involves the intentions and actions of key player 
functioning in a dynamic generative process aimed at new-venture creation”. Five 
dimensions of EO are presented. Although referred to the firm level, four of the 
five dimensions might be applied at the individual level too, thus helping to 
characterize some of the attributes possessed by entrepreneurs and aspiring-
entrepreneurs. These dimensions are: autonomy (independent action of an 
individual in bringing forth an idea or a vision and carrying it through to 
completion); innovativeness (in the Schumpeterian sense of “creative destruction” 
and “new combinations” of existing products and processes); risk taking 
(financial, personal and social risks); and finally, proactiveness (a forward-
looking perspective). Again, without being drawn into entrepreneurship research, 
these dimensions are important aspects of which to be aware in creating the 
questionnaire for CERN’s researchers. 
 
3.2.5 Opportunity recognition and prior knowledge 
Three elements have been recognized as essential for the success of nascent 
entrepreneurs: human capital, financial capital and social capital (Aldrich and 
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Martinez 2001). By human capital is meant the entrepreneurial knowledge: formal 
education, previous experience and informal training of the entrepreneur. 
Financial capital is of course the initial endowments necessary to a new firm. And 
the social capital is understood as the access to, and position in, social networks, 
which will allow the entrepreneur to obtain information, knowledge, and other 
resources that he/she does not have.  
It was also proposed that the study of entrepreneurship should be defined as “the 
scholarly examination of how, by whom, and with what effects opportunities to 
create future goods and services are discovered, evaluated, and exploited” (Shane 
and Venkataraman 2000,. p.218). Therefore, entrepreneurship research should 
focus on the sources of opportunities, the process by which such opportunities are 
discovered, evaluated and exploited, and the individuals that see and use such 
opportunities. 
 
Entrepreneurial opportunities are defined as situations in which new goods, 
services, raw materials and organizing methods can be introduced and sold at 
greater than their cost of production (Casson 1982 cited in Shane and 
Venkataraman 2000).  
 
To recognize an opportunity an entrepreneur must have a prior knowledge (Shane 
2000) that allows him to capture the potential marketability of the new product or 
process. The fact that prior knowledge is highly personal, helps explaining why 
new opportunities are obvious only to some people and not to everybody. 
Therefore, it has been argued that opportunity discovery is a function of the 
distribution of information in society (Shane 2000), which is in turn connected to 
the issue of asymmetric information. 
In this optic, there are three main research questions in entrepreneurship studies:  
(1) why, when, and how opportunities for the creation of goods and services come 
into existence; (2) why, when, and how some people and not others discover and 
exploit these opportunities; and (3) why, when, and how different modes of action 





This whole chapter was based on the assumption of discussing concepts that will 
– directly or indirectly – inform the model proposed in the theoretical framework 
chapter. 
In fact, we will try to show how an institution (CERN, in this case) and its 
knowledge producers (researchers) are interconnected, while trying to understand 
whether the researchers are interested to act as ‘entrepreneurial’ scientists in the 
broad sense, i.e. to actively transfer, in the broad sense, their knowledge industry. 
We will propose that internal policies and rules and incentives influence both 
what researchers can do (= behaviour) and would like to do (=norms). This, in 
turn, affect CERN, as an organization, transfers its knowledge to the wider world 
than specialists. 
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Chapter 2 – CERN: what is it and how does 




This chapter intends to acquaint the reader to the multifaceted world of CERN, in 
general, and of its Technology Transfer service and policy, in detail.  
The chapter is divided in four sections. 
 
The first and second sections give a general presentation of CERN, highlighting 
its uniqueness, presenting its organization and its day-to-day activities. Literature 
about CERN and by CERN is also considered. A number of studies have been 
conducted since the creation of CERN, analyzing it from many different 
perspectives: historical, economic, etc. (e.g. Pestre and Krige 1988; Pavitt et al. 
1982). 
  
The third section focuses on Technology Transfer Policy (TTP) at CERN. It gives 
an overview of the steps by which it was introduced and put into practice. It also 
presents the TT service, giving a brief explanation of how this group is organized 
and works. 
Documents for these two sections are to be found exclusively within CERN. 
Some of them, as the financial committee reports are not public, and the author 
thankfully acknowledges the permission granted to access them. Specific 
economic figures could not be reported, but general indications are available 
throughout the chapter.   
Finally, the fourth section presents the Human Resources database of CERN, from 
which descriptive data can be drawn. 
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1. The history of CERN 
CERN14 mission is to investigate the fundamental constituents of matter and what 
forces hold them together (CERN 2005b), in a quest to understand how the 
universe came to be as it is.  
CERN studies the particles that constitute the atomic and subatomic structure 
through an accelerator, now being upgraded to become the Large Hadron Collider 
(LHC), housed today in a 27 km ring that accelerates particles to almost the speed 
of light, and particle detectors – equipments able to register and analyze the 
fragments of matter coming out from the collisions among particles. Since its 
creation, the results of its research are freely accessible to the public and there is 
no connection with any kind of military activity or commercial exploitation of 
nuclear power. 
 
As clearly stated in Article II of its founding convention, CERN goals are the 
following: 
"The Organization shall provide for collaboration among European States in 
nuclear research of a pure scientific and fundamental character, and in research 
essentially related thereto. The Organization shall have no concern with work for 
military requirements and the results of its experimental and theoretical work shall 
be published or otherwise made generally available.” (CERN 1953) 
 
CERN was officially born on 29 September 1954 by twelve European countries, 
although the first steps for its creation were taken in 1949-50. The history of 
CERN is a long and fascinating adventure, which has been fully documented and 
deeply analyzed in a two volumes study by an ad hoc “CERN History team” 
composed of Armin Hermann, John Krige, Ulrike Mersits and Dominique Pestre. 
In this study, they make an in-depth historical and critical analysis, taking into 
account the political dimension, the scientific and technical determinants and the 
uniqueness and originality of this international research center, its uniqueness 
                                                 
14 The acronym comes from the original French name Conseil Européen pour la Recherche 
Nucléaire, European Council for Nuclear Research. 
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lying in the fact that from the very beginning it is depoliticized, demilitarized and 
truly multinational. (cfr. Hermann et al. 1987). 
 
The creation of CERN has been one of the first European joint ventures, and the 
very first European scientific collaboration. In the years, different reasons for its 
foundation have been proposed.  
The main rationale for its creation being that a leading-edge nuclear research 
centre would require financial means and human resources far in excess than 
those available to a single country. In the meantime, not only a European research 
centre would bring together scientists from countries that were at war only few 
years before (CERN 1991) – when CERN was created not even ten years had 
passed since the end of the Second World War. Moreover, CERN also had a role 
of bridging opposing cultures during the Cold War, an example being the 
scientific exchanges with Soviet scientists beginning as early as in 1960 
(Cashmore and Kirpichnikov 2004).  
Another ‘traditional’ explanation for setting up this international research center is 
normally considered to be the Europeist approach permeating the political 
dimension of the 1940s-50s: governments and politicians were creating the 
European Economic Community, thus favouring European collaboration in 
various fields. 
An additional and more subtle rationale was identified as being the distinctiveness 
of the original group of scientists actually proposing to build what became CERN 
and the particular historical period for the involved nations, which at the time did 
not have clear science policies. “Individuals were thus left ‘free’ to act as 
champions of ‘products’ that they then managed to ‘sell’ to key people in their 
government. […] Power remained effectively in the hands of a group of people 
who were at once influential at home and free to act from personal conviction 
without having to wait for an official mandate” (Pestre and Krige 1995).  
 
In 2004, CERN celebrated its 50th birthday with a ceremony that brought together 
authorities from all its Member States and a majority of its Non-Member States. 
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In this occasion, a point was made of celebrating its internationality and its role in 
bridging people from different countries in the name of science: 
“Physics and fundamental research could contribute to this endeavor through 
their intrinsic neutrality, consistent need for objectivity, and their ability to 
stimulate thought and bring people together in a common purpose.   
It was in this spirit of bringing peoples together in the pursuit of peace and 
human progress that CERN was founded.” (CERN 2004a) 
 
Of interest for the history of CERN were the only surviving founding patron’s 
words in explaining one of the unexpected effects of the creation of the 
organization, if compared to motivations. Mr. François de Rose said: 
“Robert Oppenheimer once said ‘What we know, we have learnt in Europe. 
But (…) it would be basically unhealthy for the Europeans to have to go to 
the US or the USSR to be able to continue contributing to fundamental 
research’. And indeed CERN was created so that Europeans were not forced 
to go to the United States.  
Today, Americans are coming to Europe to work on CERN's machines, 
something which I don't think Oppenheimer had anticipated. I find that an 
extraordinary turnaround”. (CERN 2004a) 
 
2. CERN Organization 
2.1 Member States and Non-Member States 
Member States make a contribution to the capital and operating costs of the 
CERN programs. They are represented in the Council and are responsible for all 
important decisions about the Organization and its activities (CERN 2005c).  
 
There currently are 20 member countries supporting CERN.  
Eleven are the original founders (as Yugoslavia withdrew in 1961): Belgium, 
Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, 
Switzerland, and United Kingdom.  
Others joined later on: Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, 
Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic and Spain.  
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States (or International Organizations) for which membership is either not 
possible or not yet feasible have Observer status. Organizations with Observer 
status are the European Commission and UNESCO (United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization) (CERN 2005c). The Observer status allows 
these countries and organizations to attend Council meetings and to receive 
Council documents, without taking part in the decision-making procedures of the 
Organization.  
 
Non-Member States Institutes and Universities participating to the CERN 
program are from all over the world, for a total of 72 countries (CERN 2006d), 
including Canada, Russian Federation, Latin America, People's Republic of 
China, Pakistan, etc., for a total of 224 Institutes and Universities. By April 2006 
a total of 6775 Users were supported by the following countries: 4716 from 
Member States, 709 from Russian federation, 52 from CIS, 59 from Eastern 
Europe, 69 from Canada, 751 from USA, 45 from Latin America, 98 from Japan, 
47 from People's Republic of China, 53 from India, 39 from Israel and 137 from 
other countries world wide. 
The Member States provide financial contributions in proportion to their Net 
National Incomes. CERN's budget is drawn up in Swiss francs, the currency of the 
country where the Organization has its legal seat. The expenses budget in 2006 
amounts to 1.238,9 million Swiss francs (CERN 2006b). The Contribution to 
CERN budget from the Member countries amounts in 2006 to over one thousand 
million Swiss francs. 
 
Universities, research institutes and funding agencies both from Member and 
Non-Member States are responsible for the financing, construction and operation 
of the experiments on which they collaborate, as CERN spends much of its budget 






Table 2.1 – Member states contribution to CERN budget and users in 2006. 
Country Percentage Million CHF Users at 12 June 2006
Germany 20.19% 198,310 704
United Kingdom 17.35% 170,486 495
France 15.09% 148,178 703
Italy 12.18% 119,614 1,388
Spain   7.97% 78,279 223
Netherlands   4.36% 42,853 135
Switzerland   3.22% 31,646 231
Belgium   2.62% 25,705 92
Sweden   2.61% 25,620 49
Austria   2.17% 21,288 49
Norway   2.16% 21,194 48
Poland   2.11% 20,703 149
Denmark   1.70% 16,654 50
Greece   1.75% 17,236 82
Finland 1.28% 12,580 99
Portugal 1.09% 10,729 89
Hungary 0.83% 8,162 33
Czech Republic 0.82% 8,033 151
Slovak Republic 0.31% 3,087 20
Bulgaria 0.19% 1,876 38
Total 100% 982,234 4,828  
Source: (CERN 2006b) 
 
 
CERN is granted the status of International Organization. This is true both for its 
location (it extends across the border of France and Switzerland) and for its staff, 
who has the status and obligations of international civil servant. Over 2500 people 
coming from all Member States are currently enrolled at CERN. And by June 
2006, 7170 scientists, half of the world's particle physicists, are at CERN for their 
research, representing more than 500 universities worldwide.  
 
2.2 Internal Organizational asset 
It then becomes clear that the organizational asset15 of CERN needs to be quite 
specific for its particular needs. CERN organization is depicted in Figure 2.1.  
                                                 
15 The upcoming paragraphs will give a brief description, for a more thoroughly description see 
(CERN 2005d)  
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Figure 2.1 – CERN organization 
  
Source: (CERN 1998) 
 
The highest authority in CERN is the Council, which has the ultimate 
responsibility for important decisions in scientific, technical and administrative 
matters, both in terms of policy and in terms of budgets and expenditures. The 
Council is composed of two delegates per Member State, one is the scientific 
delegate and the other is a representative of the country, however each MS has a 
single vote. Most of the Council’s decisions require a simple majority to pass, 
although votes are partly weighed by the contribution of the country to the budget. 
In fact, as can be noted in table 2.1 above, four of the twenty countries contribute 
for more than two thirds to the budget, and this is correctly taken into account 
during voting procedures. However, whenever possible the Council tries to arrive 
to a consensus. 
 
Help is provided to the Council by the Finance Committee and the Scientific 
Policy Committee in their respective areas.  
“The Finance Committee is composed of representatives from national 
administrations and deals with all issues relating to financial contributions by the 
Member States and to the Organization's budget and expenditure” (CERN 2005d).  
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Whereas the Scientific Policy Committee is composed of scientists who are 
elected by their colleagues in the Committee (their election is then acknowledged 
by the Council, who appoints them). It should be noted that the election to the 
Scientific Policy Committee is only based on scientific excellence and it is 
independent of nationality; in fact, some of the scientists can also come from Non-
Member States. 
 
     
2.3 CERN day-to-day management: CERN 
organigram 
The Council appoints the Director General (DG), who is the official representative 
of CERN and its Chief Executive Officer (CEO). The DG will hold his position 
for a five years period and, although his main responsibilities are those of a 
manager, he is traditionally a scientist. He reports directly to the Council, to 
whom he can propose any adjustment he deems necessary to meet the evolving 
needs of the organization. The DG is helped to run the everyday tasks at CERN by 
the Directorate. The Directorate is composed of the:  
? Director-General;  
? Deputy Director General – who is also the Chief Scientific Officer; 
? Chief Financial Officer – who is responsible for Finance and Human 
Resources;  
? Secretary General – which comprises the Directorate Services Unit, 
including the Technology Transfer Group, and the Safety Commission  
? And, finally, the Project Management, representing the main present 
projects of CERN: the LHC Project, the LHC Computing Grid, the 
Enabling Grids for e-science in Europe (EGEE), the CERN Neutrinos to 










2.3.1 CERN Departments 
Up to 2003 daily activities at CERN were performed by 15 Divisions, whereas 
from 2004 the Divisions were re-organized in seven departments, each one with a 
Director:  
? AB: Department Accelerators and Beams  
? AT: Department Accelerator Technology  
? FI :  Department  Finance  
? HR: Department Human Resources  
? IT :  Department Information Technology  
? PH : Department Physics  
? TS : Department Technical Support 
 
The AB Department hosts the groups responsible for beam generation, 
acceleration, transfer, control and delivery for the CERN accelerator complex. It 
is also in charge of specification, procurement and commissioning of the LHC 
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machine equipments. The core competences residing in the department include: 
accelerator physics, particle beam generation, RF acceleration systems, power 
converters, beam instrumentation, controls, beam extraction and injection, targets, 
collimators and dumps, as well as operation of the whole CERN accelerator 
complex (CERN 2005a) 
 
The AT Department mission is to use its expertise in accelerator technologies of 
superconductors, magnets, cryogenics & vacuum to serve the goals of CERN, in 
order to operate the accelerator complex, build the LHC, build the CNGS facility, 
provide support to the physics experiments and, finally, to contribute to 
accelerator and detector R&D (CERN 2006a). 
 
The FI Department is responsible for handling all financial matters. Part of its 
mission is to provide the internal and external users (delegates of MS, Visiting 
Research Teams, Funding Agencies, etc.) of financial statements with timely 
accurate and relevant information and to ensure that the necessary financial 
control is adhered to in order to safeguard the assets of the Organization. 
Furthermore, the Department is in charge of all aspects of procurement within 
CERN (CERN 2006c). 
 
The HR Department is responsible for handling all manners concerned with 
CERN staff and users. Main areas of responsibility include manpower planning, 
organizational development, employment and association conditions, recruitment, 
job classification, training and social services (CERN 2004b). 
 
The IT Department is responsible for general-purpose computing, administrative 
computing, physics and engineering computing and consolidation, coordination 
and standardization of computing activities. “To provide its services, the IT 
Department relies primarily on commercial sources. The Department develops in-
house solutions if commercial solutions do not exist. To maintain the quality of its 
services, a key emphasis of the department is on maintaining the technical 
competence of its staff” (CERN 2004c). 
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The PH Department carries out the basic research in the field of experimental and 
theoretical particle physics. It is composed of two units, the Theory Unit and the 
Experimental Physics Unit. The former has the objective of developing new 
theoretical ideas aimed at understanding the fundamental constituents and forces 
of nature and study their relevance for the experimental program of CERN. The 
Experimental Physics unit is composed of different groups, which are active in the 
domains of detector technologies, including mechanics, electronics and 
experiment related computing and participate in the construction and running of 
experiments and in the physics analysis (CERN 2006f). 
 
Finally, the Technical Support Department has to provide support for the technical 
infrastructure of CERN, accelerators, experiments and services related to the site 
operation and maintenance. This means that it has the responsibility to ensure 
monitoring and operation of the technical infrastructure of the whole site 365 days 




3. Technology Transfer at CERN 
3.1 The introduction of technology transfer at 
CERN 
The planning of the LHC, in the mid 80s, led to the realization that a strong 
involvement of industry would be necessary from project design up to 
implementation, in order to make this machine come to life. It was then clearly 
understood that such an interaction would lead to a technology improvement 
thanks to science push. 
In 1986 an internal committee made an in depth analysis of the relations between 
CERN and industry (Bressan 2004). And in 1987, CERN Member States 
suggested a more pro-active attitude towards TT. This finally led to the formal 
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establishment of an Industrial Technology Liaison Office (ITLO). Its mandate 
was to become the point of contact between CERN and industry for all aspects not 
directly related to procurement. This had to be done by enhancing and 
strengthening contacts on industrial matters with CERN MS delegates and the 
Industrial Liaison Officer, as well as external bodies such as commercial attachés, 
regional bodies, industrial parks, etc.; by promoting technology transfer in 
general; by adequately protecting CERN intellectual property rights and by 
exploiting them if and when it might be of interest (Bressan 2004). The 
foundation of ITLO became the real beginning of an institutionalized TT office at 
CERN. 
In the following years, steps were taken to gather experience in a more proactive 
technology transfer, for example by filing a few patents (Barbalat 1995). At the 
same time, a revision of CERN Staff Rules set general provisions concerning 
IPRs and its staff and associated personnel16 (CERN 1996, chapt. I, sect. 4). 
Article 4.01 sets the definition and interpretation of IPR at CERN, art. 4.02 gives 
the general principles governing IPRs in the organization, art. 4.03 is concerned 
with the protection of the interests of the Organization regarding intellectual 
property, and finally art. 4.04 concerns awards for IPRs. 
 
I4.01 The term “intellectual property” shall be interpreted in the 
widest sense. It shall include inventions, copyright material, 
designs as well as technical and other developments. 
 
I4.02 All intellectual property rights which result from or a 
substantially based on a member of personnel’s activities at the 
Organization are automatically vested in the Organization. The 
Director-General shall decide whether or not an intellectual 
property right results from or a substantially based on a 
member of personnel’s activities at the Organization.  
I4.03 The Director-General shall lay down the conditions under 
which a member of the personnel may have his name 
associated with a publication by the Organization or with 
copyright material. The member of the personnel concerned 
shall be entitled to have his name associated with any patent for 
which the Organization has applied. 
                                                 
16 Associated personnel comes from institutions of Member States, and are on such institutions 
payroll and not on CERN payroll. 
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I4.04 The Director-General may waive the aforementioned 
intellectual property rights or make them over to a third party, 
particularly when such rights are claimed by the home 
institution of an associated member of the personnel. 
 
R I4.01 So as to enable the Organization to protect its intellectual 
property interests, a member of the personnel shall declare to 
his Division Leader at the Organization any work or inventions 
which he considers to fall within the scope of Article I 4.01 of 
the Rules, including any work or inventions realized its specific 
task in the Organization, and shall disclose all relevant 
information concerning such work or inventions. Members of 
the personnel shall not claim intellectual property rights or 
apply for intellectual property protection unless they have 
obtained prior written approval by the Director-General.  
R I4.02 The aforementioned obligations shall continue to apply for a 
period of three years with the effect from the date of 
termination of the contract of the member of the personnel 
concerned. 
 
R I4.03 The Director-General may decide to grant an award to the 
author of any work or inventions falling within the scope of 
Article I 4.01 of the Rules. 
 
The enhanced attention of CERN executive bodies towards interactions between 
the Organization and the industrial world, finally led to an explicit definition of a 
Technology Transfer Policy at CERN. Priorities to enact such a policy were 
identified as being: creation and/or consolidation of appropriate structures; 
adequate IPR protection practices; proper documentation of the CERN technology 
portfolio; expert TT-oriented auditing of that portfolio, so to enhance the means of 
making available the portfolio; additional raising of awareness inside the 
Organization; and finally specific training and more experimentation with various 
forms of TT in close collaboration with the Member State industries (CERN 
1999).  
The founding principle of IPR and TT policy at CERN was stated as “To make 
known and available to third parties, under agreed conditions, technical 
developments achieved in fulfilling the laboratory's mission in fundamental 
research” (CERN 1999, p. 2). A lot of attention was paid to create an active TT 
policy which would not be in contrast with CERN mission of making its scientific 
 58
results generally and freely available, as only technology and instruments to 
achieve such results would fall under IPR protection and TT mechanisms, and not 
the results themselves. 
Reasons to undertake a proactive TT approach at CERN were identified as 
transferring the Organization expertise in front-edge technologies to the industrial 
sector in its Member States (which could also result in giving them a pre-
competitive advantage), and having a pool of industrial collaborators capable of 
responding to the extreme technical necessities of the Laboratory. 
Contemporarily, for the first time, it was recognized that TT from CERN to the 
industrial world might also provide a powerful accountability and justification 
tool towards the general public, which often does not have the means to appreciate 
what is generally done in basic science research laboratories. In fact, it was stated 
that one of the reasons to pursue TT policy at CERN was “to make sure that the 
interest and usefulness of CERN’s technological work is widely understood” 
(CERN 1999, p. 1) 
In order to enact the TT policy, a new division was created in 2000, the Education 
and Technology Transfer division17. One of its missions was to enhance TT at 
CERN. In order to do so, a TT Director was identified, a TT group and an IPR 
group were assembled and their activities were coordinated by the ITLO Director. 
The following year, the TT group and the IPR group were joined in a single TT 
group. 
A Technology Advisory Board (TAB) was appointed. It was composed of the TT 
Director, the ITLO Director, the CERN - EU link person, a member of the Legal 
Service, a member of the Purchasing Service, senior experts from the Laboratory 
in areas such as: computing, cryogenics, electronics, magnets, material 
technology, sensors, vacuum, etc. Also external experts might be invited to TAB 
meetings, whenever necessary, so to give an informed advice on industry, or 
specific stakeholders, points of view. 
                                                 
17 Public education through visits, press relationships and access to the library was deemed related 
to the general aim of TT policy of providing public recognition of CERN activities. 
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As well summarized by Bressan (2004), “the CERN TT service was mandated to 
identify, promote, protect and transfer technologies developed at CERN in 
research, accelerator and information technology domains to industry”. 
 
3.2 Technology Transfer in practice at CERN 
Although it might seem normal that the importance of TT would be self-evident to 
CERN scientists, the general view was that TT is fine, but it is not part of CERN 
mission. The TT group had to find ways to spread around the Organization the 
concept that technology transfer is an integral part of CERN mission, as often 
stated by the present Director General, and it does not impair CERN mission, on 
the contrary it is complementary. The mission of the Laboratory being to make 
freely available the results of its research: scientific discoveries, theories and 
mathematical methods, this would not contradict with the scope of protecting 
intellectual property rights by means of patents. On the contrary, when the 
technologies and the technological processes developed to reach these scientific 
results can be protected by patents and copyrights, this would have the double 
merit of a) providing a widely accepted means of communicating technical 
innovation to industry and b) identifying CERN's subsidiary role as a generator of 
technology which, in general, is often overlooked by the public at large (CERN 
1999). This might also have the additional credit of enhancing public interest in 
nuclear and particle physics research and therefore of improving public 
recognition and understanding of the importance of basic science not only for a 
deeper understanding of our world, but also for the advancement of society. 
To pass along CERN the concept of the goodness of a pro-active technology 
transfer, a number of meetings, workshops, conferences and seminars were and 
still are organized and networks have been created both internally and externally. 
Some of them are aimed at group leaders or division leaders, others ask for the 
participation of members of specific groups, others are open to anybody who 
might be interested. Workshops are also being held to provide information and 
means of entrepreneurialism such as identifying opportunities to partnering with 
CERN or to create a spin-off, seek funding, etc.  
 60
 
CERN often extends the limits of technology, and stimulates technical 
developments to obtain from industry the best possible products at an affordable 
cost. These developments may have applications in areas beyond high energy 
physics, and CERN should be in a position as to use the substantial value of its 
technology and expertise. On this base, a campaign for information retrieval of 
technologies that might be of value and relevance for industry started in 1999. 
Together with the identification of prior work, a technological watch for the early 
assessments of new developments was set in place. These activities have led to the 
implementation of a TT database which was serving both external and internal 
working needs. This is now going to be substituded by a new more user-friendly 
tool, especially designed to attract industry interest. 
 
If in 1997, in his final presentation as Head of ITLO, Dr. Barbalat identified three 
means of Technology Transfer at CERN – namely TT through people, through 
purchasing and through collaboration agreements with industry (Barbalat 1997) – 
in 2000 (CERN 2000), after the formal introduction of a proactive TTP, a fourth 
type was identified as: TT through R&D special projects.  
At the same time, technology transfer through patenting and licensing fell under 
the tasks absolved by the IPR group, as well as TT through start-ups and spin-offs 
and the maintenance of the technology database (developed in the previous years, 
in order to identify technologies that might be interesting to industry). All of these 
types of technology transfer fall now in the tasks undertaken by the TT group, 
which since 2005 is part of the Director Services Unit. 
From the beginning of the implementation of a pro-active TTP at CERN, two 
practical priorities were identified: first, develop an in-house understanding of the 
importance of TT for CERN; and, second, identify the existing technologies or 
processes that might be of interest to industry. 
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3.2.1 TT through collaboration agreements and partnerships 
for R&D special projects 
Collaborations are funded by a number of institutes interested in applying 
technologies that were developed for high energy physics in other domains. The 
R&D activities are carried out at CERN and in collaborating institutes. “The 
results are usually proof of concepts aimed at validating the pertinence of the 
technologies in the considered application domains” (CERN 2006g, p. 4). 
Partnerships are aimed at further developing – with industry – a technology to a 
stage where its commercial opportunities can be exploited. Partnership 
agreements are therefore intended for parties interested in technologies that are 
sufficiently mature for a targeted application to be envisaged (CERN 2005e) The 
results are normally prototypes and demonstrators. In the case of partnerships, 
R&D activities are done with the support of CERN personnel, but are completely 
funded by external sources (either the commercial partner, collaborating 
institutions or different research-funding bodies). 
In order to protect its position, CERN has adopted the custom of including IPR 
statements systematically and at early stages of its collaborations and partnerships 
agreements. In 2005, the TT group was dealing with up to 175 collaboration and 
partnership agreements, twenty-one of which were signed in 2005. Of these 175 
total R&D projects, thirty nine of them are signed with industrial partners, while 
the rest is with other institutions (CERN 2006g). Seventy five percent of 
collaboration and partnership agreements are related to developments in domains 
such as accelerators, magnets, cryogenics, vacuum, radio frequency, mechanics, 
material science, electronics and information technology (CERN 2002b).  
 
3.2.2 TT through IPR: patenting and licensing 
The general IP strategy of CERN is to protect its right to its technologies and to 
preserve their commercial potential. Based on the singular case at hand, the TT 
group decides what kind of IPR protection is the most appropriate between: 
? Patent protection; 
? Copyright protection; 
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? Trademark protection; and 
? Confidentiality (non disclosure) agreements. 
 
CERN policy concerning patents and other forms of IPR protection consists in 
filing the application for such protection only after an in-depth assessment of 
commercial opportunities for the case at hand has been conducted. In such case, 
the application for protection is filed through the appropriate structures (patent 
office, etc.) and the protection is maintained only for a limited period of time, 
unless they are not licensed to potential users or a market opportunity really 
arises. This is why it is important that effort be expended by the inventor(s) as 
well by TT group and CERN to timely find an exploiter for the license18. 
In 2005, actions to obtain protection for CERN IPRs were undertaken for two 
patents, six copyrights, two trademarks and six confidentiality agreements. A total 
of twenty-five technologies were under patenting activities by the TT group, for 
eleven of them the patent was already obtained. The total portfolio cost for patents 
in 2005 adds up to 435 kCHF. In more general terms, CERN holds a total number 
of 36 agreement among patents, copyrights, trademarks and confidentiality 
agreements. Twenty-one of them are signed with industrial partners (CERN 
2006g). 
License agreements at CERN often include the provision of technical assistance 
or consultancy, in order to facilitate the effective transfer of the technology. 
Financial conditions for a license normally include a lump sum that covers the 
access to the technology and any technical assistance or supply, and also royalty 
payments related to its commercial exploitation by the licensee. In 2005, twelve 
license agreements were signed during the year19  (CERN 2006g). 
 
                                                 
18 On this topic compare (Bressan 2004). 
19 As sums are considered confidential information, it is not possible to give a detailed figure, 
although the lump sum was in the range of some hundred thousands Swiss Francs. 
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3.2.3 TT through consultancy and services 
Consultancy agreements are signed when CERN is asked from external bodies to 
provide specialized advice and/or to transfer the know-how and unique expertise 
embedded in some of its staff.  
Services agreements are signed when CERN is required the use of its unique 
installations by companies or other research institutes that would be unable to 
access otherwise. 
In both these cases, agreements cover IP issues as well as the cost of the 
consultancy or access itself. In general CERN requires to be recognized as the 
source of the know-how that will be transferred (CERN 2002b).  
Up to 2005, a total number of 94 agreements for licenses, services and 
consultancy were signed; in particular, 45 of them were signed by industrial 
partners. 
 
3.2.4 TT through people  
CERN has and was always recognized its educational role throughout the years of 
its existence. However, since the inception of its TT policy, the importance of 
technology transfer to people has been re-evaluated and it has been the object of 
knowledge transfer studies (Bressan 2004; Cruz et al. 2004). CERN turn-over of 
visiting staff adds up to some thousands of people per year. Their core 
competencies vary through the whole spectrum of technologies used at CERN. 
Some of these people, after their commitment with their home institute ends, may 
pass to industry.  
This allows for a continuous flow of knowledge transfer to external institutions 
and industry, both in Member and non-member states. All visiting staff can 
liberally access the numerous seminars and training courses held at CERN all year 
long concerning the most recent developments in the disciplines used in the 
Laboratory. 
Some States have established special schemes to allow engineers and applied 
physicists to train at CERN in technology domains. Other States reinforced such 
programs. In the same way, some companies have established agreements with 
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CERN to train, at their own expense, their personnel for some months by 
participating in relevant research projects. The same free access to training 
activities at CERN is available to these visitors. 
Similarly, every year hundreds of students working on their thesis projects for 
their graduation or for their Master or PhD title join CERN. Whereas some of 
them will remain in the academic and research sector, most of them will finally 
find a position in industry, where the experience they gained in the top-edge 
technological environment of CERN is highly valued. Above the normal training 
programs already mentioned, special “schools” are held at the laboratory to train 
students. 
 
3.2.5 TT through purchasing  
Throughout its history, CERN actively worked with industry mainly through its 
procurement activities. In fact, equipment for carrying out research is purchased 
by companies, which are given the specifications by CERN and produce the 
required equipment or develop it, if it already exists in the Laboratory. Industry 
will, through the manufacturing process, acquire new skills and gain a new know-
how and possibly develop new products. There are also cases where CERN asks 
for improved specifications, inducing firms to improve their standard products 
(Barbalat 1997). 
The importance of technology transfer through purchasing by CERN has been 
analyzed since the 1970s in a number of studies: Schmied (1975), Streit-Bianchi 
et al. (1984), Nordberg (1994). Some authors interpreted TT from CERN in terms 
of its frontier-technology needs, which require industry to develop new 
technologies to satisfy CERN’s requirements (Hameri and Vuola 1996; Hameri 
1996).   
More recently, Autio et al. (2003) found that technological learning and 
innovation benefits derived form CERN procurement activity tend to appear 
together and to depend on the quality of the supplier’s relationship with CERN: 
the greater the amount of social capital interacting, the greater the learning and 
innovation benefits (Autio, Streit-Bianchi, and Hameri 2003, pp. 45-48). 
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3.2.6 TT through start-ups and spin-offs 
In 1999, CERN recognized the possibility that some of its staff might be 
interested in creating a company of their own, either as a start-up based on the 
knowledge acquired at CERN or a real spin-off based on technologies, processes 
or research results obtained at CERN. In particular, it was decided that “CERN 
entrepreneurs” would be granted easy access to its facility (CERN 1999) and 
access to CERN technologies under favorable conditions, although the decision 
finally rests on the Director-General assessment. In some cases, CERN might also 
grant its researcher/entrepreneur-to-be an unpaid leave of absence for a limited 
period of time. In general, the TT group is responsible for creating links with 
existing incubators to help companies “arising” from CERN. In any case, 
attention should be paid to ensure fair competition, qualitative criteria regarding 
the business plan, and a fair distribution of support among spin-off companies of 
all Member States (CERN 2003). 
As a general line, CERN has retained the intellectual property right, while 
establishing license agreements (either with domain-limited exclusivity or non-
exclusive provisions) allowing for commercial use. In some cases, a combination 
of license and partnership can be envisaged in order to assist the development of 
the technology.  
By 2005, 5 start-ups have been created as results of direct licensing (CERN 2003). 
Two of them are in the domain of information technology; other two of them are 
concerned with detectors, whereas the last of them is based on the accelerator 
domain and applies a CERN patent to the production of radioisotopes for 
medicine20. 
At any rate, the total number of start-ups and spin-offs generated by CERN know-
how or based on CERN technologies in the Host States of France and Switzerland 
went from 7 to 17 between 200 and 2004 (Carchia and Loeffler 2006).   
To our knowledge, to the present only a Finnish case of a spin-off from CERN 
was found to be analyzed in depth, in terms of commercial outcome (Byckling et 
al. 2000). Therefore, it might be an interesting and over-needed study to contact 
                                                 
20 Respectively, as numbered in the list of TT cases by CERN: cases 5 and 26 in IT, cases 23 and 
68 in detectors, and case one in accelerators. 
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the aforementioned cases and investigate if and how they developed their business 
and if they carried out further R&D, and if so, if they did it with or without 
CERN. 
Concerning CERN spin-outs and spin-offs, part of an Interreg Project, currently 
underway, is focusing on the creation of new firms in the geographical area 
around CERN and by   CERN former staff or users (ADEPGBB, 2005). An initial 
survey was done, analyzing the reasons for creating the firms and the tools and 
structures used by the researchers/entrepreneurs to open their firms. At the same 
time, a first comparison with technology transfer support structures in place at two 
other European organizations – ESA and EMBL – was conducted, to see what 
CERN situation compared to its fellow organization was.  
 
3.2.7 Complementary TT activities 
Starting from 2002, CERN recognized that other activities might be 
complementary to TT: standardization, publication and promotion. All of these 
complementary activities are intended to raise awareness of CERN as a centre of 
excellence for technology and intend to establish and exchange best practices with 
the various actors involved in technology transfer activities in general. 
 
Standardization  
As already mentioned, CERN has happened to be the developer (either directly or 
indirectly) of various technologies. In this sense and through the efforts in 
establishing standards and the willingness to act as a test-bed, CERN can act as a 
support in enhancing the competitiveness of European industries. The Laboratory 
was already involved in two cases of standardization, one concerning vacuum 
technologies and the other concerning IT (CERN 2003). 
 
Publication  
A large number of technology preprints by CERN personnel are produced each 
year, and most of them are submitted and accepted for publication by the most 
important journals and in international conference proceedings. Between 1954 and 
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2003 a total of 35722 publications have been published by CERN scientific staff, 
which means more than 700 each year. It should be noted that this is a very 
conservative value, as for about twenty years the number of papers published in 
conferences or journals was not recorded. The same is true for theses done at 
CERN. 
 
Figure 2.3: CERN theses and publications between 1954 and 2003 
 





These are activities to promote technology transfer from CERN to the outside 
through the creation and maintenance of the TT database, through the 
participation to promotional events (conferences, workshops, etc.) and through the 
preparation of promotional media (leaflets, flyers, posters, books and articles).  
At the same time, the TT group is also reinforcing its relationship with the 
Member States, especially through the TT External Network, which is composed 
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of experienced people for TT matters, who act as the national Technology 
Transfer Officers (TTO) becoming the primary contact for TT promotion in the 
Member States, helping CERN to fulfill its obligation of impartiality with respect 
to TT towards all the MSs. 
A corresponding TT Internal Network was created to allow for more formal “in-
house” communication channels between the departments and the TT Service. 
Consequently, CERN experts from all departments act as the focal point within 
the departments on all matters relating to technology transfer and as the first point 
of contact between a Department and the TT Service and vice-versa.  
The creation of a regular TT newsletter was one of the activities that started in 
2005 as an additional channel of information and promotion, designed to raise 
industrial interest (CERN 2006g). 
 
The TT database 
The TT group also created and implemented a database for gathering and handling 
all relevant data about technologies which are deemed interesting for transfer. 
Users can also find names and contact details of CERN TT staff, news on 
upcoming events and video-clips allowing online demonstrations of selected 
technologies. For each technology on the database, a brief description is given; 
references to connected patents are also available. This part of the database is 
public and freely available through any Web interface. Guidelines for would-be 
inventors and authors are also available on the public pages of the TT database. 
In this way, the TT database, available to public from the welcome page of CERN 
through the http://cern.ch/ttdb link, is a two-way contact point between CERN and 
the outside, allowing for promotion of CERN technologies and for an initial 
auditing of possibly interesting technologies by industry. 
It is important to point out that a new database is being implemented and it will be 





3.3 The Technology Transfer Service in detail 
 
The mandate of TT office can be summarized in the following points:  
? to maintain the Technology Transfer Database;  
? to be the contact for all Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) and associated 
issues;  
? to promote Technology Transfer through patenting and licensing, start-
ups, consultancy, collaborative developments agreements, TT projects, 
standardization and benchmarking, people and partnership;  
? to collaborates in TT through purchasing;  
? to participate in the organization of related training and topical workshops. 
 
Technology Transfer activities are divided in two categories: technology transfer 
processes and technical activities. 
TT processes – which are carried out by the TT group – are defined as activities 
concerning IPR protection, promotion, commercialization and establishment of 
R&D agreements. 
Technical activities – which are executed in the technical departments – are 
described as TT R&D projects and technical services provided by CERN. 
CERN expenditure for Technology Transfer activities covers both TT processes 
by the TT group and technical activities by other departments. The following table 
gives an indication of CERN personnel allocated to each activity and the 
respective expenditure in thousands of Swiss francs. 
 
Table 2.2 – CERN personnel & expenditure by TT activity in 2005. 
HR (#)
Personnel Personnel Material IP portfolio Total 
TT processes 
by TT group 15 1500 350 435 2285
R&D projects and 
technical services 19 495 1140 - 1635




Source: Adapted from (CERN 2006g). 
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Income for TT activities is the result of CERN allocated budget for TT activities 
and of external income, either from external funding for TT activities or from 
income generated by the commercialization of CERN technologies. In 2005, 1227 
kCHF were obtained by external funds and 612 kCHF were gained by the 
commercialization of technologies, giving a total external TT income of 1839 
kCHF. In the same year, TT income from CERN budget was 2130 kCHF (CERN 
2006g).   
 
The total income for TT activities in 2005 is then 3969 kCHF, which compared to 
total expenditure, gives a positive balance of 49.000 CHF. It is true that some 
external funds have not been accounted for in the 2005 budget as they are still 
under the previous accounting scheme. However, it should be noted that TT group 
is not yet able to survive without a partial allocation of CERN budget, which 




4. CERN HR database 
Implemented in 1995, the Human Resources database was first released at the end 
of 1996 to allow human resources management, planning and follow-up by 
providing access to restricted and relevant personnel of CERN personnel data. At 
the beginning it ran under Microsoft Excel and was accessible only within the 
CERN site. Between 1999 and 2000 implementations were underway to move the 
database to the web. The Human Resources Toolkit (HRT) – as the new database 
was named – was available on-line from February 2001 (CERN 2002a). 
The HRT database reports data about people at CERN (staff members, fellows, 
users, etc.). The database is constructed according to five functionalities (CERN et 
al. 1996). Information available in the functionalities will be differently accessible 
according to the access level granted to the person accessing the database: 
- System: This concerns common activities such as logging-on and off, 
printing, saving, etc; 
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- Person: this concerns static personal information (name, address, 
telephone number, e-mail, contract and leave information, etc.) without 
going into details of career history and planning; 
- Career: this concerns all detailed personal career and contract information 
history (job title, status, start/end of contract, etc.); 
- Planning: this concerns statistical and personnel information required for 
HR planning (arrivals, transfers, departures, age profiles, etc.); 
- Help: this provides support for the various search functions. 
 
For each member of CERN staff the following information can be retrieved from 
the HRT database: 
- General information: Name, sex, age, date of birth, nationality, second 
nationality, presence at CERN, CERN id (identification number), 
preferred language 
- Office information: office number and location, telephone, GSM number, 
post-box, email 
- Job information: Organic unit, division, group, section, status (i.e. staff 
member, paid/unpaid associate, etc.), roles held (since entrance at 
CERN)21, job title (e.g. senior physicist, senior engineer, etc.), professional 
class (scientific and engineering work, administrative work, technical 
work, etc.), professional code (e.g. inside scientific and engineering work, 
the job code can be: mechanics, electricity, electrodynamics, computing, 
applied physics, chemistry, mathematics, etc.), experiment (to which the 
staff member is attached), institute (to which the staff member is attached), 
team (to which the staff member is attached), supervisor 
- Contract information: contract type (indefinite, limited duration, fixed 
term, fellow), start date of the contract, end date of the contract, career 
path (as defined by CERN), position (as defined by CERN), remuneration, 
presence, hours per week, etc. 
- Personal information: leave balance, leave taken, overtime balance, private 
address, home country address, marital status. 
                                                 
21 However this voice is not always complete nor updated. 
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A lot of the information contained in the contract and personal categories of the 
database are – as easily understandable – confidential and therefore access to them 
was denied for information such as salary, career path leave balance, private 
address et similia. 
Data from the HR database is important to understand what the composition of 
CERN population is. A synthetic description of such population and of the 
researchers who were identified as the envisaged respondents of the questionnaire 




CERN is the first European research center. As other European research centers, 
such as EMBL …, its staff enjoys an international officer status (while also being 
subject to the limitations such a status imposes) and is deeply embedded in an 
international environment. As in all big research centers, a wide range of 
professions are present as well as different backgrounds and experiences.  
Technology Transfer as an activity disciplined by a policy is quite recent, even 
though actual technology transfer has been on-going since CERN was born. TT in 
the Lab takes place in a number of forms and through a number of researchers 
belonging to different departments and with different tasks. 
Having presented the research organization, it is now possible to try to set a 
theoretical framework for the analysis to be conducted, such framework is also 
constructed on the basis of the literature discussed in chapter 1. 
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This chapter is composed of two parts: the first introducing a theoretical 
framework and the second presenting research procedures. 
 
The first part is divided into two sections. The first section deals with the 
intermediate level – and proposes some organizational concepts that should be 
considered when analyzing a basic research center. The second section deals with 
the individual level: a theoretical framework proposes what factors might explain 
entrepreneurial behaviour of researchers. The overall theoretical framework is 
deconstructed to its constituent parts, in order to set the hypotheses that will be 
tested in the empirical part of the thesis through a questionnaire.  
 
The second part of the chapter is a presentation of the methods and procedures 
adopted for this study. For the purpose of presentation, this part of the chapter is 
composed three sections: description of the research instrumentation, description 
of the procedures, and description of the subjects.  
 
The research questions that the study wants to answer to are: 
- Do the researchers show an interest towards an entrepreneurial behaviour 
either at the individual level or at the organization level?  
- Do they see scientific research and entrepreneurialism as essentially 
complementary or substitutive activities? 
- Are there incentives that (can) play a role in encouraging CERN 
researchers to become (more) entrepreneurial and thus engage in 
technology transfer activities? 
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1. Intermediate level – Organizational 
aspects  
Knowledge production arises in different organizational structures: universities, 
public and private research centers, individual or corporate firms, etc. Given the 
focus of the thesis, organizations such as firms and private research centers will 
not be dealt with, as they have different rationales and different operating 
methods. On the contrary, universities and public research centers are consistent 
with European research centers, as they receive a consistent share of their funds 
from the government and as they traditionally were not directly concerned with a 
profit-making use of the knowledge they produced. 
 
1.1 Knowledge seeker, research contractors and 
service provider organizations 
 
In the literature analysis, it was seen that the Actor-Centered Institutionalism 
(ACI) “concentrates its analysis on the intentional action of both individual and 
collective actors and relates the outcomes of interaction to the institutional 
settings in which these actors pursue their particular goals and interests” (Wilts 
2000). 
In the framework of ACI, Wilts categorized research centers as: knowledge 
seekers, research contractors and service providers. This theory allows for an 
integration of the intermediate (=organizational) level and the micro (=individual) 
level. 
 
In proposing a theoretical framework for the organizational structure of a 
European research center such as CERN, it should first of all be noted that such a 
research center however does have differences compared to a university due to its 
international status and defined mission.  
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For example, it is not possible to fully apply Boyer’s (1990) four main activities 
as defining the organizational form of universities: discovery, teaching, 
application and integration.  In fact, even though training of young researchers is a 
de facto important activity at CERN, it is not part of its mission in its strictest 
sense. On the other side, research centers, as much as universities, are subject to 
increasing demands of producing “usable” knowledge.  
 
Other factors that are unique to European research centers are internationality and 
inter-disciplinarity. 
Internationality is here intended to point out that in European research centers, 
researchers come from all over the world and work with people from all over the 
world.22 This means that they are exposed to different habits in terms of 
mentalities, customs and working procedures. Such habits might well include 
attitudes towards university-industry collaboration and technology transfer at 
large.  
Inter-disciplinarity in this context intends to stress that in basic research centers is 
possible to find – on-place and in-house – not only physicists, engineers and 
administrative profiles, but also people coming from previous experiences in 
high-tech companies or who worked for joint university-industry projects. 
 
A European research center (and CERN) organization is given by the following 
variables: 
- its constituting mission as set in its founding constitution; 
- fixed funds from member countries; 
- accountability to European research policy; 
- public accountability; 
- researchers’ goals and objectives.   
 
In setting a model for a European research center, all of the above variables must 
be kept into account. This means that such a center has to remain faithful to its 
founding mission, which in the case of CERN is to produce publicly accessible 
                                                 
22 As explained in Chapter 2 at CERN are present people coming from over seventy countries. 
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fundamental knowledge in nuclear research (in particular in high energy physics). 
Also, funding for a European center comes from its member states, this means 
that an agreement must be found on how incomes from “licensable” knowledge 
should be appropriated. At the same time, guidelines of EU policy must be 
respected and applied, but also the public justification for the center’s existence 
should be considered23. Finally, researchers’ goals and objectives are part of the 
organization’s operative functioning as are variations in researchers’ general 
behaviour and attitude. 
 




At the intermediate level, it could be said that the organization of a European 
research center such as CERN should be as synthesized in figure 3.1, which 
                                                 
23 In a moment when Europe is facing economical problems, the general public tends to have 
difficulty in justifying high expenses in “exotic” fields such as High Energy Physics, which is 
commonly seen as an interesting, but not-economically-remunerative quest in the foundation of 
matter. 
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should be read as: CERN should remain a knowledge seeker organization, where 
– mediated by public and EU accountability – Technology Transfer is a 
complementary activity to the research mission; this complementary activity has 
to be mediated by the eventual entrepreneurialism of the researchers, which 
should continue to do basic research, but also be allowed – if interested – to get 
involved with TT. 
Such an organizational model means that CERN should remain faithful to its 
original mission of producing basic knowledge freely available to all those 
interested (i.e. Member States and not). However, it should understand the 
modern dictat of public accountability and the present EU stress on sustaining 
European knowledge-base society by creating and maintain a strong and excellent 
production of basic knowledge. This would mean using TT as a way to allow and 
help a more intensive use of knowledge-based byproducts (know-how, edge 
technologies, etc.) filtrate to the industrial sector, in order to “improve” CERN 
usefulness at a more practical level; i.e. not only a center of excellence for high 
energy physics specialists, but also a research center that is seen by the general 
public as producing something more usable and practical than theoretical - 
although fascinating - knowledge about the basic constituents of the universe. It 
should however be noted that the present DG of CERN is giving more emphasis 
to TT activities considering technology transfer as the second mission of the 
Laboratory 
 
1.2 Stiglitz’s Sharecropping 
It can be proposed that, if the organizational model discussed above was to be 
valid, (CERN) technology transfer could be observed under a new light. 
 
In fact, it can be argued that the actual organization of TT at CERN can be 
paralleled to the classical sharecropping organization in agriculture. In fact, as 
shown by Stiglitz in his fundamental paper on sharecropping (Stiglitz 1974), the 
sharecropping arrangement allows for both the landlord and the worker to gain 
from the outcome (although the worker usually also receives a fix wage) by 
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sharing risks and allowing for incentives to the worker (see the literature chapter 
for a more detailed explanation). In the parallel, CERN is the landlord, as it is 
CERN who owns the laboratory and the infrastructure (= the field) to undertake 
the research; the researcher is the worker, who uses the assets owned by CERN to 
do his/her research; incentives can be set for both CERN and the researcher to 
pass the results of the research or the technologies used for the research to the 
industrial sector as economical revenues are shared between the two, although at 
the discretion of the Director General.  
 
However, risks concerning the TT process are borne only by CERN, as the 
researcher receives a wage and he/she does not necessarily feel compelled to try to 
apply the technologies outside their field of competence or to disseminate his/her 
research to industry, therefore there is no “punishment” applied in case no such 
application exists or is recognized. There is, however, an agency problem: CERN 
has to extract information on the “quality” of the researcher’s efforts (an example 
might be an individual publications count and on the “quality” of each specific 
project (maybe through an analysis of the working reports) that is undergoing a 
technology transfer process. 
 
For example, it could be argued that researchers with more publications are more 
active and are “higher quality” researchers (although we should not forget the 
well-known implications of Lotka’s Law). Moreover, the number of publications 
also could be used as a “quality” indicator of the researcher and of the results (or 
technologies) that he wants to transfer to industry, also through interim reports 
that could be checked to see how much the results or the technologies might be 
sellable in the future. In any case, it should also be noted that nowadays 
publications in high-energy physics often include tens, and sometimes hundreds, 
of authors, because of the number of researchers constituting the collaborations 
who found the results being published, and this could cause skewed results from 









The application of sharecropping to CERN is schematized in Figure 3.2, where 
the organization is split into its two basic components: physical assets (the 
laboratory) and human resources (the researchers). Research output is the outcome 
of the necessarily interlinked work of the two. TT is a byproduct of research 
output in the sense that edge-technologies (both hardware and software) are 
developed as means to obtain experimental proofs of physical theories. The 
outcome of TT, if any, is then reabsorbed by the institution. 
 
After a few years of proactive technology transfer policy, sometimes it happens 
that researchers spontaneously go to the TT thinking or knowing that a technology 
might have applications for industry. This means that the TT office, and therefore 
CERN, is slowly reaching a position where, internally, it is known that TT might 
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be possible. This also means that the effort to find transferable technologies does 
not rest exclusively on the TT office anymore, but it is partly shared by the staff. 
In the future, if the actions and results of TT are made more widely known to 
CERN staff, there might be a consistent, if not constant, flow of information from 
the base of the research center (a bottom-up flow). 
 
However, the fact that some researchers go to the TT office to propose a possibly 
transferable technology does not solve the agency problem. It is still important for 
CERN to assess the quality of the researcher and of the technology/project, even if 
the agency problem is now narrowed down to the specific case. 
 
Similarly to what is conventionally done in many other institutions, up to the 
beginning of 2005, CERN actual organization of TT revenues (at the net of the 
costs) allowed,  for a 30% to the inventor(s), for a 25% to the group to which the 
inventor belongs, and the rest went to CERN TT budget.  
In March 2005, the finance committee decided that net TT revenues should go to 
CERN to further TT activities, whereas the researcher(s) responsible of the 
transferable technology will be remunerated, always at the discretion of the 
Director-General by: an added step (or steps) in their career path; and/or by an 
added remuneration called the “Responsibility Allowance”; and/or by a special 
remuneration called “Premium for Exceptional Services”24 
 
In this sense, CERN is actually comparable to the landlord, as it is the 
organization who receives the revenues from the TT process (the crop) and then it 
shares it with the worker according to its own discretion. 
 
As in the case of share cropping there is an asymmetry of information, although 
reversed. In fact, even though CERN is not able to perfectly observe the input 
provided by the researcher, the researcher receives a wage. But, it is the researcher 
in primis who is in the position to understand that a research or a technology 
                                                 
24 See chapter 2, paragraph 4, for a discussion on this policy change and its peculiarity compared 
to other European research institutions. 
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might be interesting for industry, therefore it is the researcher who has a stronger 
position concerning TT aspects. It is for this reason that the incentive issue 
becomes particularly important. If the researcher is not motivated enough, he will 
not necessarily make the information available to CERN, falling back to the 
classical moral hazard problem. 
 
If we focus for a moment on the institutional aspect of TT at CERN, we can try to 
visualize the present situation in the following way.  
We can say that output q is an aggregated function of the researchers’ aggregated 
in-house effort e and of their aggregated collaboration with industry θ, however 
the collaboration results can not be entirely controlled neither by the researchers, 
nor by industry nor by CERN in their being productive and/or rewarding (because 
of all the uncertainties embedded in basic and almost basic research itself). 
Therefore the output can be expressed as q(e, θ), a function expressing a 
technology with decreasing returns, so that q’’<0. 
Now, the researchers’ wage w in the past was a function of both in-house effort e 
and collaboration with industry θ, so that w(e, θ). Nowadays, instead, the 
researchers wage is only a function of their in-house effort, so that w(e). In 
particular, we can see it as a threshold contract, where for θ lower than a θ0 the 
wage remains a flat wage, whereas for θ higher than a θ0 the wage is – eventually 
– increased by a certain amount decided by the Director General.  
 
For simplicity sake, we can assume that CERN costs – in TT case – are given by 
the aggregated researchers’ wage, and they are in one case costs as it was before 
Cb = w(e, θ) and costs as it is now Cn = w(e) + pn, where pn is a monetary reward 
for θ>θ0. Also, in order to give a graphical representation, we can assume that 
effort e is given and does not bring about any change at θ changing and also that q 






Figure 3.3 – Outputs and costs 
 
 
We now see that CERN profits (i.e. the value of innovation appropriated by the 
organization = q -w) are higher with the present wage of researchers for θ<θ0 and 
for θ>θ1. This means that for CERN is convenient not to have researchers’ wage 
based on θ, other than in the case when the award and/or career advancement 
gives the researchers a higher wage than the one they would have in case the wage 
is also based on θ (i.e. a fraction of revenues from the collaboration), as in the 
case when θ0<θ< θ1. 
 
However, from such an arrangement some questions arise both at the intermediate 
and at the micro-level. 
 
For example, concerning the intermediate (organizational) level, might it be more 
efficient to use part of the net revenue from TT activities to finance CERN 
research in general, in view of shrinking budgets faced by CERN nowadays? Or 
would it be in contrast with CERN mission?  
It should be noted that this solution might not be seen very favorably by CERN 
management, as it might prove a double-edged weapon. We should consider that 








θ  θ0 θ1
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(plus a small part obtained by European funds for strategic research projects). 
Now, if increasing funds were available from technology transfer activities, it 
might prove unwise to finance CERN general mission with them, as the 
organization might be factually swayed to a more contract seeker orientation, 
which is against the defined CERN mission.  
At the micro-level, are the researchers aware of the possible rewards? Which is, is 
the incentives structure efficient in CERN? Should the researcher be made 
responsible for part of the risks bore by CERN in the TT process? And also, what 
is the researchers’ opinion on a more proactive TT policy by CERN? 
 
It’s a given that for technology transfer to really become an important part of 
CERN activities, researchers need to be spurred to become attentive to possible 
industrial application of their research, thus incentives must really be seen as such 
by researchers in the first place. At the same time, it is important to understand 
what researchers think of a traditionally research-only organization becoming 
involved in TT activities. If the general attitude of researchers turns out to be 
indifferent, or even adverse, to TT by CERN, its effects are felt at the 
organizational level, and it might be necessary for the organization to work 
toward a better understanding with its own staff.  
 
Even though, the goal of this thesis is not to propose a different model for 
CERN’s organization, its actual organization can be tested against the above 
mentioned model and similarities and discrepancies can be noted and propositions 
can be made. This can be done as long as it is kept in mind that the focus of this 
thesis is to analyze whether CERN’s researchers are becoming more interested in 
collaborating in any way with industry, therefore allowing for an opening from 
the inside to an increase of technology transfer activities as generally envisaged 
by policy’s guidelines.  
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2. Micro-level – Entrepreneurial Behaviour 
of researchers 
Both the organizational model of a knowledge-seeker institution and that of 
sharecropping give relevance to the figure of the researcher. In both of them, the 
researcher is an active part in what happens both in the institution and in the TT 
process. This is the reason why it is so important to study and understand if and 
how researchers’ behaviours are changing regarding the technology transfer 
process at large. 
At this point, it is fundamental to try to understand what, if anything, moves an 
individual researcher toward becoming involved in a technology transfer process, 
which is to say toward an entrepreneurial behaviour.  
 
The definition adopted throughout the thesis is that the Entrepreneurial Behaviour 
of the researchers is their interest (both at the practical and theoretical level) in 
(co)ownership patents, copyrights, trademarks, licenses, proprietary rights on the 
products of research as well as their interaction with the industrial and commercial 
sector, in form of consultancy, equity shares in companies, creation of spin-offs, 
professional training to industry, etc. 
In the context of this thesis, a researcher is defined as having an Entrepreneurial 
Behaviour not necessarily by being an entrepreneur (i.e. owing its own firm), but 
also by being active towards technology transfer and partnership with industry. 
Here we adapt the concept of Etzkowitz’s entrepreneurial university (Etzkowitz 
2003) to the researcher, who becomes an “entrepreneurial researcher”. The focus 
is what might move the researcher to become involved in TT at large, and not 







2.1 A model of Entrepreneurial Behaviour of 
CERN researchers 
 
A model is here proposed and sketched to explain what factors might explain the 
entrepreneurial behaviour. Or better what factors can be expected to influence 
entrepreneurial behaviour (EB) of CERN researchers.  
 
The main building blocks (in green in the picture) are the researcher and the 
entrepreneurial behaviour by the researcher. Factors influencing a researcher’s 
entrepreneurial behaviour were recognized to be the following: 
- Recognition by peers 
- Networks 
- Personal character  
- Prior knowledge 
- Field of research 
- Incentives  
 
Whereas the two factors identified as ‘Recognition by peers’ and ‘Networks’ 
represent a connection between the individual researcher and the community in 
which s/he is embedded, the factors identified as ‘Prior knowledge’, ‘Field of 
research’ and ‘Personal character’ represent the more characteristic aspects of 
each person as an individual. Finally, the ‘Incentives’ factor wants to identify a 
connection between the researcher and the specific organization into which s/he 









Figure 3.4 – Researchers and Entrepreneurial Behaviour 
 
 
2.1.1 - Recognition by peers’ influences on EB  
Increasing attention on university-industry collaboration might be playing a role 
in modifying the evaluative norms of the scientific community in Mertonian 
terms. Authors (Etzkowitz 1998, 2001; Lee 1996; Etzkowitz et al. 2000) are 
proposing that the scientific community is now willing and able to accept claims 
of priority that are covered by IPR protection or that are exploited on the market. 
Scientists collaborating with or working for industry are not seen as “outsiders” or 
B-category researchers any more, but as experts whose value is also recognized by 
sectors other than academic. 
 
If the researcher feels that there is a positive recognition by peers concerning 
contacts with industry, then entrepreneurial behaviour is positively affected. In 
particular, approval by peers of entrepreneurial activities positively influences 
researchers’ norms concerning EB: it is not seen any more as an outlaw activity, 
which could get them banished, therefore interest in EB can be constructively 
pursued if willed.  
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On the contrary, if entrepreneurial activities are perceived as negative for the 
scientist’s career, it is probable that the researcher will tend to negatively consider 
EB himself, or anyway reject the intention of pursuing EB if his interest is 
primarily ‘scientific excellence’ recognition by peers. 
It should be noted that the change in perceived norms might, but not necessarily 
will, result in a change of practice. Therefore, the fact that the researchers feel that 
an EB is not assessed as negative anymore, might make him more comfortable 
about considering to act entrepreneurially, but he still might not want to undergo 
the whole process (taking contacts with industry or with TT office, propose a 
transferable process or product, etc.). 
 
 
It is also interesting to note that there might be a backward relation too. EB norms 
of the researchers might cause a change in evaluative norms by peers: with more 
researchers starting to be entrepreneurs without feeling alienated by the scientific 
community because of it, entrepreneurial behaviour becomes less strange and 
might become incorporated (at least in part) in recognition rules. Whereas a 
complete absence of EB by researchers might also have a negative influence on 
peers’ evaluation system: a not common behaviour is hardly seen as good by 
colleagues. 
 
2.1.2 - Researcher’s networks influence on EB 
As in the case of recognition by peers, also norms shared in networks or examples 
of practices within networks can influence the EB of researchers. In fact, 
professional networks are made up of researcher’s peers also from other 
institutions than his own, but they are still very important in forging what is his 
‘scientific value’ (i.e. is the researcher considered to be a valid scientist by his 
peers in the network?). 
 
H1: The first hypothesis is that there is a positive relation between recognition 
by peers and EB by researchers. 
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In research policy literature, the importance of  formal and informal networks for 
technology transfer and research activities is recognized (Gibbons et al. 1994; 
David, Foray, and Steinmueller 1997; Chataway 1999). Networks were also 
shown to be able to introduce new behaviors in research organizations (Hoddeson 
1980). Therefore if within the network in which CERN’s researchers are inserted 
(even if it extends outside CERN), entrepreneurial intentions are seen in a 
constructive way, then the researchers probably hold positive perceptions of 
entrepreneurial behaviors. Whereas, if within the network EB is negatively 
assessed, the researcher might not pursue his/her entrepreneurial intention.  
 
Moreover, the researcher’s networks may also influence his/her entrepreneurial 
behaviour in a much more practical way. For example, experiences of other’s EB 
within the network can show solutions to practical problems faced by the would-
be-entrepreneur. Also, the network can offer the researcher an access to 
information, knowledge and resources (Aldrich and Martinez 2001) that he/she 
personally does not have. Finally, networks acquaintances might actually facilitate 
the EB of the researcher, or – at least – the network might make it look more 
feasible to the researcher. 
 
Also in this case, there might be a backwards pattern too, as EB by researchers 
(and his factual entrepreneurial experiences and experiments) might influence the 
network in return. 
 
2.1.3 - Researcher’s character influence on EB 
The researcher’s character surely plays a role in his/her entrepreneurial behaviour. 
A lot of literature on entrepreneurship, and the entrepreneur as a person, 
concentrated on the importance of the entrepreneur’s character. However, most of 
this literature deals with psychological factors (e.g. Katz 1992).  
H2: The second hypothesis is that there is a positive relation between 
network’s assessment of EB and the researcher’s norms about entrepreneurial 
behaviour. 
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An individual’s character is an expression of his/her psychological attitudes and 
can hardly be studied from a science and technology policy point of view. For this 
reason, although acknowledging a direct positive relation between the researcher’s 
character and his/her EB, the matter will not be explored any further, as it 
concerns a field other than this thesis’. The psychological/character factor is taken 
as a given. 
 
2.1.4 - Researcher’s prior knowledge influence on EB 
The specific knowledge (mainly professional/academic knowledge, but not only) 
of the researcher makes it easier for him/her to recognize niches in which 
commercial opportunities were not exploited, so it facilitates EB.  
 
Literature on opportunity recognition perceived the importance of prior 
knowledge (Shane 2000). It argued that different people discover different 
opportunities in a given field because they have different prior knowledge 
(Venkataraman 1997), this allows them to have an informed and peculiar 
perspective on the issue at hand and to be able to pinpoint aspects that to others 
are not at all self-evident.  
Such prior knowledge is the result of each individual’s life experiences and also 
of random events, as Nelson and Winter (1982) put it: some people have 
information that others don’t have through “blind luck”. 
Prior knowledge that might affect the researcher’s entrepreneurial behaviour has 
been identified as:  
- Professional, for example having worked within a small company; having 
industrial experience, consulting experience, etc.;  
- Academic, as having developed process of products for a joint project 
between industry and university, and similar; 
- Personal, as might be having had relatives owning their own business; or 
having already tried to start his own business, or such. 
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It then becomes clear that the researcher’s prior knowledge is an important factor 
affecting his entrepreneurial behaviour, as his prior experiences will affect his 
disposition to get involved with industry at large. A researcher who had an 
industrial experience (both, personally or in his family or in university) will 
probably be more open to the possibility of getting involved with in a technology 
transfer process (although he might be more disenchanted than some colleagues). 
Whereas a researcher who had no contact at all with industry might be more 




2.1.5 - Field of research influences his/her EB 
The field of research in which the researcher is directly involved bears important 
consequences on his/her recognition of entrepreneurial opportunities (and here 
there is a reconnection to the discussion about prior knowledge), as there are 
domains of research that bear possibilities of closer links to industry than other 
domains. For example, experimental physicists with computing knowledge, 
software engineers, electronic engineers have specific knowledge that is more 
easily transferable to industry under consultancy form than that of a theoretical 
quantum mechanics physicist. In the same way, some kind of research fields 
require for their experiments machines to be created that might – after necessary 
changes – be passed to industry for high-tech applications. 
 
H3: The third hypothesis is that there is a positive relation between the 
researcher’s prior knowledge and the practical aspects of his/her 
entrepreneurial behaviour.  
H4: The fourth hypothesis is that there is a positive relation between field of 
research in which the researchers is involved and his/her entrepreneurial 
activities.  
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It should be noted that also in this case (as in the one of possible additional 
financial gains as part of the incentive scheme) a shift may occur in the research 
focus in order to concentrate on more applicable research. In fact, always 
remaining within his/her own field of research, a researcher may envisage to move 
towards more sellable research results. 
 
A change in focus of the research may occur because of many different reasons. In 
CERN it has happened that researchers (were) moved from one research group to 
another with subsequent modification of research focus. Such a shift might also be 
hypothesized as a consequence of a prospect of additional financial gains or of the 
field of research in which the researcher is involved. 
 
Shifts may occur at the personal (or research group) level to achieve research 
results or to develop instruments that may be more easily transferred to industry. 
Or simply, such shifts may highlight results that could be used in industry or 
create competencies that might be useful to industry, thus having an influence on 
entrepreneurial behaviour.  
However, similar shifts may also cause a deviation from industrial application of 
research results or researcher’s knowledge. In any case, there are too many 
reasons for possible shifts in research focus and therefore it will not be feasible 
within this thesis framework to test how a such a shift may correlate to EB of the 
researchers. Here we just want to highlight that such a correlation might exist, but 
it will not be taken further into account. 
 
 
2.1.6 - Incentives influence on EB 
Incentives from the mother institution tend to increase scientist’s 
entrepreneurialism (Mowery et al. 2001; European Commission 2000). Incentives 
from CERN take a number of forms: from sensibilization of researchers about 
entrepreneurial activities (leaflets and seminars about spin-offs creation, 
consultancy and licensing) to practical help in filing and obtaining patents 
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(copyrights, etc.) and cost bearing on the institution and not on the single 
researcher. All these activities are done and/or coordinated by the Technology 
Transfer office, which also has the important task of reducing incomplete 
information faced by the researchers. 
 
As already pointed out, additional incentives for researchers are the possibility of 
advancing in their career and of obtaining an extra remuneration for a positive 
result as a consequence of their pro-active role in a technology transfer process. 
The possibility of increased financial gains may create an interest in the researcher 
towards entrepreneurial activities. Financial gains from TT activities may generate 
additional incomes for both the researcher and his/her research group (e.g. Trune 
and Goslin 1998; AUTM 2001; COGR 1996; Mejia 1998). Such a motivation can 
contribute to entrepreneurial practices. Although it cannot fully justify the 
scientists’ entrepreneurialism, as strongly argued by Mowery and Rosenberg and 
by other authors (e.g. Mowery and Rosenberg 1989; Miyata 2000). 
 
An additional form of incentive for researchers is given by the possibility of 
having additional funds, and most of all, additional staff (usually graduate and 
PhD students) to divert to R&D activities that would not be otherwise pursued. 
The reason for this is that most of CERN forces are now concentrated on 
completing the LHC and, in the next couple of years, will be focused on having 
the new accelerator functioning at maximal speed and new experiments taking 
data and analyzing them. This causes a drain of resources, both financial and 
human resources, for LHC implementation, thus causing an ever diminishing 
number of other activities to be undertaken. However, technology transfer allows 
for R&D to go ahead within such constraints and that is why, for the time being, 
the possibility of having resources to allocate to activities other than LHC can be 
seen as a real incentive for CERN researchers. 
 
Incentives that will be called general incentives are not CERN-dependant, but can 
be recognized in any kind of organization. These incentives to the researchers can 
be material incentives – such as pay/salary, shares in success using bonuses, 
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shares in success using variable payment shares – such as self-realization, 
additional qualifications, gather experience for entry into industry/business, start 
and expand personal, career-supporting relationships (Walter et al. 2002). 
 
It should be noted that the possibility to obtain additional income might also cause 
a change in research focus towards more applied research which is more readily 
sellable.  
 
3. Research Instrumentation Description 
3.1 Questionnaire construction  
In order to test what factors correlate to entrepreneurial behaviour of researchers, 
a questionnaire was handed out to the selected population. The questionnaire was 
constructed as a sum of three previously published questionnaires, each analyzing 
different aspects of the behaviour of academic researchers. 
The three original questionnaires were obtained directly by the respective authors 
– whom the author hereby formally thank – after explaining what they would be 
used for. All the authors provided also a copy of the papers and/or reports for 
which the questionnaires were developed. Internal consistency was ensured by 
absorbing the questionnaires without major changes, if not substituting some 
terms to adapt the questions to CERN environment. 
 
The questionnaire by Prof. Jones-Evans was developed as part of a project, 
coordinated by the professor himself, which intended to study the process of 
technology transfer from universities to industry in different regions of Europe 
(Jones-Evans and et al. 1998). The project had a multi-level approach, as 
H5: The fifth hypothesis is that there is a positive relation between general 
and/or CERN incentives to the researcher and his/her intention of 
entrepreneurial activities. 
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technology transfer policies and practices at institutional level with a focus on 
Industrial Liaison Offices and as results of single academics activities. In this 
latest case, as in the present thesis, academic entrepreneurship was broadly 
defined as including contract research, technical consultancy, patenting and 
licensing activities, as well as the creation of spin-off firms, by university staff 
(Jones-Evans and et al. 1998). 
 
The questionnaire by Prof. Autio et. al. was created to study what factors 
influence entrepreneurial intent among university students (Autio et al. 2001). 
Based on the theory of planned behaviour, factors affecting entrepreneurial intent 
were categorized as being based on three independent antecedents: attitude 
towards entrepreneurship, subjective norms and perceived behavioral control. The 
study, based on international comparisons, showed that perceived behavioral 
control seems to be the most important determinant of entrepreneurial intent. 
 
The questionnaire by Prof. Lee was developed to study what was the specific role 
that academicians believe they can play in technology transfer and how they 
might want to collaborate with industry (Lee 1996). The main point of the study 
was to see how academics personally responded to institutional pressures towards 
technology transfer and where they would draw the boundaries to university-
industry links, in the light of major concerns such as decreasing national funds to 
research and concern to loose academic freedom to pursue basic research because 
of stronger links with industry. 
 
On these bases, the questionnaire used in the present thesis was assembled by 
incorporating into an harmonic unit the three questionnaires, in order to study the 
various causes of the entrepreneurial behaviour (or the causes of a disinterest 
towards an entrepreneurial behaviour) both at the individual and at the 
organizational level from the point of view of the researchers. 
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3.2 Questionnaire protocol  
The resulting questionnaire (which can be found in Annex I) is made up of 
different parts, corresponding to different information to be obtained and therefore 
different type of protocols.  
Question 1 to question 12 and then question 19 wanted to gain information about 
the respondent: nationality, age, gender, status and job at CERN, academic 
background, previous work experience, previous entrepreneurial experience. 
Questions concerning nationality, age, academic background, unit and department 
at CERN and average number of publications per year, were open questions. The 
remaining questions of this group had multiple choice answers. 
Questions 14 to 18 were asked in order to gather information about technology 
transfer at CERN, both about the TT unit and technology transfer policy, so to 
have useful indications for the TT unit that supported the author throughout the 
thesis development. These were yes or no questions. 
The remaining questions use Likert protocol on a five scores scale, with the sole 
exception of question 13 with a three scores scale. 
 
The overall length of the questionnaire was of 27 questions over six pages. The 
questionnaire took ten to fifteen minutes to complete and it was administered by 
e-mail. The body of the e-mail contained a presentation of the author, an 
indication of the author’s supervisor at CERN – dr. Marilena Streit-Bianchi – and 
a brief explanation of the research, although in general terms so not to influence 
the respondent. The questionnaire had the organization logo in all pages, so that 
the receivers would know it had been authorized. 
 
3.3 Hypotheses testing 
The questionnaire was used to test, in general, what is the attitude of the 
researchers towards entrepreneurial behaviour both at the level of CERN and at 
their own individual level.  
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Perceived entrepreneurial behaviour at the level of CERN, but always from the 
point of view of the researchers, was defined as: 
1) a series of activities that are presently done by the organization with 
industry – and the researcher was asked to express a judgement on the 
opportunity of the Lab engaging in such activities and the perceived 
impact of such activities on the Lab environment; 
2) a series of activities with industry that – according to the researcher – 
CERN should engage into, sometime in the future.  
Entrepreneurial behaviour at the level of the researcher was identified as 
expressing what career alternative he/she would choose outside working at 
entrepreneurial behaviour CERN. 
The following table schematizes the model used in the statistical analysis that will 
be presented in following chapter. 
 
Table 3.1 – Schematic representation of the experimental design. 
Hp 1 Hp 2 Hp 3 Hp 4 Hp 5 
  D20 D13 D25 D9 D10 D19 D24 D26 
D21 CERN work with industry                 
Displacement of mission                 
Loss of freedom              
Pressure for short-term res.              
Reduce basic research              
D22 
Conflict of interest                 
Commercialize research                 








Encourage consulting                 
                 
Corporate career                 
Civil service career              










Academic career                 
 
Entrepreneurial behaviour measurements were given by answers to questions 
number twenty-one (D21), twenty-two (D22) and twenty-three (D23) for EB at 




The different factors supposed to influence entrepreneurial behaviour attitudes of 
researchers were expressed by the following questions:  
? Recognition by peers (hp. 1) – D20; 
? Networks (hp. 2) – D13 and D25; 
? Prior knowledge (hp. 3) – D9 and D10; 
? Field of research (hp. 4) – D19; 
? Incentives (hp. 5) – D24 and D26. 
 
The data collected was analyzed using the Pearson correlation test. The highest 
level of confidence employed for the rejection of the null hypothesis was 0,10; 
however the level of confidence was specified for significant result as being either 
p < 0.001, p < 0.01, p < 0.05 or p < 0.10. 
 
 
4. Description of Procedures 
4.1 Submitting the questionnaire 
As already stated, the questionnaire was administered uniquely by e-mail to all of 
the 487 researchers identified as having a fellowship or a limited duration contract 
and working in scientific (other than theoretical physics) and engineering 
assignments identified by job code 1 and 2 by the HR department. 
The first run of e-mails was sent in four subsequent days in the last week of May 
2006.  A remainder run of e-mails was sent fifteen days later, given that e-mail 
questionnaires tend to be completed within the first days upon receipt.   
In the first run, all 487 researchers received the questionnaire. In the remainder 
run, the questionnaire was sent again to all those who had not responded the first 
time. Time, seasonal and institutional constraints made it impossible to do another 
call. 
There were 47 respondents to the first run and 38 of them answered within two 
days of receiving the questionnaire. The second run had 56 respondents, again the 
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majority answered within 48 hours. Finally, a total of 104 filled-in questionnaires 
could be collected. 
 
In contacting the subjects, a number of ethical considerations were addressed.  
The subjects were informed of the general aim of the study and were asked 
consent to use their answers for the study itself. They were also assured that their 
answers would be treated confidentially and that the data analysis would insure 
them complete anonymity.  
At the same time, respondents were informed that the questionnaires results would 
be used in a PhD thesis and that, therefore, the finding will be freely accessible. 
Those who specifically asked for a communication on the study results will be 
provided a short report and all reference details of the thesis. 
The respondents who asked for a more detailed explanation of the study project 
were debriefed and offered the chance to accept or refuse to fill in the 
questionnaire at their discretion.  
 
4.2 The Human Resources Department 
From the beginning of the PhD project, the author received a major support from 
CERN, given that the whole second year and part of the third year of PhD was 
spent at the Laboratory in the TT unit on a part-time basis to acquire basic data 
and understanding of the organization. Following the on-site period, the author 
had the possibility to remain connected to CERN as an Unpaid Associate in the 
TT, which granted free access to resources and continuous contact with the 
organization and, in particular, with the supervisor. 
 
In order to submit the questionnaire to CERN staff, permission had to be asked to 
the HR department. Such permission was promptly granted from the HR Director 
himself, whom the author hereby formally thanks, with only a minor change to the 
questionnaire. The only stipulation to the permission for submitting the 
questionnaire was that permanent staff should not be involved in the study 
because of career position, on the one hand, and time constraints for the LHC, on 
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the other. At any rate, the HR department leader, being interested in the research 
altogether, said that the results of the study should be communicated to him and 
his services.  
 
Once permission was granted, the HR department provided the names and e-mail 
addresses of the 487 researchers present at CERN in the spring of 2006 with a 
limited duration or a fellowship contract. At the same time, the HR department 
also provided a series of data requested by the author: gender, age, job code, job 
title and job description and finally duration of the contract with CERN. The use 
of this information is purely statistic to describe the population under study. 
Furthermore, the original list – as well as the emails containing the filled-in 
questionnaires – was destroyed, so that from the anonymous questionnaire the 
respondent could not be tracked back. 
 
 
5. Description of Subjects 
At the beginning, the subjects of the study were intended to be researchers and 
engineers who are on CERN payroll; this means some one thousand people, 
identified by their contract with CERN. The following groups were selected and 
can be classified according to their contract: 
- Fellows: they are typically young researchers who have a two or three 
years long contract which can be renewed for another two or three years; 
there were 199 fellows in the list given by HR;  
- Limited Duration contracts: these are people who are enrolled by CERN 
with a fixed term contract depending on the estimated duration of their 
task at CERN; there were 288 people with LD contract in the list given by 
HR; 
- Indefinite contract: these are people that are enrolled to build the 
accelerators and carry out the support necessary to the CERN users and 
have with CERN a contract of indeterminate duration, which may 
eventually end up at retirement age. 
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The organization staff varies greatly for age, educational and cultural background. 
CERN has researchers coming from over seventy countries. The staff with 
academic background varies from engineering to physics to informatics. 
Researchers may have academic experience, but some of them also had previous 
professional experiences in industry. By end 2005, the CERN staff accounted to 
2635 staff classified according to the following categories: 2.9% Researchers, 
36.2% Scientific and engineering services, 34.8% Technical Services, 8.7% 
Manual and skilled workers and 17.4% Administrative duties. 
 
In 2002-2003, when the work began, it was assumed that almost all CERN 
researchers would be sent the questionnaire. This would have meant all staff and 
fellows with job code 1 and 2 (Scientific work in Experimental and Scientific and 
Engineering work), other than theoretical physicists (who are a small group of 
about 30 people), whose field of research is generally too abstract to have any 
interest for industry.  
At the moment of actually sending the questionnaire to the subjects of the study, it 
was finally decided to send it out only to all CERN staff with a limited duration or 
a fellowship contract and with job code 1 or 2, other than theoretical physicists. 
The questionnaire was then sent to 487 researchers.  
 
The reason to send the questionnaire only to these researchers is twofold. 
 
On the one side, they constitute the young part of CERN researchers (as we saw 
that a big part of permanent contract staffs are over 51 years old as can be seen in 
Annex II). Whereas LD contracts and Fellows are the ones who still do not have a 
definite position in the labour market. On the contrary, they have contracts that 
can be renewed only once and most of them will have to leave CERN and find a 
position outside the Laboratory, might it be in industry, academy or other research 
centers. In fact, there are only few openings for permanent contracts, compared to 
the number of people enrolled at CERN with limited duration or fellowship 
contracts.  
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These two types of contracts are for a two or three years period. If one can obtain 
a renewal of a fellowship contract (for a total of four years) and then a LD 
contract (renewed once for a total of four to six years), still this person will 
feasibly find him/herself at the age of 35-40 becoming available for the European 
job market.. It is then self-evident that these are the kind of people that are most 
interesting from the point of view of their behaviour towards industry in general 
and entrepreneurship in particular. 
 
On the other side, the HR department explicitly asked not to send the 
questionnaire to permanent staff. The first reason being – in substance, if not in 
words – the same as the above. The second reason was that at the time of the 
questionnaire, around mid 2006, staff was deeply and busily involved in keeping 
the time schedule for the LHC to arrive to an end and the HR felt it would not pay 
to try sending them the questionnaire, as there would not be a significant response 
rate.  
 
Given the limited number of components of the selected population and given the 
chosen procedure of an e-mail questionnaire, it was decided that the whole 
population could be used as subject pool; therefore no sample was extracted from 
the population. This approach was chosen also in view of a possible low rate of 
response to e-mail questionnaires. 
 
5.1 Presentation of selected population  
 
Some graphics describing the entire scientific staff of CERN can be found in 
Annex II, whereas here is provided a short presentation in terms of descriptive 
statistics of the main characteristics of the population selected for the study.  
Of the 487 researchers whom have been sent the questionnaire, 198 of them are 










Source: elaboration on row data about selected population 
 
 
The selected population includes researchers who have different tasks at CERN. 
The following table and figure provide the description of the jobs of the 
researchers. It is interesting to note that almost 41% of the population has 
computing tasks (figure 3.6), which can be explained by the advanced computing 
skills necessary to program and run a complex machine such as the LHC and by 
the people being member of the EGEE, an EU founded project. 
 
 
Table 3.2 – Fellows and LD contracts by job. 
Job code and title description Abbreviated Fellows LD Total 
1 - Experimental physics Exp. Phys. 46 19 65 
2 - Applied physics Appl. Phys. 69 48 117 
2 - Chemistry Chemistry 1 1 2 
2 - Civil engineering/surveying-topometry Civil eng. 3 3 6 
2 - Computing Computing 55 144 199 
2 - Electricity Electricity 0 7 7 
2 - Electromechanics Electromech. 0 1 1 
2 - Electronics Electronics 9 27 36 
2 - Engineering/Scientific work - General     
or combination of code 
General eng./sc. 10 11 21 
2 - Mechanics Mechanics 5 22 27 
2 - Work safety/radiation protection Safety/radiation 0 6 6 
Total   198 289 487 
Source: elaboration on row data about selected population 
 
 103
The second more frequent job – 24% of the population – is applied physics, 
although this is the activity of the highest number of fellows (normally nuclear 
engineers). The third most frequent job is experimental physics – for 13% of the 
population – and again fellows make up the majority of people with this job, this 
is usually the case of experimental (particle) physicists. These three jobs alone 
employ more than 78% of the whole population, and the same holds true for the 
entire research staff at CERN, permanent jobs included. 
 
 



























































































Source: elaboration on row data about selected population 
 
Concerning the age of the population, there are significant differences between 
Fellows and LD staff. In fact, whereas all fellows are below 40 years old, LDs are 
up to 63 years old, seven of them are over 51 and thirty-three of them are in their 
forties (for a total of 14% of LDs over 41 years old). Figure 3.7 gives the age 
distribution.  
If a comparison is done between Figure 3.7 here and Figure A.3 in Annex II, it 
can be seen that while 61% of CERN staff is over 41 years old (and 34,6% is over 




























Source: elaboration on row data about selected population 
 
The percentage of women in the selected population is 18%. In 2005 the 
percentage of women at CERN in general is about 20%. However, women are 
23% of fellows and only 14% of staff with limited duration contracts.  
 
 

















Source: elaboration on row data about selected population 
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The nationality distribution of fellows and LD contracts sees Italy as the most 
represented country with a total of 85 people, followed by France (63), Germany 
(51), Spain (49), and United Kingdom (47). These five countries are also the 
biggest contributors to CERN budget. Non-Member States are represented by 18 
people, coming from countries such as India, Japan, Russia, etc. Such distribution 
is consistent with that of staff in general (as can be seen in Figure A.5 in Annex 
II).  
 
















Having set some organizational concepts that should be considered when 
analyzing a basic research center, this chapter proposed a theoretical framework to 
recognize factors which might explain entrepreneurial behaviour of researchers.  
Having explained how the questionnaire was constructed and submitted to the 
subjects of the research, it is now possible to consider what results were obtained, 
under the consideration that the core of the study is the individual level. 
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The purpose of this work is to examine what factors might be correlated to an 
expression of interest towards Entrepreneurial Behaviour by the individual 
researchers at CERN. A total of one-hundred and three answered questionnaires 
were used to review the hypotheses presented in Chapter 3. Following are the 
results of the analysis of the survey. 
This chapter is divided into seven sections. The first introduces the statistical 
method used. The following five sections correspond to the five hypotheses 
relating to factors influencing EB and describe the results for each of them. The 




1. Statistical procedure 
 
It was interesting for the model to see the linear correlation between the identified 
factors influencing entrepreneurial behaviour and the expression of interest and 
attitudes towards EB by the single researcher both at the level of CERN and at the 
level of the researcher him/herself. 
In order to test if such a linear correlation existed, it was decided to use the 
Pearson’s R correlation coefficient, because it gives an indication not only of the 
magnitude, but also of the direction of the association between two variables that 
are on an interval or ratio scale.  
The correlation coefficient can vary between +1 and -1. This number tells us 
about the magnitude and direction of the association between two variables.   
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The magnitude is the strength of the correlation. The closer the correlation is to 
either +1 or -1, the stronger the correlation is. If the correlation is 0 or very close 
to zero, there is no association between the two variables.  
The direction of the correlation indicates how the two variables are related. If the 
correlation is positive, the two variables have a positive relationship (as one 
increases, the other also increases). If the correlation is negative, the two variables 
have a negative relationship (as one increases, the other decreases).  
The level of confidence, the probability level for rejection of the null hypothesis, 
was set and identified in each case between 0.001 and 0.10. The following 
notation was adopted: ***(p < 0.001); **(p < 0.01); *(p < 0.05); +(p < 0.10). 
It remains understood that correlation refers to the departure of two variables from 
independence, although correlation does not imply causality. 
 
A previous analysis was done checking for the Spearman correlation coefficient, 
to analyze whether an arbitrary monotonic function could describe the relationship 
between the two variables at hand, without making any assumptions about the 
frequency distribution of the variables. Given that the significant results had an 
almost 99% match over significant corresponding values of Pearson’s R, it was 
decided to use this last coefficient in the analysis. 
 
 
2. Hypothesis 1 – Recognition by peers 
 
The first hypothesis stated that there is a positive relation between recognition by 
peers and entrepreneurial behaviour by researchers. 
The perception of research credit for patentable inventions being greater than or at 
least equal to refereed journal articles was set as a measure of recognition by peers 
that might influence entrepreneurial behaviour in terms of what researchers think 




Table 4.1 – Research credit correlation to entrepreneurial behaviour 
Research 
Credit
D21 CERN work with industry -0,045
Displacement of mission 0,045
Loss of freedom 0,109
Pressure for short-term research 0,023
Reduce BR 0,154
Conflict of interest 0,170 +
Commercialize research 0,047
Set up incubator 0,101
Encourage consulting -0,077
Corporate career 0,091
Civil service career 0,055
Entrepreneurial career -0,028
Academic career 0,220 *
















Research credit for patentable inventions was found to a have a positive and 
significant correlation to the fact that a close CERN-industry collaboration for 
technology transfer and commercialization would not cause conflict of interest 
between research and “business” at CERN. 
The same variable has a positive and significant correlation to the choice of 
academic career as an alternative to employment in CERN. 
Results do not show other significant correlations between recognition by peers 
and entrepreneurial behaviour by CERN or by the individual researchers. 
Judgement by peers does not result as a variable having much of correlation to 




3. Hypothesis 2 – Networks 
The second hypothesis is that there is a positive relation between network’s 
assessment of EB and the researcher’s attitudes about entrepreneurial behaviour 
both at the CERN level and the individual level. 
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Table 4.2 shows the coefficients for the correlation between unspecified networks 
in which the researcher is embedded and entrepreneurial behaviour. 
In particular, the perception that entrepreneurship by researchers and a career 
alternative in industry are considered good by the network in which the researcher 
is rooted are positively and significantly correlated to the fact that a close CERN-
industry collaboration would not cause a displacement of the Organization 
mission, nor a loss of freedom and autonomy for the Lab, nor a pressure for short-
term research, nor would it reduce research activities or cause a conflict of 
interest.  
 
Networks general perceptions about entrepreneurship also have a positive and 
significant correlation to the view by the researchers that CERN should 
commercialize its research by more strongly support its technology transfer office, 
as well as set up an incubator and encourage its staff to provide consulting 
services to private firms (a case in which correlations were quite significant, 
particularly in the case of entrepreneurship considered as a good career alternative 
by the network members). 
 
Table 4.2 – Networks correlation to entrepreneurial behaviour 
Res. entr. Coll. entr. Entr. as altern. I know entr. Ind. as empl.
D21 CERN work with industry 0,096 0,099 0,066 0,066 0,153
Displacement of mission 0,153 0,170 + 0,275 ** 0,134 0,228 *
Loss of freedom 0,220 * 0,187 + 0,366 *** 0,106 0,415 ***
Pressure for short-term res. -0,058 0,065 0,247 * 0,177 + 0,266 **
Reduce BR 0,093 0,061 0,263 ** 0,177 + 0,320 **
Conflict of interest 0,248 * 0,213 * 0,327 ** 0,156 0,328 **
Commercialize research 0,182 + 0,118 0,187 + 0,180 + 0,115
Set up incubator 0,186 + 0,245 * 0,202 * 0,225 * 0,144
Encourage consulting 0,119 0,225 * 0,357 *** 0,168 + 0,337 **
Corporate career 0,103 0,17 + 0,353 *** 0,091 0,334 **
Civil service career 0,143 -0,051 0,131 0,045 0,238 *
Entrepreneurial career 0,278 ** 0,251 * 0,385 *** 0,052 0,293 **





















The idea that the networks in which the researcher is embedded have a positive 
view of entrepreneurship and collaboration with industry also shows a positive 
and significant correlation to career alternatives in industry and also in self-
employment (in this last case the correlations were particularly significant). On 
the contrary, and quite consistently, there was a negative correlation to the choice 
of academic career as an alternative: the strongest the idea that entrepreneurship is 
considered good, the least appealing a career in university. 
The analysis showed no significant correlation between present-day CERN- 
industry collaboration and the perceived position of network members towards 
entrepreneurship or employment in industry. 
 
Table 4.3 shows the coefficients for the correlation between the perception of 




Table 4.3 – CERN network correlation to entrepreneurial behaviour 
Entrepreneurship Contract research
D21 CERN work with industry -0,188 + -0,017
Displacement of mission 0,124 0,225 *
Loss of freedom 0,127 0,168
Pressure for short-term research 0,002 0,06
Reduce BR 0,175 + 0,16
Conflict of interest 0,211 * 0,387 ***
Commercialize research -0,089 0,142
Set up incubator 0,12 0,114
Encourage consulting 0,04 -0,129
Corporate career -0,02 0,033
Civil service career 0,235 * -0,005
Entrepreneurial career -0,114 -0,088
Academic career 0,084 -0,083
CERN network



















A perceived supportive environment inside CERN towards staff getting involved 
in the development of entrepreneurial activities was found to have positive 
significant correlations to a hypothetical closer collaboration between the Lab and 
industry as not impacting on reducing basic research or causing conflicts of 
interest and civil service as a career alternative, but a negative correlation to the 
present collaboration as being too close, thus not showing coherency. On the 
contrary, a perceived supportive environment towards staff getting involved in 
contract research had positive and quite significant correlations to small chances 
of displacement of mission or interest conflicts. 
 
 
4. Hypothesis 3 – Prior knowledge 
The third hypothesis is that there is a positive relation between the researcher’s 
prior knowledge and his/her attitudes towards entrepreneurial behaviour. 
Prior knowledge as a factor affecting researchers’ attitudes towards 
entrepreneurial behaviour at CERN level and at the individual level was defined 
both as previous work experience by the researcher and also as prior knowledge 
of entrepreneurship – both personally or familiarly – and of big or small 
companies. 
 
Table 4.4 presents the correlation coefficients relative to previous work 
experience. 
Only in the case of researchers with prior experiences in manufacturing there was 
a positive although loosely significant correlation to the perception that CERN is 
not working closely enough to industry in transferring technology and 
commercializing its research. 
 
Interesting results concern the impact that a close CERN-industry collaboration 
(D22) would have on various aspects of the Lab’s environment. In the case of 
researchers having experiences as consultants, the correlations were all positive 
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and significant in indicating that a strong collaboration between the Organization 
and industry would not cause shifts in the implementation of research. 
 
 
Table 4.4 – Prior knowledge (previous work) correlation to entrepreneurial 
behaviour 
No exper. Manufact. Consulting Public Univ. Other
D21 CERN work with industry -0,039 0,188 + 0,057 -0,082 -0,132 0,127
Displacement of mission -0,077 0,041 0,245 * -0,007 -0,131 0,021
Loss of freedom -0,049 -0,132 0,239 * 0,018 -0,126 0,087
Pressure short-term res. -0,164 + 0,005 0,280 ** -0,054 -0,067 0,111
Reduce BR -0,064 0,108 0,247 * -0,160 -0,08 0,054
Conflict of interest 0,006 -0,038 0,236 * -0,103 -0,119 0,027
Commercialize research -0,107 0,155 0,166 + -0,006 -0,037 -0,020
Set up incubator -0,031 0,111 0,057 0,020 -0,077 -0,005
Encourage consulting 0,066 0,044 0,024 0,001 -0,063 0,136
Corporate career -0,076 0,123 0,055 -0,075 0,069 -0,003
Civil service career -0,089 0,045 0,019 -0,074 0,238 * -0,063
Entrepreneurial career 0,066 0,078 0,190 + -0,138 -0,172 + 0,173 +
Academic career 0,052 -0,05 -0,252 ** -0,119 0,293 ** -0,081
Previous work experience



















Concerning the actions that CERN should undertake, there is only one significant 
result, which is consistent with what was said just above. In fact, the case of 
researchers with consulting experience is positively correlated to the possibility of 
CERN commercializing its research, although quite curiously no significant 
correlation was shown with encouraging staff to do consulting. 
 
Consistency is also found in the career alternatives considered by the researchers. 
There is a negative correlation that is quite significant between previous 
experience in consulting and academic career as a desirable alternative, and a 
positive correlation to entrepreneurship. The opposite is true for those with prior 
experience in university: positive and significant correlation to academic career 
and public sector career and negative correlation to entrepreneurship. Finally, a 
positive correlation emerges between other kinds of previous work experience and 
the alternative of self-employment. 
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Table 4.5 presents the correlation coefficients relative to previous work 
experience: entrepreneurial experience was set in terms of having had own or 
family business: previous work experience was set as having worked in a big or 
small business. 
 
Table 4.5 – Prior knowledge correlation to entrepreneurial behaviour 
Family bus. Own bus. Big bus. Small bus. Other
D21 CERN work with industry -0,165 + -0,024 -0,002 -0,142 0,043
Displacement of mission -0,055 0,078 -0,083 -0,102 0,003
Loss of freedom -0,025 0,124 -0,093 -0,036 0,111
Pressure short-term res. 0,109 -0,027 -0,269 ** -0,05 0,049
Reduce BR 0,004 0,016 -0,174 + -0,105 -0,007
Conflict of interest -0,009 0,137 -0,183 + -0,009 -0,026
Commercialize research 0,131  -0,173 + -0,044 -0,044 0,107
Set up incubator 0,182 + -0,06 -0,064 -0,062 0,022
Encourage consulting 0,124 0,075 -0,214 * -0,061 0,224 *
Corporate career 0,166 + -0,063 -0,064 -0,057 -0,061
Civil service career -0,069 0,145 -0,082 0,105 0,001
Entrepreneurial career 0,134 0,21 * -0,084 -0,076 -0,015


















Prior knowledge of entrepreneurship in terms of family business was found to 
have a negative correlation to the present working situation of CERN with 
industry. Researchers who had experience in big business (indicated in the 
questionnaire as those with more than fifty employees) expressed a view that a 
close collaboration between the Lab and industry would induce a pressure for 
short-term research, a reduction of basic research activities and a conflict of 
interest between basic research and business (all expressed by negative significant 
correlations).  
Prior knowledge of researchers was also differently correlated to entrepreneurial 
behaviour applied to CERN. So, entrepreneurial experience via family business 
was positively correlated to setting up incubators as a desirable action by CERN. 
Encourage consulting by staff had a positive significant correlation to other kinds 
of prior knowledge, while it had a negative correlation to the case of previous 
experience in big business. Interestingly, a prior experience in self-employment 
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was negatively correlated to the idea that the Organization should commercialize 
its research. 
Finally, considering researchers indication of desirable career alternatives 
significantly positive correlation were found between: a) corporate career and 
prior experience in family business; b) between academic career and self-
employment, but also employment in big and small business; c) as expected, 
between own business experience and entrepreneurial career. 
 
5. Hypothesis 4 – Field of research 
The fourth hypothesis is that there is a positive relation between field of research 
in which the researchers is involved and his/her entrepreneurial activities. 
Researchers at CERN are employed in different kinds of research activity. Their 
working time is variously divided between basic and applied research and 
prototyping, according to their academic background and their division and unit 
they belong to and the kind of task they are working upon.  
 
Table 4.6 – Research activity correlation to entrepreneurial behaviour 
Basic research Applied research Prototyping
D21 CERN work with industry -0,088 0,018 0,010
Displacement of mission -0,049 0,056 -0,047
Loss of freedom -0,103 0,140 0,101
Pressure short-term res. -0,083 0,072 0,012
Reduce basic research -0,038 0,136 -0,042
Conflict of interest -0,064 0,121 -0,023
Commercialize research -0,266 ** 0,044 0,169 +
Set up incubator -0,235 * 0,264 ** 0,133
Encourage consulting -0,268 ** 0,299 ** 0,132
Corporate career -0,169 + 0,293 ** 0,049
Civil service career 0,100 0,151 -0,083
Entrepreneurial career -0,096 -0,009 0,081
Academic career 0,235 * -0,021 -0,117
Research activity at CERN
















When basic research accounts for most of the researcher’s activity, there is a 
negative and significant correlation to entrepreneurial activities in which CERN 
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should get involved. Coherently, at the individual level corporate career is not 
seen as a desirable activity, as shown by the negative correlation, whereas 
academic career is positively and significantly correlated. 
When applied research is the respondent’s main activity, there is a positive and 
significant correlation (p<0,01) to envisaged EB by the Lab in form of setting up 
incubators and encouragement of consulting activities by staff, but no significant 
correlation was found towards commercialization of research results. A positive 
and significant (p<0,01) correlation was present in case of corporate career as an 
alternative to a job at the research center.  
Finally, prototyping as a main activity is significantly and positively correlated 
only to the perception that CERN should commercialize it research. 
 
 
6. Hypothesis 5 – Incentives from CERN 
and general incentives 
 
The fifth hypothesis is that there is a positive relation between incentives to the 
researcher and his/her entrepreneurial behaviour. 
Different kinds of incentives were identified as possibly influencing the 
entrepreneurial attitudes of researchers both at the level of CERN and at the 
individual level. Those incentives were divided in incentives by CERN and 
general incentives. 
 
Table 4.7 shows correlation coefficients relative to CERN incentives. 
The identified incentives by CERN did not show a very high number of 
significant correlations to EB of researchers, but the significant ones do show 
interesting results. When CERN is perceived to encourage researchers to actively 
pursue their ideas in application of research, such a perception is positively and 
significantly correlated to a view that the Organization should encourage its 
scientists to engage in consulting activities and no conflict of interests would arise 
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from a close collaboration with industry.  In the same way, the fact that at CERN 
a good number of people can be found to have good ideas for starting firms is 
positively correlated to no perceived risk of displacement of mission or loss of 
freedom of the Lab. And the perception that international status holds back people 
from engaging in entrepreneurial activities is positively correlated to no pressure 
for short term research arising from collaboration with industry.  
 
 











D21 CERN work with industry -0,129 -0,102 0,016 -0,284 ** -0,189 +
Displacement of mission 0,162 0,180 + -0,033 -0,015 -0,056
Loss of freedom 0,126 0,185 + 0,037 0,081 -0,032
Pressure for short-term res. 0,126 0,104 0,176 + -0,062 -0,118
Reduce BR 0,133 0,143 0,162 -0,087 -0,128
Conflict of interest 0,241 * 0,138 0,138 0,013 -0,008
Commercialize research 0,011 -0,047 -0,018 -0,115 -0,216 *
Set up incubator -0,012 -0,088 -0,026 0,043 -0,258 **
Encourage consulting 0,244 * 0,114 0,072 0,006 0,073
Corporate career 0,206 * 0,116 0,275 ** 0,107 0,108
Civil service career 0,226 * -0,037 -0,069 0,015 0,052
Entrepreneurial career -0,068 0,083 0,044 0,029 -0,008


















It is interesting to note that awareness of a clear TT policy concerning IPRs is 
negatively correlated to present collaboration with industry (which is then seen as 
too close) and also the perception of a well functioning TT infrastructure at CERN 
has negative correlations to collaboration with industry as well as to the 
advisability of commercializing research results or setting up incubators. 
Finally CERN incentives are positively correlated to careers alternatives in 
industry, public sector and university but not significantly correlated to 
entrepreneurship. 
 
Table 4.8 shows the correlation coefficients relative to general incentives and 
entrepreneurial behaviour at CERN and individual level. 
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General incentives did not show any significant correlation on the perception of 
the goodness of present collaboration between CERN and industry. On the 
contrary, numerous and significant and positive correlations on perceived 
outcomes of a possible closer collaboration were found. In particular, financial 
incentives were positively correlated to no perceived loss of freedom, nor pressure 
for short term research nor conflict of interests, whereas all ‘personal’ incentives 
were positively correlated to almost all outcomes of such a collaboration as not 
being harmful at all. 
 
Financial incentives were also correlated to the view that CERN should encourage 
consulting activities by its staff and – in the case of remuneration in form of 
shares – to setting up incubators. Self-realization was positively correlated to all 
EBs of the Organization as being desirable and obtaining additional qualification 
was in positive correlation to set up incubators.  
 
Table 4.8 – Incentives correlation to entrepreneurial behaviour 
Pay Bonus Share Self-
realizat.
Qualificat. Exper. Relation.
D21 CERN work with industry 0,059 0,038 0,065 0,079 -0,073 -0,157 -0,075
Displacement of mission 0,153 0,154 0,136 0,164 + 0,167 + -0,005 0,136
Loss of freedom 0,276 ** 0,219 * 0,170 + 0,184 + 0,243 * 0,254 * 0,281 **
Pressure for short-term res. 0,206 * 0,141 0,105 0,196 * 0,248 * 0,165 +  0,332 **
Reduce BR 0,128 0,093 -0,014 0,115 0,199 * 0,177 + 0,265 **
Conflict of interest 0,287 ** 0,312  ** 0,288 ** 0,265 ** 0,249 * 0,192 + 0,367 ***
Commercialize research 0,053 -0,074 0,000 0,178 + 0,034 -0,053 0,056
Set up incubator 0,049 0,160 0,209 * 0,205 * 0,202 * 0,027 0,150
Encourage consulting 0,167 + 0,280 ** 0,247 * 0,254 * 0,294 ** 0,238 * 0,314 **
Corporate career 0,318 ** 0,310 ** 0,269 ** 0,307 ** 0,221 * 0,289 ** 0,236 *
Civil service career -0,012 -0,099 0,046 0,056 0,188 + 0,141 0,261
Entrepreneurial career 0,191 + 0,104 0,206 * 0,354 *** 0,199 * 0,388 *** 0,334 **
Academic career -0,047 -0,193 + -0,121 -0,107 0,071 -0,082 -0,134
Incentives

















It is particularly interesting to note that all incentives are positively and 
significantly correlated to encourage consulting activities by CERN staff. 
Finally, all incentives were also positively correlated to a career alternative in 
industry and also all of them, but bonuses, are positively correlated to an 
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alternative entrepreneurial career. Incentives in the form of bonuses are coherently 
in a negative correlation to a career in university. 
 
 
7. Descriptive statistics  
Some of the questions (D14 to D18) that were asked to the researchers referred to 
the introduction of a formal technology transfer policy at CERN and the existence 
of the TT office, within the organization, and how these affected their relationship 
with industry. It was of particular interest to understand if the researchers were 




Figure 4.1 – Impact of technology transfer policy on CERN researchers 
































The graph above illustrates how the vast majority of the respondents are aware of 
the existence of a TT service inside CERN, however very high shares of them – 
respectively 89% and 87% – do not feel that the creation of a TT service changed 
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their interaction modalities with industry nor that the introduction of a proactive 
TT policy change their attitudes towards it.  
When asked to say if financial incentives would motivate them to transfer 
technology 58% of them answered yes. 
 
If the data just presented seem quite encouraging for the TT group, they should be 
checked against the data in the following graph (Figure 4.2). Here percentages to 
three items of question D26 are presented. These items are directly connected to 
TT group activities at CERN. 
The international status of CERN researchers means that for any activity in which 
staff is involved that may provide financial gains, the individual has to ask and be 
granted a special permission by the Director General. It is interesting to note that 
49% of researchers declared themselves indifferent to the fact that international 
officer status holds back people at CERN from engaging in entrepreneurial 
activities. Whereas 24% of respondents said they strongly disagree with this, 
while another 24% said they agree (the remaining 3% is given by those who 
didn’t answer the question).  
 
A more positive result for the work of the TT group is given by the answers to the 
item “I am aware that CERN has a clear policy regarding the intellectual 
ownership of ideas developed during research”. In this case, 45% of respondents 
agreed with the statement, 33% declared themselves indifferent, whereas 20% 
disagreed.  
 
Finally, when asked to express agreement or disagreement with the statement that 
at CERN there is a well functioning infrastructure in place to support technology 
transfer, the very high majority of researchers answered that they were indifferent; 
an additional 20% said that they did not agree, whereas only 12% approved of the 





Figure 4.2 – Perception of TT activities at CERN and impact of international 
status. 























strongly disagree disagree indif ferent agree strongly agree
 
 
Question D11 asked if, since joining CERN, the researchers had any direct contact 
with industry in one or more of the following ways: 
- I approached an industrial organization for procurement – selected 38 
times; 
- I approached an industrial organization for R&D outside procurement – 
selected 23 times; 
- An industrial organization approached me for consultancy – selected 11 
times; 
- No contact – selected 57 times. 
 
In case the researcher had had any kind of contact with industry, he/she was asked 
to select what type or types of activities he/she had been involved in. In particular, 
the respondent was also asked to specify if he/she carried on these activities with 
or without CERN. This question was consciously left not very specific as to when 
those activities had been done, although having answered yes to the precedent 
question understated that these should be activities done since joining the 
organization, with CERN itself or externally to it, which – for contract – the 
researcher should not be allowed to, as we noticed before. In the following table 
are presented the number of times that each item was selected. 
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Participating in research projects with industry 24 12 
Patenting / licensing research results 2 4 
Consulting / provision of personal expertise 12 15 
Teaching to non-university individuals (ex.: 
continuing education) 7 8 
Spin-off: the formation of a new organization to 
exploit the results of the research 1 4 
Other 4 2 
 
 
What is of interest in understanding researchers attitudes towards entrepreneurial 
behaviour as defined in this study is that twelve people out of one-hundred and 
three have worked on research projects with industry outside of CERN and fifteen 
people have been consultants outside of contracts formally signed by the 
organization. Other eighteen people were involved either in professional training, 
patenting, aiding in the creation of spin-offs or some other kind of activity.  
 
Question D23 asked the respondent to express agreement and/or disagreement on 
whether CERN should: a) commercialize its research by more strongly support its 
technology transfer office; b) set up its own incubator to help start up new 
technology-based businesses; c) encourage staff to provide consulting services to 
private firms. 
 







Figure 4.3 – Indication of desired entrepreneurial behaviour at CERN level. 

























strongly disagree disagree indifferent agree strongly agree
 
 
As can be observed, in each case the majority of researchers agreed with the 
option that CERN should engage in a more active contacts with industry, although 
a good portion of respondents also said to de indifferent. The statement that the 
organization should encourage consulting activity by its staff to private firms was 
the one that had the highest share of agreement (52% between agree and strongly 
agree). A total of 48% of respondents agreed with the statement that the Lab 
should set up incubators. Somehow smaller (43%) was the share of respondents 
expressing the view that CERN should commercialize its research. Leaving aside 
those who declared themselves indifferent, the researchers that clearly disagreed 
with these options were in a significant smaller number compared to those 
agreeing with such possibilities.  
 
Finally, question D27 was asking the respondent to grade how attractive they 
would find each career alternative if the had to choose an alternative career. 
 
Figure 4.4 illustrates the percentages of respondents grading each item. 
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The career that resulted the preferred one by the vast majority of researchers was a 
professional life in university, which received high grades of attractiveness by 
most respondents (for a total of 86% over 103 answers from attractive to highly 
attractive). The second preferred career was in a large company (72%), followed 
by a career in the public sector (67%) and finally the entrepreneurship alternative 
(found attractive in 63% of 103 cases). The entrepreneurial alternative was the one 
with the highest number of respondents finding it attractive (41% compared to 
other medium attractive career with lower percentages, such as 23% for corporate 
or academic career), but also with the highest number of researchers not finding it 
attractive (28% not very attractive, plus 8% not attractive at all). 
 










































From the analysis of the questionnaires the following results can be summarized. 
Concerning recognition by peers, this factor had significant and positive 
correlations only to two items of EB. General networks have many positive 
correlations to EB both at CERN and individual level, whereas CERN network 
has positive correlation to potential EB of CERN in the future, but negative 
correlation to present-day collaboration between CERN and industry. Previous 
 124
work experience in consulting is positively correlated to almost all EB at both 
levels, whereas Prior work experience in business is negatively correlated to EB. 
As a factor explaining entrepreneurial behaviour, basic research activity is 
negatively correlated to EB; applied research is positively correlated to EB at 
CERN level and once at individual level; and Prototyping has only one significant 
and positive correlation to EB. General incentives are positively correlated to 
almost all expressions of EB at both levels, whereas Two CERN incentives have 
positive correlations to EB. The 2 TT incentives have negative correlations to EB. 
While aware of a technology transfer policy and infrastructure, researchers claim 
there were no significant changes in their relationships with industry, although the 
existence of financial incentives would push them to engage in TT-related 
activities. High shares of respondents also agree that the Lab should 
commercialize its research and/or technologies, set up incubators and mostly 
encourage its staff to provide consulting services to the industrial sector. Finally, 
academic career was recognized as the most attractive, followed by corporate, 
public sector and entrepreneurial career. 
From these results some interesting interpretations might be drawn. 
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Chapter 5 – Interpretations 
 
Introduction 
This chapter presents interpretations that can be drawn from the study presented in 
earlier chapters. After a bottom-up approach, it is now appropriate to try and 
provide a general interpretation framework at the three levels that were considered 
throughout the thesis: the macro-level, the intermediate level and the individual 
level. 
The present chapter is divided into three sections. The first one deals with policy 
interpretations that can be inductively proposed at the macro-level, concerning 
science and technology policy in general. The second section presents strategy 
interpretations that can be referred to the intermediate level, that of the research 
institutions. Finally, the third section proposes interpretations at the micro-level, 




1. Macro-level: some policy interpretations 
The macro-level, as defined in the present study, concerns the knowledge-
production system and the knowledge-governance system. Applying an inductive 
approach to the empirical results, especially in light of the fact that CERN-related 
factors were not significant, it is possible to propose some general interpretations 
in terms of science and technology policy. 
  
Researchers’ interest towards collaborations with industry; technology transfer 
projects, as well as cooperation projects between industry and research centers, 
born from applications developed for basic researches; technologies implemented 
for pure science goals and sold on the market after standardization for industrial 
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users’ needs; all these allow recognizing basic research as a highly prolific 
potential generator of industrial applications25.  
In this sense, from the point of view of science policy research, a partial revival of 
the linear model, integrated by a reshaped reward system allowing scientists to get 
credit also for entrepreneurial activities, may be proposed. In the case of basic 
research, such as high energy particle physics, one may identify problem domains 
that are at the same time overlapping and disjoint with near-term potential 
applications.  In other words, there are problem domains that have no current 
overlap with practical purposes.  But the means for exploring these domains, 
however, are very likely to have overlaps.  Hence, there is no reverse causation 
from practical pursuits to, say, the pursuit of Higgs’ boson or string theory for 
example. But if there are specific tests of string theory hypotheses to be made the 
problem domains relevant for making tools for performing these tests are likely to 
overlap with practical problem domains. Learning gains for private firms by 
developing state-of-the-art technologies for high energy physics were recently 
demonstrated by Autio, Erkko, M. Streit-Bianchi, and Ari-Pakka Hameri (Autio, 
Streit-Bianchi, and Hameri 2003) 
 
Then, the concept of “entrepreneurial university” (Etzkowitz 2001), as an 
institution that emphasizes its ‘third’ mission of contributing to the economy as 
much as its teaching and research missions, can be borrowed and applied to 
knowledge-seekers institutions. In terms of science and technology policy, 
Etzkowitz’s words can be used as a recommendation to policy-makers to drive 
and direct research centers to make “entrepreneurship […] compatible with the 
conduct of basic research through a legitimating theme that integrates the two 
activities into a complementary relationship” (Etzkowitz 1998). The idea is that 
the present trend of a re-organization of the research environment, which is 
becoming a hybrid of traditional academic research and the knowledge-based 
                                                 
25 The case of EGEE (Enabling Grids for E-SciencE), a huge IT project funded by the EC under 
the 6th FP and coordinated by CERN, is a good example of industrial interest towards academic 
research. Among the industrial users in the forum, there are representatives of some of the leading 
companies, and not only of the IT sector: Microsoft, IBM, Alcatel, HP, Fujitsu, Oracle, Sun 
Microsytems, Vodaphone, France Telecom, Novartis, Sanofi-Aventis, Total, Renault, Michelin, 
Airbus, and many others. 
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economy, should be orchestrated at the European level, with the understanding 
that “collegial recognition will remain an important normative element for 
academic researchers, together with entrepreneurialism and societal 
accountability” (Benner and Sandstrom 2000, p. 300). 
 
In terms of science and technology policy, also some other interpretations can be 
proposed on the base of the results of the study.  
As shown by Cohen and Levinthal 1989, in-house R&D efforts are important 
because they allow the firm to create new knowledge, but also because it enhances 
their ‘absorptive capacity’, i.e. their capability to assimilate, understand and 
exploit external knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal 1989). This same absorptive 
capacity must be present in basic research centers. Researchers from these centers 
can form the base for a pool of informed producers and users of knowledge, from 
which the industrial sector can draw specialized personnel.  
“Firms also look to universities as a source of technology as well as trained 
personnel. Local and regional government also view local universities in a 
new light as a potential source of contribution to the economy through the 
formation of start-up firms” (Etzkowitz 1994, p. 11). 
Scientists working in front-edge research are in a privileged position, from where 
they can first identify technologies which might be useful for industrial 
applications and thus provide a competitive advantage to the European industry 
sector, much in accordance with the objectives of the Lisbon strategy. 
Spill-overs are but a form of technology transfer in its broader definition and are 
valued by firms, universities and governments. The case of CERN is but one of 
the many publicly funded European research centers that are recognized world-
wide excellence. Spill-overs from basic research centers are also possible and 
should be better studied and understood as well as sustained by European S&T 
policy. 
 
Finally, in terms of science and technology policy, the results obtained are in 
accordance with the attributes of knowledge production in Mode II – knowledge 
produced in the context of application, trans-disciplinarity, heterogeneity and 
organizational diversity, social accountability and reflexivity, quality control – 
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which can also all be recognized in the case of basic research centers. The results 
are consistent with the proposition that nowadays there is a new method (Mode II) 
of producing knowledge, where knowledge is generated in “broader, trans-
disciplinary social and economic contexts” (Gibbons et al. 1994, p. 1). 
 
2. Intermediate level 
The results presented in the previous chapter can be interpreted as a tangible clue 
that researchers do show attitudes towards entrepreneurial behaviour. This forms 
the base for the sharecropping model proposition to explain how the relationship 
between Laboratory and its research staff might be interpreted when technology 
transfer is a complementary part of the job of scientists.  
It was also hypothesized that in a basic research centre interested to engage in TT 
activities, output is a function of both in-house effort e and collaboration with 
industry θ. The questionnaire showed that collaboration with industry is an 
activity that researchers do find desirable. 
 
The results of the questionnaire on CERN staff are in accordance with a trend that 
has been theorized upon and recorded by a number of authors, whose 
contributions have been highlighted in the literature chapter and in the theoretical 
chapter. See, for example, participation to networks  - par. 1.3.1., chapt. 2 - as a 
form of technology transfer (Nelson 1993; Chataway 1999; Senker 1992; Harmon 
et al. 1997; Shane 2002b); process of capitalization of knowledge – par. 3.1, 
chapt. 2 - (Etzkowitz 1998; Stephan and Everhart 1998; Geuna 2001); 
entrepreneurialism of researchers – par. 3.3, chapt.2 – (Etzkowitz 1998; Walter, 
Auer, and Gemunden 2002; 2001; Etzkowitz et al. 2000; Lee 1996; Scott 1998; 
Autio et al. 1996). 
 
All these works show that there is a growing interest by researchers to transfer 
their knowledge to the “outside” world. If this is true, then the sharecropping 
model and the hypothesis of total output interpreted as the sum of output from 
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research and technology transfer activities can both be extendable in general to 
any research center and not only to the case of CERN. 
 
2.1 Research activities, technology transfer 
activities, outputs and costs 
 
Independently from CERN particular situation, this means that nowadays in a 
research centre where both research and TT activities are implemented, the lab 
general output (Ytot) can be expressed as really being a function of both research 
AND technology transfer, or better it is given by both the output from research 
activities (YR) and the output from TT activities (YTT), so Ytot = f(YR, YTT).  
When this is the case, different types of relations can be hypothesized to come 
into being between research and technology transfer output affecting total output. 
Costs are intended as total costs, made up of personnel costs – given by wages in 
the form of a threshold contract – personnel selection costs, fixed costs, and all 
costs generally sustained by a research laboratory. 
 
 
Additive relation between output from research and output from TT 
The first possibility is that there is an additive relation, i.e. output from research 
and output from TT activities add to each other, but there is no interference 
between them, which means that the two activities are not directly related to each 
other.  
Focusing entirely on outputs and abstracting from costs changes for the moment,  
total output Ytot will be the sum of the two activities YR and YTT, and its overall 
increase or decrease will depend on the sign and the dimension of the two. “θ” 
indicates the point of the threshold contract where, for a collaboration with 
industry higher than a certain amount θ0, the researcher can be rewarded with a 
monetary prize. 
This is the typical case of complementarity. 
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Substitutive relation between output from research and output from TT 
The second possible relation is that there might be a substitutive relation between 
output from research activities and output from TT activities.  
Total output is always a function of YR and YTT. In this case, if output from one 
activity increases, output from the other decreases as there is a direct interference 
between the two activities on each other. Here, too, the focus is entirely on 
outputs effects, so costs are supposed not to change for simplicity sake. 
This is the typical case of a substitution effect. 
The substitution effect might be complete (i.e. Ytot remains the same) or partial, in 
which case the total output might increase or decrease depending on the relative 













Multiplicative relation between output from research and output from TT 
The third possibility is that there is a multiplicative relation between output from 
research activities and output from TT activities.  
Here there is an interference between the two activities in the sense that engaging 
in one will improve the possibilities and/or capabilities of engaging into the other, 
in the sense of the user-producer absorptive capacity. In this case the total output 
will increase as a result of the two activities YR and YTT, where YTT itself is 
dependant from the output of pure research activities (YR). Basically, doing 
research provides the means (both practical and intellectual) to engage in TT 
activities that might not be undergone if research is not done. This means that 
output from TT activities is directly connected to additional research output. 










A kind of “industrial” effect on selection costs 
In this case, the focus is entirely on costs. Here a kind of “industrial” effect on 
total costs can be hypothesized in the sense that the fact of engaging in technology 
transfer activities and of keeping in place a fixed-term threshold contract for 
researchers allows to test them in order to see who, among them, are the really 
valuable resources, without actually having to hire all of them.  
The fact that some – and only some – researchers engage in TT activities, can be 
used as an indicator (maybe together with publications and research results) of 
which researchers are the most productive. And this actually becomes part of the 



















Synthesis towards a more realistic depiction 
In a more realistic situation, whereas the case of additive relation is probably too 
simplicistic and the case of substitutive relation is probably screened out by the 
organization statute, it might well be that the proper situation might be pictured by 
an intertwining of the multiplicative and the industrial relation. This means taking 
into account the absorptive capacity given by also engaging in TT activities and 
the selection costs effect. 
This can be visualized as in the following figure, where total output increases and 















Figure 5.5 – A possibly more realistic depiction 
 
 
This would mean that a research center can increase its revenues from non-
governmental incomes. Such a case would also give the laboratory a better public 
justification for its costs. But it could also be a double-edged weapon, because 
institutional funders might find it a justification for lowering funds. At the same 
time, this provides a justification to the utilization of fixed-term threshold 




In terms of sharecropping, the problem is whether a fixed-term threshold contract 
is considered by the researcher a good enough incentive. In effect, the results 
showed that financial incentives are considered important by researchers to 
engage in technology transfer activities. If researchers are not motivated enough 
to engage in technology transfer, they not only will not participate to TT 
activities, but they might retain information about transferable technologies, thus 
creating an information asymmetry. This means that they would stick to strictly 








therefore no additional input can be redistributed because there is no additional 
input.  
 
Such a case might be seen as a principal-agent situation. And, if we were to 
analyze whether the best environment for TT was with the previous contract 
(where researchers would get a share of eventual TT outcomes) or with the 
present researchers’ contract (where researchers eventually get a monetary prize 
or a career advancement), we would need to solve for two different principal-
agent problems. It is not within the scope of this work to say which of two 
contract schemes is the best one, but it does make sense to highlight the fact that 
such a point should be studied in the future. 
 
In the case of past contract scheme, there would be a maximization problem, 
where the principal (CERN) has to maximize its utility in appropriating the value 
of innovation spurring from TT in a situation in which the researchers’ wage is a 
function of the output q, which in turn is a function of in-house effort e and 
collaboration with industry θ. Therefore, we have: 
q(e, θ) 
w(q(e, θ)) 
and the maximization problem is: 
max EUCERN (q(ẽ, θ) – w(q(ẽ, θ))) 
subject to the incentive compatibility constraint, to give the agent (the researcher) 
an incentive to choose the desired effort ẽ: 
ẽ = eargmax EUres(e, w(q(e, θ))) 
and the participation constraint: 
EUres(ẽ, w(q(ẽ, θ))) ≥ Ū 
where Ū is the utility below which the agent will not participate, the so-called 
reservation utility. 
 
Whereas, at present the maximization problem is given by: 
max EUCERN (q(e, θ) – ŵ(e, θ)) 
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where ŵ(e) is the function that makes the agent just willing to accept the contract, 
so that 
Ures(e, w(e, θ)) = Ū. 
The problem here is that the researchers wage is given by a threshold contract 
which sets w(e, θ<θ0) = w(e) and w(e, θ>θ0) = wO, which means a flat wage for 
low levels of collaboration with industry θ plus a bonus if collaboration at least 
reaches θ0. 
 
Visually, this can be expressed as the absence of technology transfer from the 
depiction of normal running of a basic research laboratory. 
 





At this point there is no gain for anybody, not even for the landlord. On the 
contrary, at the public and political level, for a research center to have a TT office 
that does not fully exploit the center’s potential, might be seen as a negative point, 
even when it is not an infrastructure problem, but an internal policy problem. 
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A good incentive for researchers might be to reinvest part of the TT income at 
least on the researcher’s group, if not on the researcher himself. 
 
2.3 A “patching” organization 
As seen in chapter 2, Jacob and Hellstrom (2003) apply some corporate 
organizational models to universities. Among these, they propose the idea of a 
“patching” university where “one may combine existing activities to create critical 
mass and cash flow (e.g. when departments temporarily join forces in larger 
project bids) or one may strategically exit existing businesses and re-stitch those 
resources into new areas” (Jacob and Hellström 2003) 
The concept of “patching university” can interestingly be applied to basic research 
centers in terms of strategy. In the case of CERN, for example, the Laboratory 
somehow already uses this kind of approach, as different research groups work 
once for a project, once for another, joining forces according to the competences 
needed to achieve the research goal. The same holds true for the researchers 
and/or groups called to be involved in TT activities. This allows CERN to have a 
high potential mobility, which might be more profitably used for TT purposes. 
Basic research centers could well absorb the concept of “patching” organization, 
without applying it to its fullest. That is, by making use of “mobile” human 
resources, within the organization researchers can be used to co-operate with 
different units in order to reach specific goals. By shaping and applying the idea 
of “mobile” human resources to the co-operation with industry, research centers 
would allow their researchers to more freely work with industry as needs arise and 
facilitate the process by which industry can get scientists as consultants. In this 
way, researchers could be seen as resources which are stitched and re-stitched as 




3. Individual level 
The precedent discussion holds true if the overall hypothesis that among 
researchers employed by the Lab there is a general interest towards collaborating 
with industry might be sustained as was the case of the results showed in the 
previous chapter. 
From those results, some general conclusions might be drawn concerning the 
factors hypothesized to explain the entrepreneurial behaviour of researchers. 
 
3.1 Recognition by peers  
It was seen (table 4.1) that the variable research credit had significant and positive 
correlations only to two items of entrepreneurial behaviour. Concerning EB by the 
Organization as desired and judged by the respondents, recognition by peers was 
correlated exclusively to the perception that a close CERN-industry collaboration 
would not result in conflict of interest between research and business activities.  
The fact that this variable is not significantly correlated to any other item 
expressing EB by CERN is an indication that – expressed in the terms used in the 
questionnaire – recognition by peers is either not well captured or that recognition 
by peers is not correlated to normative positions towards entrepreneurial 
behaviour at the Organization level.  
However, the fact that patenting – as an activity that can give credit at least 
equally to refereed journal articles – has a positive and significant correlation to 
the choice of academic career as an alternative to employment in CERN, might be 
interpreted as showing that the perception of scientists being involved in patenting 
does not impact negatively any more on their academic tenure, at least from the 
point of view of the interviewed researchers.  
In this sense, it might be argued that a shift in evaluative norms of the scientific 
community can be observed  as going in the direction proposed by Etzkowitz 
(1998, 2001), Lee (1996) and others, that the scientific community is increasingly 
accepting claims of priority that are covered by IPR protection or exploited on the 
market. 
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However, it must be noted that also in the case of EB at the individual level, only 
one significant correlation could be observed.  
All in all, recognition by peers does not result as a variable having much 
correlation to attitudes towards entrepreneurial behaviour. So, hypothesis one that 
there is a positive relation between recognition by peers and EB by researchers 
can not be confirmed given that not enough significant results were obtained. 
 
3.2 Networks  
As seen in table 4.2, networks in which the researcher is embedded have many 
and significant positive correlations to desired EB by CERN in terms of a close 
CERN-industry collaboration not causing any disruption of the Organization 
institutional asset and mission. The same holds true for desired EB by the Lab in 
the future. 
Thus hypothesis 2 that there is a positive relation between network’s assessment 
of EB and the researcher’s norms about entrepreneurial behaviour at CERN level 
is confirmed for general networks. 
Networks also show significant and positive correlations to career alternatives 
either in industry or self-employment. Particularly so when there is a good 
perception of entrepreneurship or industry in the network the researcher belongs 
to – respectively 0,353*** and 0,334** for corporate career; and 0,385*** and 
0,293** for entrepreneurial career. Researchers seem to be eventually interested 
to careers in industry when their networks hold positive views of such careers. 
Therefore hypothesis 2 is confirmed also at the individual level for general 
networks. This is in accordance with the recognized importance of networks for 
research and technology transfer activities (Gibbons et al. 1994; David, Foray, 
and Steinmueller 1997) as well as with the possibility for networks to introduce 
new behaviours in research organizations (Hoddeson 1980). 
A much looser correlation was found in the case of CERN network, where among 
the different significant results only one was really strong, expressing that a 
perceived supportive environment towards staff being involved in contract 
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research with industry was correlated (0,387***) to unlikeness of conflict of 
interests between research and business activities at CERN. 
So, for CERN networks, hypothesis 2 can not be confirmed neither at CERN level 
nor at the individual level. 
 
3.3 Prior knowledge  
Previous work experience does show a correlation to desired EB by CERN; in 
particular, it impacts on the Lab asset. Previous experience in consulting has 
consistently positive correlation to collaboration between the Lab and industry as 
not causing disruption of mission nor research activities. Experience in 
administration was the case of just one respondent, experience in manufacturing 
was the case of only 4 respondents, whereas many of them had experience in 
university or in other sectors. Consulting experience is positively correlated to 
entrepreneurial career alternative and negatively to academic career. 
So, hypothesis 3 that there is a positive relation between the researcher’s prior 
knowledge interpreted as work experience and his/her entrepreneurial behaviour 
holds true in the case of a previous work experience in entrepreneurial activities 
such as consulting. So the hypothesis should be restated as there is a relation 
between the researcher’s prior work experience and his/her entrepreneurial 
behaviour, AND such relation is a positive one when the prior experience is in 
self-employment AND possibly in industry at large. 
Prior knowledge of business – as shown in table 4.4 – in almost all significant 
cases (six out of 8 cases) has negative correlation to desired EB at the CERN 
level. So hypothesis 3 is rejected as the correlation is generally a negative one. At 
the individual level, the correlation is not significant enough, except for the case 
of academic career, where all kinds of previous business experience (but self-
employment) are positively correlated to it. It would seem that previous 
experience in industry makes a career in university attractive. It would be 
interesting to see if it is because of status, recognition or security that this career 
results as a desirable alternative. 
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3.4 Field of research 
When basic research accounts for most of the researcher’s activity, there is a 
negative and significant correlation to entrepreneurial activities in which CERN 
should get involved. Consistently, at the individual level corporate career is not 
seen as a desirable activity, as shown by the negative correlation, whereas 
academic career is positively and significantly correlated. 
So in case of basic research as main activity hypothesis 4 that there is a positive 
relation between field of research in which the researchers is involved and his/her 
entrepreneurial activities must be rejected. This is somewhat consistent with the 
fact that basic research does not account for a large share of activity in industry 
and self-employment, in this sense EB is not consistent with an interest in pure 
science.  
When applied research is the researcher’s main activity, a positive and significant 
correlation (p<0,01) is present to desired entrepreneurial behaviour by the Lab in 
form of setting up incubators and encouragement of consulting activities by staff, 
but no significant correlation was found towards commercialization of research 
results. So in the case of applied research, hypothesis 4 can be confirmed for 
desired EB at CERN level, especially in the form of consulting and of help to set 
up new firms, because in these cases researchers can play a role in further 
developing the product, whereas in case of commercialization such a role would 
be much smaller. A positive and significant (p<0,01) correlation was present in 
case of corporate career as an alternative to a job at the research center. So in the 
case of applied research, hypothesis 4 can be confirmed for desired EB at the 
individual level, in the form of corporate career, where the researcher can be 
employed to help passing from applied to pre-competitive development of the 
product/process. 
Finally, prototyping as a main activity is significantly and positively correlated 
only to the perception that CERN should commercialize its research. So, in case 
of prototyping hypothesis 4 can be confirmed for desired EB at CERN, in the 
form of commercialization of research.  
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3.5 Incentives  
CERN incentives are positively correlated to careers alternatives in industry, 
public sector and university but not significantly correlated to entrepreneurship, as 
if incentives provided by CERN are not sufficient to interest researchers to create 
spin-offs on the base of their acquired knowledge. Another possibility might be 
that not all CERN incentives were correctly identified. Whereas this might still be 
a possibility, it should however be noticed that there are such few cases of spin-
offs that this is still probably an area where improvements should be considered in 
CERN technology transfer policy. In this light, whereas the existence of 
institutional incentives, as exemplified by the Bayh-Doyle Act (Mowery et al. 
2001) is in place, their effectiveness could not be proved. 
 
In the case of general incentives, instead, all of them are positively and 
significantly correlated to encourage consulting activities by CERN staff. 
Moreover, all incentives were also positively correlated to a career alternative in 
industry and also all of them, but bonuses, are positively correlated to an 
alternative entrepreneurial career. Incentives in the form of bonuses are coherently 
in a negative correlation to a career in university.  
 
These results are consistent with the recognition that material and immaterial 
incentives can contribute to researchers’ entrepreneurial behaviour (Walter, Auer, 
and Gemunden 2002).  
 
 
3.6 Factors affecting entrepreneurial behaviour of 
researchers 
Summing up the above discussion, the theoretical framework proposed in chapter 
4 can graphically be depicted as in the figure below on the base of the results 
obtained. Dotted lines are intended to show factors that were not found to be 
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statistically significant and therefore can not be considered to affect desired 
entrepreneurial behaviour of researchers. 
 
Figure 5.7 – Desired entrepreneurial behaviour of researchers. 
 
 
Hypotheses were confirmed, both at the individual level and at CERN level, that 
the desired entrepreneurial behaviour is correlated to general networks, general 
incentives, to prior experience in consulting and to applied research as main field 
of activity. Such correlations could not be confirmed in the case of recognition by 
peers, of CERN networks and of CERN incentives.  
 
3.7 Descriptive statistics: perception of TT at 
CERN, indication of desired entrepreneurial 
behaviour and career alternatives 
 
 144
3.7.1 Impact of technology transfer policy on CERN 
researchers 
Figure 4.1 summarized answers directly concerning technology transfer at CERN. 
In terms of perceived impact of TT and TT policy, 89% of the respondents said 
that the creation and existence of the technology transfer service did not change 
their interaction modalities with industry, and 87% said that the introduction of a 
pro-active technology transfer policy did not change their attitude towards it. 
From the organizational point of view, the fact that such a vast majority expressed 
no changes deriving from the introduction of TT policy and service at CERN – 
while being aware of its existence (77%) – is an indication that somehow the 
concept of technology transfer has not been “metabolized” by the researchers. In 
face of the resulting over-all general interest towards collaborating with industry, 
it almost seems as if collaborations with industry at the individual level and TT at 
the organization level are perceived as two disjoined concepts and activities. 
Worth of note is also the statement by 58% of respondents that financial 
incentives would motivate them to transfer technology, something that is in 
contradiction with the unsure financial rewards in terms of the actual TTP in place 
at the Lab. 
 
3.7.2 Perception of TT activities at CERN and impact of 
international status 
The international status of CERN researchers implies that for any activity in 
which staff is involved that may provide financial gains, the person has to ask and 
be granted a special permission by the Director General. In figure 4.2, it is 
interesting to note that 49% of researchers declared themselves indifferent to the 
fact that international officer status holds back people at CERN from engaging in 
entrepreneurial activities. Whereas 24% of respondents said they strongly disagree 
with this, while another 24% said they agree (the remaining 3% is given by those 
who didn’t answer the question).  
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It might be argued that this might not be widely known, even though staff rules 
are issued to everybody who is under contract with CERN. This is a point that 
should be addressed by the Lab’s governing bodies. 
Connected to this topic are the results showed in table 4.9, where twelve people 
out of over one-hundred have worked on research projects with industry outside 
of CERN; fifteen people have been consultants outside of contracts formally 
signed by the organization and anther eighteen people have been involved either 
in professional training, patenting, aiding in the creation of spin-offs or some 
other kind of activity. This can be interpreted as a tangible clue that researchers do 
show attitudes towards entrepreneurial behaviour. Therefore the overall 
hypothesis that among researchers employed by the Lab there is a general interest 
towards collaborating with industry might well be sustained.  
 
In the same figure, a more positive result for the work of the TT group is given by 
the answers to the item “I am aware that CERN has a clear policy regarding the 
intellectual ownership of ideas developed during research”. In this case, 45% of 
respondents agreed with the statement, 33% declared themselves indifferent, 
whereas 20% disagreed. Whereas the one third of “indifferent” respondents might 
be identified as those not interested in collaborating with industry, a much more 
careful attention should be paid to the 20% that said that they don’t agree with the 
fact Lab’s policy towards IPRs  is clear. This percentage does show that TT policy 
still has to be more widely spread among the personnel or, at least, presented in a 
more easily understandable way. 
 
Finally, when asked to express agreement or disagreement with the statement that 
at CERN there is a well functioning infrastructure in place to support technology 
transfer, the very high majority of researchers answered that they were indifferent, 
an additional 20% said that they did not agree, whereas only 12% approved of the 
TT infrastructure in place in the organization.  
Here again a 20% of respondents saying that the TT infrastructure is not perceived 
as being well functioning is a point worth of closer inspection by the TT group. It 
would be important to understand if this opinion is given by a difficult circulation 
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of information or if the perceived problem is that respondents do not believe the 
infrastructure to be appropriate for their needs.  
In all cases, it seems that there is space for an improvement in communication 
with the personnel in regards to technology transfer matters. 
 
3.7.3 Indication of desired entrepreneurial behaviour at CERN 
level 
When asked whether CERN should commercialize its research by more strongly 
support its TT office, 35% of researchers agreed and 8% strongly agreed with the 
statement, although a 32% of respondents said to de indifferent and 25% 
disagreed with it (as seen in Figure 4.3). In a similar way the statement that CERN 
should set up its own incubators to help start-up new technology-based businesses 
was met with approval by 48% of respondents (between “agree” and “strongly 
agree”), whereas 26% declared themselves indifferent and another 26% disagreed 
with this idea. 
Finally, the statement that CERN should encourage its staff to provide consulting 
services to private firms was the one met by the highest share of agreement: 45% 
of them agreed and 7% strongly agreed, whereas 25% was indifferent and only 
23% disagreed with this opinion.  
These results all show that the relative majority of the researchers involved in the 
study did show a real interest – at least at the intentions level – in collaborating in 
various ways with the industrial sector. This again is in good accordance with the 
literature supporting the claim that nowadays researchers do not want to live in an 
“ivory tower” anymore, but, on the contrary, they do think that there should be 
connections with the world outside the boundaries of their research laboratory. In 
this sense, it might be claimed that the concept of pure science as an “ivory tower” 
can now be considered obsolete. 
 
3.7.4 Career alternatives selected as desirable by respondents 
In terms of career alternatives, 86% of respondents preferred a career in the 
academy, the second best was a corporate career (72%), then a position in the 
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public sector (67%) and finally an entrepreneurial career (63%), as shown in 
figure 4.4.  
What is interesting to note is that – even though the entrepreneurial option is the 
one had the lowest number of preferences in absolute term, as might be expected 
– and it is also the one with the highest number of respondents not finding it 
desirable (36%), but it also is the one with the highest share of moderate 
attractiveness, as 41% of the researchers find it attractive. Together with the fact 
that corporate career was the second more desired alternative, this data shows that 
industry is interesting for modern researchers, who do not seem afraid by the 
notion of being at stake. 
 
4. Further research 
This study intended to focus on whether a researcher has a desired entrepreneurial 
behaviour defined as his interest in filing patents, copyrights, trademarks, licenses, 
proprietary rights on the products of research as well as their interaction with the 
industrial and commercial sector, in form of consultancy, equity shares in 
companies, creation of spin-offs, professional training to industry, etc. 
In the context of this thesis, a researcher was defined as having an Entrepreneurial 
Behaviour not necessarily by being an entrepreneur (i.e. owing its own firm), but 
also by being active towards technology transfer and partnership with industry, 
thus adapting the concept of entrepreneurial university (Etzkowitz 2003) to the 
researcher, who becomes an “entrepreneurial researcher”. 
 
Given the results obtained, further research might be undergone on whether the 
factors hypothesized and showed to be influential on CERN researchers also 
prove influential on researchers of other laboratories. This would allow testing if 
the identified factors – drawn from different areas of studies – are meaningful for 
the singular case of CERN, or if they are so also for other research centers, in 
which case they might be used as part of a general model explaining 
entrepreneurial behaviour of researchers. 
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It was not within the scope of the thesis to study what actually happens in terms of 
real technology transfer at CERN. It was intentionally not taken into account what 
kinds of TT activities are successful, or what kinds of technology have been 
licensed to industry, or which type of researchers actually become entrepreneurs, 
and so on and so forth. 
Whereas similar studies already exist in case of a number of research institutions, 
further research might try to combine the individual and the institutional 
approach. Further studies might try to assess what effectively happens in terms of 
actual technology transfer when researchers are showing entrepreneurial 
behaviour as compared to when no such behaviour is observed. 
Studies might also try to assess whether the previously presented relations can be 
proved realistic or not, both in the case of CERN and of other research 
laboratories. Further research could also address the question if technology 
transfer can benefit from different incentives schemes and different contract 




From all of the above it seems to be quite clear that researchers interviewed do not 
respond anymore to the old cliché of isolated scientists only interested in pure 
science and not willing to have anything to do with industry. Collaborating with 
industry does not define a researcher as a B-category researcher and the utility – if 
not the necessity – of research and industry collaborating even in the case of pure 
knowledge seeker organizations is a possibility which is not hindered by 
researchers. 
However, in order for technology transfer to function, some aspects should be 
kept in consideration: when a TT infrastructure exists, it has to be actively 
supported by the institutional government body; researchers must be made aware 
of the existence and functioning of the infrastructure and TT policy on a 
compulsory base, not only on a self-training base (i.e. it is part of the information 
given to all new and old researchers), some kind of incentive must be provided to 
researchers to engage in TT activities. 
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Conclusions – Entrepreneurial Scientists 
 
In the last decades much attention was paid to technology transfer activities 
undertaken by universities and research centers. Authors also turned their research 
to the effect these activities had on faculty and the research community at large. 
Different views emerged as to the reason why academic scientists turned to 
entrepreneurial activities. Some authors proposed that scientists may be becoming 
increasingly entrepreneurs because of the prospect of financial. It was suggested 
that, in times of financial constraints, researchers become concerned to access 
additional funds for research through formal links with industry. On the other 
side, the idea that technology transfer and scientists’ entrepreneurialism are 
motivated by shrinking budgets alone has found some opposition, justified by the 
fact that income from TT is very modest compared to governmental funds. 
 
Therefore, the justification for researchers’ entrepreneurialism should be looked 
for at a different level. The most interesting proposition is that researchers’ 
support of entrepreneurial activities can partly be explained by a restructuring of 
the evaluative norms for scientific performance (Etzkowitz 1998, 2001; Lee 
1996). This shift in evaluative norms would allow individual scientists to aim at 
two goals simultaneously: scientific excellence and profit making. Scientists are 
proposed to no longer believe in the necessity of an isolated ivory tower. On the 
contrary, academic scientists want partnerships with industry where they can still 
do cutting edge research and publishing, having at the same time adequate 
funding and participation in high-technology areas. 
 
In analyzing organizational models for European research centers, all of the above 
must be kept into account. This means that centers have to remain faithful to their 
founding mission. Also, as their funding comes from governments, an agreement 
must be found on how incomes from “licensable” knowledge should be 
appropriated. At the same time, guidelines of EU policy must be respected and 
applied, but also public accountability should be considered. Finally, researchers’ 
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goals and objectives are part of the organization’s operative functioning as are 
variations in researchers’ general behaviour and attitude. 
 
At the intermediate level, I proposed that that the organization of a European basic 
research center could be as that of a knowledge seeker organization, where – 
mediated by public and EU accountability – Technology Transfer is a 
complementary activity to the research mission; this complementary activity has 
to be mediated by the eventual entrepreneurialism of the researchers, which 
should continue to do basic research, but also be allowed – if interested – to get 
involved with TT. 
It was also argued that the actual organization of technology transfer at research 
Lab such as CERN can be paralleled to the classical sharecropping organization in 
agriculture. In the parallel, the Lab is the landlord, as it owns the infrastruture 
(=the field) to undertake the research; the researcher is the worker, who uses the 
assets to do his/her research; incentives are present for both the Lab and the 
researcher to transfer technology to the industrial sector when economical 
revenues are shared between the two. Risks are borne only by the research center 
alone, as the researcher receives at least a fixed wage. Plus, there is an asymmetry 
of information because the Lab is not able to perfectly observe the input provided 
by the researcher and it is the researcher in primis who is in the position to 
understand what technologies might be transferable. It is for this reason that the 
incentive issue becomes particularly important. If the researcher is not motivated 
enough, he will not necessarily make the information available to CERN, falling 
back to the classical moral hazard problem. 
That is why it is important to understand what researchers think of a traditionally 
research-only organization becoming involved in TT activities. If the general 
attitude of researchers turns out to be indifferent, or even adverse, to technology 
transfer, its effects are felt at the organizational level, and technology transfer 
might become a sterile and shallow expression.  
 
Both the organizational model of a knowledge seeker institution and of 
sharecropping give relevance to the figure of the researcher. In both of them, the 
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researcher is an active part in what happens both in the institution and in the TT 
process.  
The definition I adopted throughout the thesis is that the Entrepreneurial 
Behaviour of the researchers is their interest (both at the practical and theoretical 
level) in filing patents, copyrights, trademarks, licenses, proprietary rights on the 
products of research as well as their interaction with the industrial and commercial 
sector, in form of consultancy, equity shares in companies, creation of spin-offs, 
professional training to industry, etc. In easier terms, Entrepreneurial Behaviour is 
a researcher’s interest to collaborate with industry. 
 
I proposed that factors influencing a researcher’s entrepreneurial behaviour were 
recognized to be the following: 
- Recognition by peers 
- Networks 
- Prior knowledge 
- Field of research 
- Incentives from CERN 
Whereas the two factors identified as ‘Recognition by peers’ and ‘Networks’ 
represent a connection between the individual researcher and the community in 
which s/he is embedded, the factors identified as ‘Prior knowledge’ and ‘Field of 
research’ represent the more characteristic aspects of each person as an individual. 
Finally, the ‘Incentives from CERN’ factor wants to identify a connection 
between the researcher and the specific organization into which s/he works and to 
which s/he is under contract. An additional factor was identified as being the 
‘Individual’s character’, but it was taken as a given. 
 
In order to test what factors correlate to entrepreneurial behaviour of researchers, 
a questionnaire was handed out to the selected population. Perceived 
entrepreneurial behaviour at the level of CERN, but always from the point of view 
of the researchers, was defined as a) a series of activities that are presently done 
by the organization with industry, about which the researcher was asked to 
express a judgement on the opportunity of the Lab engaging in such activities and 
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the perceived impact of such activities on the Lab environment; b) a series of 
activities with industry that – according to the researcher – CERN should engage 
into.  
Entrepreneurial behaviour at the level of the researcher was identified as 
expressing what career alternative he/she would choose outside working at 
entrepreneurial behaviour CERN. 
 
Statistical analysis on the questionnaires results can be summarized as: 
- The hypothesis that there is a positive relation between recognition by 
peers and EB by researchers can not be confirmed or rejected; 
- The hypothesis that there is a positive relation between network’s 
assessment of EB and the researcher’s desired EB is confirmed at all levels 
for general networks, but is rejected for CERN network as not being 
coherent; 
- The hypothesis that there is a positive relation between the researcher’s 
prior knowledge and his EB is confirmed in case of consulting experience, 
but is rejected in case of prior experience in business; 
- The hypothesis that there is a positive correlation between the type of field 
of research and EB is confirmed, but in the case of prototyping; 
- The hypothesis that incentives are positively correlated to EB is confirmed 
for general incentives, but not for CERN incentives. 
 
On these bases, it can be maintained that there is evidence of EB by researchers. 
Prior knowledge and field of research, and general networks and incentives are 
correlated to entrepreneurial behaviour, whereas CERN networks and incentives 
do not show coherency.  
 
The research questions can now be answered. Concerning the first issue, 
researchers do show an interest towards entrepreneurial behaviour both at the 
individual and at the organizational level. Moreover, they do not see these 
research and entrepreneurialism as conflicting activities. On the contrary, they do 
see them as complementary activities that could be carried out at the individual 
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level in form of consulting (which should be encouraged by the organization) and 
the Laboratory level (which would not be swayed from its mission by closer 
collaboration with industry). Finally, there are incentives that might encourage 
researchers to engage in technology transfer activities, and those are mainly, but 
not only, financial incentives. 
 
The questionnaire showed that collaboration with industry is an activity that 
researchers do find desirable. The results of the questionnaire on CERN staff are 
in accordance with a trend that has been theorized upon and recorded by a number 
of authors. And the fact that CERN-related factors were not significant allows 
interpreting the results in a wider perspective.  
 
At the organizational level, the center’s engagement in technology transfer can be 
described as an intertwining of the multiplicative and the industrial relations, thus 
taking into account the absorptive capacity given by also engaging in TT activities 
and the selection costs effect. In terms of sharecropping, it was demonstrated that 
researchers feel that technology transfer outcomes should be shared between 
themselves and the organization, at which moment they are will to engage in TT 
activities, thus up-holding the proposition that TT process might be described as a 
form of sharecropping. Basic research centers could also absorb the concept of 
“patching” organization, by making use of “mobile” human resources to co-
operate in various forms with industry as needs arise. In this way, researchers 
could be seen as resources which are stitched and re-stitched as required on a case 
to case base.  
 
Researchers’ interest towards collaborations with industry, drove me to infer that, 
from the point of view of science policy research, a partial revival of the linear 
model, integrated by a reshaped reward system allowing scientists to get credit 
also for entrepreneurial activities, may be proposed. In the case of basic research, 
there are problem domains that have no current overlap with practical purposes, 
but the means for exploring these domains, however, are very likely to have 
overlaps.   
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This means that the concept of “entrepreneurial university” by Etzkowitz could be 
borrowed and applied to knowledge-seekers institutions, which could now be 
interpreted as institutions that can emphasize a ‘third’ mission of contributing to 
the economy, as much as their research and knowledge diffusion missions,. 
 
In these terms, the ‘commodification’ of knowledge can be seen as a category of 
scientific activity and boundaries can be examined between this activity and the 
activities devoted to accumulating status (standing) within the scientific 
community. The willingness and ability of the scientific community to accept 
claims of priority that are covered by IPR protection or that are exploited on the 
market is a potential evolution of the norms of the scientific community in 
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CERN ENTREPRENEURSHIP SURVEY 2006   
 
 
A. PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS  
 
1.  Please state your nationality:   
      
 
2.  Please state your age (in years):   
            
 
3.  Please indicate your gender  
M  F  
 
4. Please state the highest academic qualification you have achieved  
Ph.D.  
Postgraduate (Master or specialization)  
Graduate (e.g. BSc, BA)  
Other (please specify)            
  
5. Please state what is your academic background (e.g. physics, nuclear engineering, 
administration, etc.) 
      
 
6. Please state what is your field of research at CERN and your unit and division 
      
 
7.  How many publications (articles, presentations to congresses, etc.) do you do per year?   
 
      
 
 
8.  Which category best describes your current job classification 
 
Fellow  
Staff  (temporary position)  




9.  Have you previously been employed in a full-time position outside CERN?  
 




Public sector  (NOT university)  
University  






B. PREVIOUS ENTREPRENEURIAL EXPERIENCE.  
 
 
10. Have you: 
 
Family members who own/owned their own business?  
Ever started or ever owned your own business?  
Ever worked within a big business?     ( > 50 employees)  
Ever worked within a small business? ( < 50 employees)  






C.  ACADEMIC ENTREPRENEURSHIP ACTIVITIES  
 
 
11.  Since joining CERN have you had any direct contact with industry? (You may tick more than 
one answer)  
 
Yes - I approached an industrial organization for procurements  
Yes - I approached an industrial organization for R&D outside 
procurement  




12.  If yes, which of the following activities have you been involved with:   (you may tick more 
than one box) 
 With CERN 
Without 
CERN 
Participating in research projects with industry   
Patenting / licensing research results   
Consulting / provision of personal expertise    
Teaching to non-university individuals (ex.: continuing education)    
Spin-off: the formation of a new organization to exploit research results    
OTHER – please specify            
 
 
D. SUPPORTING ENVIRONMENT 
 
 
13.  How would you describe CERN environment towards its staff getting involved into:  
 Development of entrepreneurial activities 
Contract research with 
industry 
SUPPORTIVE   
NO EFFECT   




14.   Are you aware of the industrial liaison (Technology Transfer) service within CERN?  
 YES    NO  
 
15.  If  yes, have you used this service in developing external links or to protect your intellectual 
rights?  
YES    NO  
 
16.   Did the creation and existence of the Technology Transfer service change your interaction 
modalities with industry?  
YES    NO  
 
17.   Would you be motivated by financial incentives to transfer technology?  
YES    NO  
 
18.  Has your attitude changed since a proactive Technology Transfer policy was introduced at 
CERN??  




19.  On average, how are time and effort of individual staff in your unit (group) currently 
distributed among the following categories?  
  Today  % 
Basic research       
Applied research for R&D development       




E. WHAT DO YOU THINK? 
 
20.  According to you, how much research credit for tenure and/or promotion is given to a 
researcher for patentable inventions?  
Greater than or equal to a refereed journal articles   
At least equal to a refereed journal articles  
Equal to a non-refereed publication  
No research credit  
I don’t know  
 
 
21.  Personally, do you think that CERN today is working too closely (or not closely enough) with 








22.  In your view, how likely an impact may a close CERN-industry collaboration for technology 
transfer and commercialization have on the following aspects of CERN life?  
 Almost 
certain
Likely Possible Unlikely Most  
unlikely 
Displacement of CERN mission      
Loss of CERN freedom and autonomy      
Pressure for short-term research      
Reducing basic research activities      
Conflict of interest (research and business)      
 




Closely Not closely 
enough 
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Agree Indifferent Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Commercialize its research by more 
strongly support its technology transfer 
office 
     
Set up its own incubator to help start up new 
technology-based businesses      
Encourage staff to provide consulting 









Indifferent Not very 
important 
Not at all 
important
Pay/salary       
Shares in success using bonuses      
Shares in success using variable payment 
shares      
Self-realization      
Additional qualifications       
Gather experience for entry into 
industry/business       
Start and expand personal, career-supporting 
relationships      
 
 
Finally, we would like to learn about your work-related and life-related values.  
 
25.  
 Very  
good 
Good Indifferent Bad Very  
bad 
If I became an entrepreneur, my colleagues (in- 
and outside CERN) would consider it to be…      
If one of my colleagues became an entrepreneur, 
my colleagues and I would consider it to be…      
My colleagues and I would consider 
entrepreneurship as a career alternative for people 
with our professional background to be… 
     
I know many people (in- and outside CERN) who 
have successfully started up their own firm and I 
consider it to be… 
     
We consider the increasing importance of the 
industrial sector as a potential employer for 
people with my professional background to be… 







Agree Indifferent Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
At CERN, people are actively encouraged to 
pursue own ideas in application of research      
At CERN, you get to meet lots of people with 
good ideas for young firms      
The international officer status holds back 
people at CERN from engaging in 
entrepreneurial activities 
     
I am aware that CERN has a clear policy 
regarding the intellectual ownership of ideas 
developed during research  
     
There is a well functioning infrastructure in 




27.  If you could choose an alternative career, you would find attractive or not attractive:  
 








Corporate career (working for a large, 
established, private sector company)      
Civil service career (working for a 
government agency or other public sector 
agency) 
     
Entrepreneurial career (starting up and 
managing your own firm / business / 
consultancy) 
     
Academic career (working at a university 











THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR HELP AND 
KINDNESS 
 
Send it back to me        
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ANNEX II – Some general data on scientific 
researchers at CERN 
 
People at CERN 
People on CERN payroll are divided in the following categories:  
? Staff – who are divided in permanent staff, staff with Limited Duration 
(LD) contracts and staff with Fixed Term (FT) contracts; 
? Fellows – who are selected via a call and normally are young researchers; 
? Students – who are at CERN in order to complete their studies and 
typically write their dissertation (either to graduate or to get their Master 
on PhD title) on the project they are working at; 
? Apprentices – who are at CERN with a contract for professional training; 
? Paid Associates – who are from external institutions, but their professional 
activity is entirely at CERN and therefore they are partly sustained by it. 
 






Total on CERN payroll 3458
    
Unpaid associates & users 6333
Total at CERN 9791
 
In 2005, there were 3.458 people on CERN payroll. In addition to them, in the 
same year there were 6.333 people that have been at CERN for periods of time 
that go from a few months to the whole year.  
The following figure gives the percentage distribution of status at CERN. The fact 
that the majority (64%) of people working at CERN is not on its payroll is a clear 
sign of the scientific excellence and uniqueness of CERN. Such leading role is 
going to be even more important with the opening of the LHC in 2007. The LHC 
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will be the largest and most advanced collider in the world, reason why so many 
countries are participating to its creation even though they are not Member States. 
 







staff fellows students & apprentices
paid associates unpaid associates & users
 
Source: elaboration on (CERN 2006e). 
 
Distribution of personnel by job 
Personnel and users tasks at CERN are coded from one to five according to the 
following definitions: 
1 Scientific work (Experimental and Theoretical Physics) – researchers 
whose tasks are strictly embedded or connected with Physics research, 
both at the experimental level (e.g. interpretation of results) or at the 
theoretical level (e.g. theories development); 
2 Scientific and Engineering work (other than Experimental and Theoretical 
Physics) – researchers whose tasks are normally those of designing, 
implementing and running the complex machines in place at CERN; 
3 Technical work – support staff with technical competencies  
4 Manual work, Crafts and Trades – support staff. 
5 Administrative and Office work – staff with administrative tasks 
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Table A.1 – Code and Job title description of people on CERN payroll. 
Code & Job title description 
Staff 
Fell. & Paid 
Ass. Total  
  LD Indef. & 
Other 
Total % Nr. % Nr % 
1 - Scientific work (Experimental 
and Theoretical Physics) 31 42 73 3 197 31 270 8 
2 - Scientific and Engineering work 
(other than Experimental and 
Theoretical Physics) 
261 696 957 36 395 61 1352 41 
3 - Technical work 294 604 898 34 42 7 940 29 
4 - Manual work, Crafts and Trades 71 162 233 9 0 0 233 7 
5 - Administrative and Office work 172 302 474 18 9 1 483 15 
Total 829 1806 2635 100 643 100 3278 100,00 
Source: elaboration on (CERN 2006e) 
 
The highest percentage of indefinite contract personnel has scientific and 
engineering tasks, immediately followed by technical work and, at a greater 
distance, by administrative jobs. The same three tasks are the ones concerning 
most of the LD contracts, but with the difference that 294 of them have technical 
work tasks, compared to 261 of them with scientific and engineering work tasks. 
Finally, Fellows and Paid Associates are almost completely concerned with 
scientific work, both in terms of physics and engineering assignments. 
Figure A.2 – Distribution of CERN personnel by job code 
 







Fellows and Paid Associates 




















Distribution of Personnel by Job
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Age distribution of staff and fellows 
In the following figure, we can notice that while the majority of fellows are 
between 26 and 35 years old, over 34% of staff is above 51 years old. This means 
that most of permanent staff is nearing retirement age, as LD and FT personnel 
are generally younger (their average age is 35 years old). Staff above 50 years old 
is generally in a good position relative to possible career path, in terms both of 
remuneration and responsibility. 
 



























Source: elaboration on  (CERN 2006e) 
 
Gender distribution of people at CERN 
The vast majority of people at CERN, both staff and users are males. Even if at 
CERN there is an equal opportunity policy, the number of women is still 
relatively small, although it is well known that worldwide women in fields such as 
physics and engineering are few compared to their male colleagues. 
In any case, the percentage of women on CERN payroll (staff, fellows and paid 
associates.) is 23.6%, whereas of the total of people at CERN (including users and 



















On CERN payroll Total at CERN
Gender distribution
 
Source: elaboration on (CERN 2006e) 
 
Nationality distribution 
Over 44% of CERN staff (permanent, LD and FT contracts) comes from France, 
the remaining staff is distributed among the various Member States of CERN and 
only fourteen people are from Non-Member States.  
 
Figure A.5 – Nationality distribution of CERN staff 








FR GB IT DE CH BE ES NL AT SE PT DK FI PL GR NO NMS SK HU BG CZ
Country
 
Source: elaboration on (CERN 2006e). 
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The nationality distribution for the first four MS is in accordance with the fact that 
those same countries also provide the biggest shares of CERN budget. Thus, 
France, UK, Italy and Germany provide almost 71% of personnel as well as 
almost 65% of total budget. 
The nationality distribution is skewed for French personnel, but this is 
understandable given the geographical location of CERN between France and 
francophone Switzerland. In fact, a large share of French personnel is local staff 
and is employed in support and administrative jobs.  
 
 
 
